Defeating Communist Insurgency PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Defeating Communist Insurgency PDF full book. Access full book title Defeating Communist Insurgency by Sir Robert Thompson. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Sir Robert Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Get Book Here
Book Description
The 1st vol. of the author's trilogy ; the 2d of which is No exit from Vietnam ; the 3d, Revolutionary war in world strategy, 1945-1969.
Author: Sir Robert Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 184
Get Book Here
Book Description
The 1st vol. of the author's trilogy ; the 2d of which is No exit from Vietnam ; the 3d, Revolutionary war in world strategy, 1945-1969.
Author: Sir Robert Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 180
Get Book Here
Book Description
Erfaringer i bekæmpelse af oprør og guerillabevægelser i Malaysia og Vietnam.
Author: Robert Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 171
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 171
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 171
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: B. M. W. Trapnell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Robert Grainger Ker Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
Get Book Here
Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author: Donald W. Hamilton
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 1573568546
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 212
Get Book Here
Book Description
In his analysis of insurgency war, Donald Hamilton first attempts to provide insight into a strategic concept he believes is little understood today, and to explain its complicated relationship to American policy failures in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 era of containment. The study develops a working model of insurgency, explaining it as both a unique method and type of war-making. Significant findings include the inability of policymakers to perceive a potential insurgency in Vietnam as early as 1946, subsequent American involvement in not one, but three Asian insurgencies during the 1950s, and the ultimate failure of the U.S. military to meet the insurgency challenge in South Vietnam. This inability to eliminate the insurgency led not only to the complete breakdown of the South Vietnamese government, but was the primary reason why further U.S. military action after 1965 would prove ineffectual. This historical narrative also follows the involvement of several key players, including the personalities of Edward Lansdale, Sir Robert Thompson, Archimedes Patti, and Vo Nguyen Giap, who through their life experiences and writings, provide a keen profundity into why insurgencies occur, why they fail, and why they succeed.
Author: Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 178
Get Book Here
Book Description
