Dynamic Relational Contracts for Quality Enforcement in Supply Chains PDF Download
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Author: Mariya Bondareva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We model the interaction of a single buyer with a single supplier within a market in a developing country with homogeneous local suppliers and homogeneous buyers from developed nations. The buyer sources a product from a supplier and then inspects and sells it on the market, subject to quality standards such as regulations about chemical content. Suppliers decide how much effort to exert to ensure compliance with quality standards. Buyers are assumed to comply with con-tracts because they are based in countries with strong legal systems. We assume that legal enforcement of the supplier's contractual obligations is not possible. We model the interaction be-tween buyer and supplier as a repeated game in which the partnership can be terminated by the buyer if the supplier refuses to pay penalties for quality violations. After termination, the buyer and supplier each search for a new business partner. We model the interaction between buyer and supplier using relational contacts in which penalties for quality failures are set so that the supplier voluntarily pays them. We show that optimal relational contracts have dynamic form in this set-ting because the value of the outside option available to the parties, if the relationship is terminated, is determined by the contract terms. We characterize the properties of the optimal dynamic equilibria and analyze the use of third-party quality certifications within this framework.
Author: Mariya Bondareva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We model the interaction of a single buyer with a single supplier within a market in a developing country with homogeneous local suppliers and homogeneous buyers from developed nations. The buyer sources a product from a supplier and then inspects and sells it on the market, subject to quality standards such as regulations about chemical content. Suppliers decide how much effort to exert to ensure compliance with quality standards. Buyers are assumed to comply with con-tracts because they are based in countries with strong legal systems. We assume that legal enforcement of the supplier's contractual obligations is not possible. We model the interaction be-tween buyer and supplier as a repeated game in which the partnership can be terminated by the buyer if the supplier refuses to pay penalties for quality violations. After termination, the buyer and supplier each search for a new business partner. We model the interaction between buyer and supplier using relational contacts in which penalties for quality failures are set so that the supplier voluntarily pays them. We show that optimal relational contracts have dynamic form in this set-ting because the value of the outside option available to the parties, if the relationship is terminated, is determined by the contract terms. We characterize the properties of the optimal dynamic equilibria and analyze the use of third-party quality certifications within this framework.
Author: Michaela Isabel Höhn
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642027911
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 134
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Book Description
Supply relations are often governed by so-called relational contracts. These are informal agreements sustained by the value of future cooperation. Although relational contracts persist in practice, research on these types of contract is only emerging in Operations and Supply Chain Management. This book studies a two-firm supply chain, where repeated transactions via well-established supply contracts and continued quality-improvement efforts are governed by a relational contract. We are able to characterize an optimal relational contract, i.e., to develop policies for supplier and buyer that structure investments in quality and flexibility in a way that no other self-enforcing contract generates higher expected joint surplus. A second goal is to compare the performance of different returns mechanisms in the context of relational contracting (quantity flexibility and buy-back contracts). Industry studies motivate the presented model.
Author: Mariya Bondareva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Moral hazard
Languages : en
Pages : 171
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Book Description
"This dissertation is devoted to sustainability management in supply chains where both the monitoring of compliance and the legal enforcement of penalties are challenging. This situation is relevant to firms operating in developing countries where it is hard to make suppliers pay penalties for poor quality. Because buyers are concerned with such quality issues as nonhazardous chemical content for their products, enforceability becomes particularly important. In the first chapter, we study sustainability issues in supply chains and classify the methods used by industries to make suppliers comply with environmental requirements: integrating sustainability into products, managing manufacturing processes and managing supplier relationships. We discuss the academic literature related to the proposed taxonomy and suggest directions for future research. The second chapter introduces dynamic memoryless contracts that use self-enforcing penalties to discipline suppliers under poor legal enforcement. Our model bridges two areas of research: relational contracts and dynamic moral hazard with complete contracting. We use the framework of a two-level supply chain with one-sided moral hazard and imperfect monitoring. The relationship is a repeated game in which the partnership can be terminated by the buyer if the supplier refuses to pay penalties for quality violation. After termination, the buyer and supplier start searching for new business partners. Considering markets with homogeneous suppliers and homogeneous buyers, we assume that the solution to this game is a symmetric perfect public equilibrium. The buyer makes a commitment to a compensation scheme, and optimal contracts have dynamic form.The optimal contract is characterized by non-decreasing expected profits for suppliers, non-decreasing penalties for quality failures and non-increasing defect rates. We offer a procedure to build a dynamic equilibrium, which is used to approximate an optimal equilibrium. Intuitively, buyers create non-decreasing compensation and penalties to discipline suppliers through an artificial increase in the suppliers' termination costs. The third chapter focuses on specific cases of the dynamic relational equilibrium: stationary and two-stage equilibria. We characterize these equilibria and perform sensitivity analyses to compare all equilibria and to understand how key parameters influence their efficiency."--Abstract.
Author: Michaela Isabel H Hn
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783642027925
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 140
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Book Description
Author: Vibe Ulfbeck
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429866097
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 254
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Book Description
Corporate Social Responsibility has for long been on the agenda in the business world and recently, it has also become a political agenda in the European Union. Focusing on international supply chains and their control based on studies of law in several European jurisdictions, this book aims to advance the discussion on the application and enforcement of CSR. Drawing parallels to US and Canadian law, the book explores to what extent private law tools can be used as an enforcement device and it ultimately asks if what we are witnessing is the formation of a new area of law, employing the interplay of contract and tort – a law of "production liability", as a corollary of the concept of "product liability".
Author: Benjamin van Rooij
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108754139
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1559
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Book Description
Compliance has become key to our contemporary markets, societies, and modes of governance across a variety of public and private domains. While this has stimulated a rich body of empirical and practical expertise on compliance, thus far, there has been no comprehensive understanding of what compliance is or how it influences various fields and sectors. The academic knowledge of compliance has remained siloed along different disciplinary domains, regulatory and legal spheres, and mechanisms and interventions. This handbook bridges these divides to provide the first one-stop overview of what compliance is, how we can best study it, and the core mechanisms that shape it. Written by leading experts, chapters offer perspectives from across law, regulatory studies, management science, criminology, economics, sociology, and psychology. This volume is the definitive and comprehensive account of compliance.
Author: David Frydlinger
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030650995
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 327
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Book Description
Today’s business environment is constantly evolving, filled with volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity and driven by digital transformation, globalization, and the need to creating value through innovation. These shifts demand that organizations view contracting through a different lens. Since it is impossible to predict every what-if scenario in a transactional contract, organizations in strategic and complex partnerships must shift to a mindset of shared goals and objectives built upon a strong foundation of transparency and trust, working together to mitigate risk much better than merely shifting risk to the weaker party. Contracting in the New Economy helps you to not only develop this mindset – but also offers the practical tools needed to embrace the social side of contracting, enabling your organization to harness the value creating potential of formal relational contracts. Briefly sharing the theoretical foundations that prove relational contracting works, it goes well beyond theory by providing powerful examples of relational contracting principles in practice. In addition, the authors provide a practical and proven approach for helping you to put relational contracting theory into practice for your own relationships. First by providing a framework for approaching any contracting situation and helping organizations finding the best contract model for each situation. And then by sharing five proven steps you can take to create an effective relational contract for you own strategic and complex business relationships. For anyone involved in developing contracts —lawyers, in-house counsels, contract managers, C-level managers, procurement officers, and so on — this book will empower you to create powerful cooperative alliances that will help you reach —and surpass — your business goals in today’s dynamic new environment.
Author: Thomas Y. Choi
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190066725
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
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Book Description
"Abstract: Supply chain management contends with structures and processes for delivering goods and services to customers. It addresses the core functions of connected businesses to meet downstream demand. This innovative volume provides an authoritative and timely guide to the overarching issues that are ubiquitous throughout the supply chain. In particular, it addresses emerging issues that are applicable across supply chains-such as data science, financial flows, human capital, internet technologies, risk management, cyber security, and supply networks. With chapters from an international roster of leading scholars in the field, The Oxford Handbook of Supply Chain Management is a necessary resource for all students and researchers of the field as well as for forward-thinking practitioners. Keywords: supply chain management; value; human society; goods and services; competitive advantage; people and welfare; data and technology; moving goods and services; structure and strategy; growing and sustaining"--
Author: Francisco Brahm
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Relational contracts are key to supply chain collaboration. The literature has focused on the role of trust stemming from prior business with current suppliers. However, the role of expected future business volume on the make-or-buy decision has been relatively neglected. This paper contributes to the literature by examining how the level of expected future business volume affects the make-or-buy decision, that is, the choice to produce the product or service internally rather than to outsource it. Using regression analysis of secondary data from 12,272 construction projects and controlling for endogeneity, our results show that expected future business volume promotes outsourcing and that this impact is larger when the level of prior business with external suppliers is stronger and there is more specificity in the relationship. Our results are consistent with a game theoretic logic in which informally promising future interactions to sustain collaboration is more credible to external suppliers than to internal units because the former can use their assets elsewhere. Also, our results suggest that trust stemming from prior business reinforces the calculativeness logic that stems from the expectation of future business.
Author: Torben Pedersen
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1787432432
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
Recent developments are challenging the traditional separation between advanced and emerging economies as host of knowledge and production-intensive activities, respectively. Authors assess whether the co-location of R&D and manufacturing is critical for development and innovation.
