Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces PDF Download
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Author: United States. Congressional Budget Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Air defenses
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congressional Budget Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Air defenses
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Author: Lauren Caston
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833076264
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 185
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Book Description
The authors assess alternatives for a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) across a broad set of potential characteristics and situations. They use the current Minuteman III as a baseline to develop a framework to characterize alternative classes of ICBMs, assess the survivability and effectiveness of possible alternatives, and weigh those alternatives against their cost.
Author: Colin S. Gray
Publisher: Lynne Rienner Publishers
ISBN: 9781555873318
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 212
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Book Description
The author takes issue with the complacent belief that a happy mixture of deterrence, arms control and luck will enable humanity to cope adequately with weapons of mass destruction, arguing that the risks are ever more serious.
Author: Eric Heginbotham
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833096524
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 213
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Book Description
China’s approach to nuclear deterrence has been broadly consistent since its first test in 1964, but it has recently accelerated nuclear force modernization. China’s strategic environment is likely to grow more complex, and nuclear constituencies are gaining a larger bureaucratic voice. Beijing is unlikely to change official nuclear policies but will probably increase emphasis on nuclear deterrence and may adjust the definition of key concepts.
Author: United States. Congressional Budget Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Civil defense
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
Author: Amy F. Woolf
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437920438
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
Contents: (1) Introduction; (2) Background: The Strategic Triad: Force Structure and Size During the Cold War; Force Structure and Size After the Cold War; Future Force Structure and Size; (3) Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles: Ongoing Plans and Programs: (a) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles: Peacekeeper; Minuteman III; Minuteman Modernization Programs; Future Programs; (b) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles: The SSGN Program; The Backfit Program; Basing Changes; Warhead Issues; Modernization Plans and Programs; Future Programs; (c) Bombers: B-1 Bomber; B-2 Bomber; B-52 Bomber; Future Bomber Plans; (4) Issues for Congress: Force Size; Force Structure; Safety, Security, and Management Issues. Illustrations.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428910336
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
Nearly 40 years after the concept of finite deterrence was popularized by the Johnson administration, nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) thinking appears to be in decline. The United States has rejected the notion that threatening population centers with nuclear attacks is a legitimate way to assure deterrence. Most recently, it withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an agreement based on MAD. American opposition to MAD also is reflected in the Bush administration's desire to develop smaller, more accurate nuclear weapons that would reduce the number of innocent civilians killed in a nuclear strike. Still, MAD is influential in a number of ways. First, other countries, like China, have not abandoned the idea that holding their adversaries' cities at risk is necessary to assure their own strategic security. Nor have U.S. and allied security officials and experts fully abandoned the idea. At a minimum, acquiring nuclear weapons is still viewed as being sensible to face off a hostile neighbor that might strike one's own cities. Thus, our diplomats have been warning China that Japan would be under tremendous pressure to go nuclear if North Korea persisted in acquiring a few crude weapons of its own. Similarly, Israeli officials have long argued, without criticism, that they would not be second in acquiring nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Indeed, given that Israelis surrounded by enemies that would not hesitate to destroy its population if they could, Washington finds Israel's retention of a significant nuclear capability totally "understandable."
Author: Gregory D. Koblentz
Publisher: Council on Foreign Relations
ISBN: 0876096119
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
The world has entered a second nuclear age shaped by rising nuclear states and military technologies. Gregory Koblentz argues that the United States should work with the other nuclear-armed states to manage threats to nuclear stability in the near term and establish processes for multilateral arms control efforts over the longer term.
Author: Matthew Kroenig
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190849185
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 281
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Book Description
For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack. So long as the US, or any other nation, retains such an assured retaliation capability, no sane leader would intentionally launch a nuclear attack against it, and nuclear deterrence will hold. According to this theory, possessing more weapons than necessary for a second-strike capability is illogical. This argument is reasonable, but, when compared to the empirical record, it raises an important puzzle. Empirically, we see that the United States has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability. In The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy, Matthew Kroenig challenges the conventional wisdom and explains why a robust nuclear posture, above and beyond a mere second-strike capability, contributes to a state's national security goals. In fact, when a state has a robust nuclear weapons force, such a capability reduces its expected costs in a war, provides it with bargaining leverage, and ultimately enhances nuclear deterrence. This book provides a novel theoretical explanation for why military nuclear advantages translate into geopolitical advantages. In so doing, it helps resolve one of the most-intractable puzzles in international security studies. Buoyed by an innovative thesis and a vast array of historical and quantitative evidence, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy will force scholars to reconsider their basic assumptions about the logic of nuclear deterrence.
Author: Committee on International Security and Arms Control
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309518377
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 119
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Book Description
The debate about appropriate purposes and policies for U.S. nuclear weapons has been under way since the beginning of the nuclear age. With the end of the Cold War, the debate has entered a new phase, propelled by the post-Cold War transformations of the international political landscape. This volume--based on an exhaustive reexamination of issues addressed in The Future of the U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Relationship (NRC, 1991)--describes the state to which U.S. and Russian nuclear forces and policies have evolved since the Cold War ended. The book evaluates a regime of progressive constraints for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy that includes further reductions in nuclear forces, changes in nuclear operations to preserve deterrence but enhance operational safety, and measures to help prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, it examines the conditions and means by which comprehensive nuclear disarmament could become feasible and desirable.
