Strategic Negotiation in Multiagent Environments PDF Download
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Author: Sarit Kraus
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262112642
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 290
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Book Description
A model for strategic negotiation for intelligent agents.
Author: Sarit Kraus
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262112642
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 290
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Book Description
A model for strategic negotiation for intelligent agents.
Author: Luiz Maurer
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 082138824X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Electricity-contract auctions have been getting increased attention as they have emerged as a successful mechanism to procure new generation capacity and. This book presents a comprehensive overview of international experiences in auction design and implementation.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Peter C. Cramton
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Book Description
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107135346
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 935
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Book Description
An international team of experts covers the pros and cons of different auction formats and lessons learned in the field.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691119252
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Book Description
Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Author:
Publisher: W.P. Carey School of Business
ISBN: 9780945968573
Category : Electronic commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Author: Kate Ho
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0323988873
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 782
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Book Description
Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Y Narahari
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9814525065
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 533
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Book Description
This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design, to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving multiple autonomous agents that interact strategically in a rational and intelligent way. The contents of the book provide a sound foundation of game theory and mechanism design theory which clearly represent the “science” behind traditional as well as emerging economic applications for the society.The importance of the discipline of game theory has been recognized through numerous Nobel prizes in economic sciences being awarded to game theorists, including the 2005, 2007, and 2012 prizes. The book distills the marvelous contributions of these and other celebrated game theorists and presents it in a way that can be easily understood even by senior undergraduate students.A unique feature of the book is its detailed coverage of mechanism design which is the art of designing a game among strategic agents so that a social goal is realized in an equilibrium of the induced game. Another feature is a large number of illustrative examples that are representative of both classical and modern applications of game theory and mechanism design. The book also includes informative biographical sketches of game theory legends, and is specially customized to a general engineering audience.After a thorough reading of this book, readers would be able to apply game theory and mechanism design in a principled and mature way to solve relevant problems in computer science (esp, artificial intelligence/machine learning), computer engineering, operations research, industrial engineering and microeconomics.
Author: Martin Bichler
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521003834
Category : Electronic commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 266
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Book Description
Dynamic pricing and on-line auctions are emerging as the preferred models for e-business. Forrester Research predicts that business-to-business Internet auctions will grow to $52.6 billion by 2002, while dynamically priced business-to-business transactions will rise to $88 billion, representing 27% of the value of all business-to-business e-commerce transactions. This multi-disciplinary book presents a framework of negotiation protocols for electronic markets. It is the first book to combine economics with computer science and the first to describe multidimensional auction mechanisms - i.e. automated negotiations on multiple attributes and/or multiple units of a product. In addition it summarises the introductory economics needed to understand electronic markets, and surveys the literature on negotiation and auction theory. Case studies include the trading of financial derivatives. For use in the design, implementation and upgrade of electronic markets, for researchers in: economics, information systems and operations management, computer science and all students of the e-commerce phenomenon.
