Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone? PDF Author: Andrea Bubula
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

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Book Description
This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimes a view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.

Are Pegged and Intermediate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

Are Pegged and Intermediate Regimes More Crisis Prone? PDF Author: Mr.Andrea Bubula
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451875312
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 37

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Book Description
This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimes-a view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone? PDF Author: Andrea Bubula
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36

Get Book Here

Book Description
This paper provides evidence on the susceptibility of different types of exchange rate regimes to currency crises during 1990-2001. It explores the incidence of crises, identified as episodes of severe exchange market pressure, to seek evidence on whether pegged regimes are more crisis prone than floating regimes and on whether certain types of pegged regimes are more crisis prone than others. The paper finds that pegged regimes, as a whole, have been characterized by a higher incidence of crises than floating regimes, for countries that are more integrated with international capital markets; and that intermediate regimes (mainly soft pegs and tightly-managed floating regimes) have been more crisis prone than both hard pegs and other floating regimes a view consistent with the bipolar view of exchange rate regimes. The degree of crisis proneness seems to be broadly similar across different types of intermediate regimes.

Exchange Rate Management and Crisis Susceptibility

Exchange Rate Management and Crisis Susceptibility PDF Author: Mr.Atish R. Ghosh
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484383974
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
This paper revisits the bipolar prescription for exchange rate regime choice and asks two questions: are the poles of hard pegs and pure floats still safer than the middle? And where to draw the line between safe floats and risky intermediate regimes? Our findings, based on a sample of 50 EMEs over 1980-2011, show that macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities are significantly greater under less flexible intermediate regimes—including hard pegs—as compared to floats. While not especially susceptible to banking or currency crises, hard pegs are significantly more prone to growth collapses, suggesting that the security of the hard end of the prescription is largely illusory. Intermediate regimes as a class are the most susceptible to crises, but “managed floats”—a subclass within such regimes—behave much more like pure floats, with significantly lower risks and fewer crises. “Managed floating,” however, is a nebulous concept; a characterization of more crisis prone regimes suggests no simple dividing line between safe floats and risky intermediate regimes.

Are Pegged and Intermadiate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

Are Pegged and Intermadiate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone? PDF Author: Andrea Bubula
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


Exchange Rate Regime Durability and Performance in Developing Versus Advanced Economies

Exchange Rate Regime Durability and Performance in Developing Versus Advanced Economies PDF Author: Aasim M. Husain
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital movements
Languages : en
Pages : 60

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Book Description
"Drawing on new data and advances in exchange rate regimes' classification, we find that countries appear to benefit by having increasingly flexible exchange rate systems as they become richer and more financially developed. For developing countries with little exposure to international capital markets, pegs are notable for their durability and relatively low inflation. In contrast, for advanced economies, floats are distinctly more durable and also appear to be associated with higher growth. For emerging markets, our results parallel the Baxter and Stockman classic exchange regime neutrality result, though pegs are the least durable and expose countries to higher risk of crisis"--NBER website

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
The criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas suggest that many (most?) countries are not good candidates for either of the poles of genuinely fixed exchange rates or freely floating exchange rates. Thus many countries should have an interest in intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, in a world of substantial capital mobility most forms of intermediate exchange rate regimes have proven to be highly crisis prone. The paper argues that the unholy trinity analysis doesn't imply that intermediate exchange rate regimes are inherently unstable, but rather that exchange rate and monetary policies need to be jointly determined. The difficulties of maintaining such consistency are as much political as economic since temporarily pegged or managed rates create a time inconsistency problem. Therefore policy officials need some institutional insulation from short sighted political pressures. A problem with most intermediate regimes is that they have focused on particular forms of limited exchange rate flexibility per se, rather than the weight that should be given to the exchange rate in setting monetary policy. It is argued that OCA theory provides the framework for determining the appropriate weights and limits on the amount of sterilized intervention to maintain the consistency between exchange rate and monetary policies necessary to avoid currency crises. The paper also considers a number of the issues involved in integrating their approach with the literature on open economy aspects of inflation targeting.

Growth Effects of the Exchange-rate Regime and the Capital-account Openness in a Crisis-prone World Market

Growth Effects of the Exchange-rate Regime and the Capital-account Openness in a Crisis-prone World Market PDF Author: Assaf Razin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Balance of payments
Languages : en
Pages : 46

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Book Description
"It has been a remarkably difficult empirical task to identify clear-cut real effects of exchange-rate regimes on the open economy. Similarly, no definitive view emerges as to the aggregate effects of capital account liberalizations. The main hypothesis of the paper is that a direct and an indirect effect of balance-of-payments policies, geared toward exchange rate regimes and capital account openness, exert a confounding overall influence on output growth, in the presence of sudden-stop crises. A direct channel works through the trade and financial sectors, akin to the optimal currency area arguments. An indirect channel works through the probability of a sudden-stop crisis. The empirical analysis disentagles these conflicting effects and demonstrates that: (i) the balance-of-payments policies significantly affect the probability of crises, and the crisis probability, in turn, negatively affects output growth; (ii) controlling for the crisis probability in the growth equation, the direct effect of balance-of-payments policies is large. Domestic price crises (high inflation above a 20 percent threshold) affect growth only indirectly; through their positive effecton the probability of sudden-stop crises"--NBER website

Don't Fix, Don't Float

Don't Fix, Don't Float PDF Author: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Development Centre
Publisher: OECD Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 104

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Book Description
Don ́t Fix, Don ́t Float is a book about credibility, or lack thereof. It deals with questions pertaining to international financial architecture from the perspective of developing countries, emerging markets and transition economies. Should the monetary authority fix the exchange rate of the national currency? Should it instead let the currency float in foreign exchange markets? What about bands, baskets and crawls between the fix and the float corners? Answering these questions is of significance to the national economy involved and, with regard to global finance, often beyond. In the same way that there may never be a pure float, even among key currencies, an instant fix does not provide a fast lane to credibility. Credibility is earned abroad as the development process reinforces institution building in monetary, financial and budgetary matters. Indeed, rules for budgetary adjustment (such as the zero deficit in Argentina or the EU Stability and Growth Pact) are necessary for any exchange-rate regime to deliver economic growth and development. In Don ́t Fix, Don ́t Float, the case for intermediate regimes is made for five country groups in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Developing countries, emerging markets and transition economies, together with the OECD area, are facing the consequences of a worsening global economic outlook. In this environment, the development perspective underlying Don t Fix, Don t Float is clearly essential.

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone?

Are Pegged and Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes More Crisis Prone? PDF Author: Andrea Bubula
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial crises
Languages : en
Pages : 44

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Book Description


Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes--a Trap?

Pegged Exchange Rate Regimes--a Trap? PDF Author: Joshua Aizenman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Financial crises
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
This paper studies the empirical and theoretical association between the duration of a pegged exchange rate and the cost experienced upon exiting the regime. We confirm empirically that exits from pegged exchange rate regimes during the past two decades have often been accompanied by crises, the cost of which increases with the duration of the peg before the crisis. We explain these observations in a framework in which the exchange rate peg is used as a commitment mechanism to achieve inflation stability, but multiple equilibria are possible. We show that there are ex ante large gains from choosing a more conservative not only in order to mitigate the inflation bias from the well-known time inconsistency problem, but also to steer the economy away from the high inflation equilibria. These gains, however, come at a cost in the form of the monetary authority's lesser responsiveness to output shocks. In these circumstances, using a pegged exchange rate as an anti-inflation commitment device can create a "trap" whereby the regime initially confers gains in anti-inflation credibility, but ultimately results in an exit occasioned by a big enough adverse real shock that creates large welfare losses to the economy. We also show that the more conservative is the regime in place and the larger is the cost of regime change, the longer will be the average spell of the fixed exchange rate regime, and the greater the output contraction at the time of a regime change.