A General Characterization of Optimal Income Taxation and Enforcement PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download A General Characterization of Optimal Income Taxation and Enforcement PDF full book. Access full book title A General Characterization of Optimal Income Taxation and Enforcement by Parkash Chander. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Parkash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Parkash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Prakash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Parkash Chander
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Risk management
Languages : en
Pages : 22
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Joel Slemrod
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780472103386
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 361
Get Book Here
Book Description
Experts discuss strategies for curtailing tax evasion
Author: Benno Torgler
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 314
Get Book Here
Book Description
The question of why citizens pay their taxes has attracted increased attention in the tax compliance literature of late. In this book, Benno Torgler considers the evidence that suggests that enforcement efforts cannot fully explain the high degree of tax compliance within society. To attempt to resolve this puzzle, numerous researchers have argued that citizens' attitudes towards paying taxes (defined as tax morale) help to explain the high degree of compliance. Yet most have treated tax morale itself as a black box, failing to discuss the issues influencing it. This unique volume provides important new insights into the factors that shape the emergence and maintenance of citizens' willingness to cooperate with tax legislations in different societies. Distinctive in its examination of citizen tax morale and tax compliance, this book will be of great interest to academics, researchers and students concerned with economics, political science, sociology, social psychology and accounting. It will also appeal to policymakers and practitioners.
Author: University of Chicago Law Review
Publisher: Quid Pro Books
ISBN: 1610278771
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 387
Get Book Here
Book Description
The first issue of 2014 features articles and essays from internationally recognized legal and economics scholars, including an extensive Symposium on "Revelation Mechanisms and the Law." Topics include voting options and strategies to reveal preferences, corporate governance, regulatory intensity, tort calculations of risk, mandatory disclosure of choices, partitioning interests in land, and shopping for expert witnesses. In addition, Issue 1 includes an article, "Libertarian Paternalism, Path Dependence, and Temporary Law," by Tom Ginsburg, Jonathan S. Masur & Richard H. McAdams. Applications include smoking bans and seat belt laws. Also included is a student Comment, "Too Late to Stipulate: Reconciling Rule 68 with Summary Judgments," by Channing J. Turner; and a Book Review, "Common Good and Common Ground: The Inevitability of Fundamental Disagreement," by Rebecca L. Brown, reviewing Ordered Liberty: Rights, Responsibilities, and Virtues. The issue serves, in effect, as a new and extensive book on cutting-edge issues of revelation mechanisms, strategies, prompts, nudges, and effects. The Symposium's contents are: * "Governing Communities by Auction," by Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky * "Partition and Revelation," by Yun-chien Chang & Lee Anne Fennell * "Savage Tables and Tort Law: An Alternative to the Precaution Model," by Janet M. Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod * "Revelation and Suppression of Private Information in Settlement-Bargaining Models," by Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum * "The Use and Limits of Self-Valuation Systems," by Richard A. Epstein * "Expert Mining and Required Disclosure," by Jonah B. Gelbach * "Renegotiation Design by Contract," by Richard Holden & Anup Malani * "Audits as Signals," by Maciej H. Kotowski, David A. Weisbach & Richard J. Zeckhauser * "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," by Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier * "From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information Revelation, and Internalities," by Saul Levmore * "Quadratic Voting as Efficient Corporate Governance," by Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl * "The Efficiency of Bargaining under Divided Entitlements," by Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston Quality ebook formatting includes active TOC, linked notes, active URLs in notes, and all the charts, tables, and formulae found in the original print version.
Author: Louis Kaplow
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 069114821X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Get Book Here
Book Description
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics presents a unified conceptual framework for analyzing taxation--the first to be systematically developed in several decades. An original treatment of the subject rather than a textbook synthesis, the book contains new analysis that generates novel results, including some that overturn long-standing conventional wisdom. This fresh approach should change thinking, research, and teaching for decades to come. Building on the work of James Mirrlees, Anthony Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz, and subsequent researchers, and in the spirit of classics by A. C. Pigou, William Vickrey, and Richard Musgrave, this book steps back from particular lines of inquiry to consider the field as a whole, including the relationships among different fiscal instruments. Louis Kaplow puts forward a framework that makes it possible to rigorously examine both distributive and distortionary effects of particular policies despite their complex interactions with others. To do so, various reforms--ranging from commodity or estate and gift taxation to regulation and public goods provision--are combined with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income tax. The resulting distribution-neutral reform package holds much constant while leaving in play the distinctive effects of the policy instrument under consideration. By applying this common methodology to disparate subjects, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics produces significant cross-fertilization and yields solutions to previously intractable problems.
Author: Joel Slemrod
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262319012
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 235
Get Book Here
Book Description
An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.
Author: Emmanuel Saez
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 1324002735
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 232
Get Book Here
Book Description
America’s runaway inequality has an engine: our unjust tax system. Even as they became fabulously wealthy, the ultra-rich have had their taxes collapse to levels last seen in the 1920s. Meanwhile, working-class Americans have been asked to pay more. The Triumph of Injustice presents a forensic investigation into this dramatic transformation, written by two economists who revolutionized the study of inequality. Eschewing anecdotes and case studies, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman offer a comprehensive view of America’s tax system, based on new statistics covering all taxes paid at all levels of government. Their conclusion? For the first time in more than a century, billionaires now pay lower tax rates than their secretaries. Blending history and cutting-edge economic analysis, and writing in lively and jargon-free prose, Saez and Zucman dissect the deliberate choices (and sins of indecision) that have brought us to today: the gradual exemption of capital owners; the surge of a new tax avoidance industry, and the spiral of tax competition among nations. With clarity and concision, they explain how America turned away from the most progressive tax system in history to embrace policies that only serve to compound the wealth of a few. But The Triumph of Injustice is much more than a laser-sharp analysis of one of the great political and intellectual failures of our time. Saez and Zucman propose a visionary, democratic, and practical reinvention of taxes, outlining reforms that can allow tax justice to triumph in today’s globalized world and democracy to prevail over concentrated wealth. A pioneering companion website allows anyone to evaluate proposals made by the authors, and to develop their own alternative tax reform at taxjusticenow.org.
Author: Narayana R. Kocherlakota
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400835275
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 230
Get Book Here
Book Description
Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for future research.
