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Author: Francesco Decarolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.
Author: Francesco Decarolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Bid delegation to specialized intermediaries is common in the auction systems used to sell internet advertising. When the same intermediary concentrates the demand for ad space from competing advertisers, its incentive to coordinate client bids might alter the functioning of the auctions. This study develops a methodology to detect bid coordination, and presents a strategy to estimate a bound on the search engine revenue losses imposed by coordination relative to a counterfactual benchmark of competitive bidding. Using proprietary data from auctions held on a major search engine, coordination is detected in 55 percent of the cases of delegated bidding that we observed, and the associated upper bound on the search engine’s revenue loss ranges between 5.3 and 10.4 percent.
Author: Francesco Decarolis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
As auctions are becoming the main mechanism for selling advertisement space on the web, marketing agencies specialized in bidding in online auctions are proliferating. We analyze theoretically how bidding delegation to a common marketing agency can undermine both revenues and efficiency of the generalized second price auction, the format used by Google and Microsoft-Yahoo!. Our characterization allows us to quantify the revenue losses relative to both the case of full competition and the case of agency bidding under an alternative auction format (specifically, the VCG mechanism). We propose a simple algorithm that a search engine can use to reduce efficiency and revenue losses.
Author: Jeannette Brosig
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Author: Song Yao
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57
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Book Description
We systematically overview the literature in key word search and propose several promising research directions. The paper is organized by each agent in the search process: searchers, advertisers and the search engine, and reviews the key research issues for each. For each group, we outline the decision process involved in keyword search. For searchers, this involves what to search, where to search, which results to click, and when to exit search. For advertisers, this involves where to bid and which word or words to bid on, how much to bid and how searchers and auction mechanisms moderate these behaviors. The search engine faces choices on mechanism design, website design, and how much information to share with its advertisers and searchers. These choices have implications for customer lifetime value and the nature of competition between advertisers. Overall, we list a number of potential areas of future research arising from the decision processes of these various agents.
Author:
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Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 44
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Author: Kinshuk Jerath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We study the bidding strategies of vertically differentiated firms that bid for sponsored search advertisement positions for a keyword at a search engine. We explicitly model how consumers navigate and click on sponsored links based on their knowledge and beliefs about firm qualities. Our model yields several interesting insights and a main counter-intuitive result we focus on is the position paradox." The paradox is that a superior firm may bid lower than an inferior firm and obtain a position below it, yet still obtain more clicks than the inferior firm. Under a pay-per- impression mechanism, the inferior firm wants to be at the top where more consumers click on its link, while the superior firm is better off by placing its link at a lower position as it pays a smaller advertising fee but some consumers will still reach it in the search of a higher-quality firm. Under a pay-per-click mechanism, the inferior firm has an even stronger incentive to be at the top since now it only has to pay for the consumers who do not know the firms' reputations and, therefore, can bid more aggressively. Interestingly, as the quality premium for the superior firm increases, and/or if more consumers know the identity of the superior firm, the incentive for the inferior firm to be at the top may increase. Contrary to conventional belief, we find that the search engine may have the incentive to over-weight the inferior firm's bid and strategically create the position paradox to increase overall clicks by consumers. To validate our model, we analyze a dataset from a popular Korean search engine firm and find that: (i) a large proportion of auction outcomes in the data show the position paradox, and (ii) sharp predictions from our model are validated in the data.
Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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In Internet auctions bidders frequently bid in one of three ways: either only early, or late, or they revise their early bids. This paper rationalizes all three bidding patterns within a single equilibrium. We consider a model of a dynamic auction in which bidders can search for outside prices during the auction. We find that in the equilibrium bidders with the low search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with high search costs bid early or multiple times and search only if they were previously outbid. An important feature of the equilibrium is that early bidding allows bidders to search in a coordinated manner. This means that everyone searches except the bidder with the highest early bid. We also compare the static and dynamic auction and conclude that dynamic auction is always more efficient but not always more profitable.
Author: Radovan Vadovic
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 180
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In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called"multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding inpractice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.
Author: Lynne E. Parker
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9781402033889
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Book Description
This proceedings volume documents recent cutting-edge developments in multi-robot systems research. This volume is the result of the Third International workshop on Multi-Robot Systems that was held in March 2005 at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. This workshop brought together top researchers working in areas relevant to designing teams of autonomous vehicles, including robots and unmanned ground, air, surface, and undersea vehicles. The workshop focused on the challenging issues of team architectures, vehicle learning and adaptation, heterogeneous group control and cooperation, task selection, dynamic autonomy, mixed initiative, and human and robot team interaction. A broad range of applications of this technology are presented in this volume, including UCAVS (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), micro-air vehicles, UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles), UGVs (Unmanned Ground vehicles), planetary exploration, assembly in space, clean-up, and urban search and rescue. This proceedings volume represents the contributions of the top researchers in this field and serves as a valuable tool for professionals in this interdisciplinary field.
Author: Prabirendra Chatterjee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Internet advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 102
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Book Description
In this dissertation, I model generalized second price (GSP) auction for keyword search to analyze the optimal bidding strategies of the participating advertisers. The results also apply to a more general setting where multiple goods are being auctioned off. The study in chapter 3 examines the bidding strategies of the advertisers in a complete information static GSP auction. The results show that unlike in standard second price auction, truthful bidding is never a dominant strategy in general second price auction. In chapter 4, I have developed a model of static incomplete information GSP auction. I characterize all possible pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the game and show that the consideration of the click through rates ratio plays a key role in determining the equilibrium bidding strategies for the advertisers. Specifically, I find that when the click through rates ratio exceeds a critical value, there will be no pure strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The analysis also reveals that in a game of static incomplete information no asymmetric bidding equilibrium would prevail. The study in chapter 5 analyzes a model of incomplete information dynamic GSP auction. I find that in a dynamic game, the existence of both separating strategy equilibrium and pooling strategy equilibrium would depend upon critical values of click through rates ratio. I also prove that the advertisers with high valuation for a keyword will either reveal their identities at the very beginning or at the very end of this dynamic game. The results also show that when search engines do not publish the bidding history (i.e. there is 'minimum disclosure of information'), the advertisers will never try to mimic each other or in other words, there will be no pooling strategy equilibrium.
