Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs PDF Author: Mr.James M. Boughton
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451859732
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.

Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Who's in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs PDF Author: Mr.James M. Boughton
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451859732
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
IMF lending is conditional on a country's commitment to carry out an agreed program of economic policies. Unless that commitment is genuine and broadly held, the likelihood of implementation will be poor. Is there a conflict between national commitment and conditional finance? Are national authorities or other agents in the country less likely to "own" a reform program simply because it is conditionally financed? This paper argues that potential conflicts are reduced when program design takes the country's interests and circumstances into account and when conditionality results from a genuine process of interaction between the IMF and the borrower.

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs

IMF Conditionality and Country Ownership of Programs PDF Author: Mr.Mohsin S. Khan
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451856255
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The paper uses finance and agency theory to establish two main propositions: First, that the conditionality attached to adjustment programs supported by the IMF is justified. Second, that ownership of programs by the borrowing country is crucial for their success. Hence, since both IMF conditionality and country ownership are necessary, the task is one of designing conditionality to maximize program ownership, subject to providing adequate safeguards for IMF lending. The paper discusses some recent proposals for enhancing ownership, and in particular, makes a case for incorporating floating tranches and outcomes-based conditionality in IMF-supported adjustment programs.

IMF-Supported Programs

IMF-Supported Programs PDF Author: Mr.Ashoka Mody
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 9781589063617
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 184

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Book Description
Research work by the IMF’s staff on the effectiveness of the country programs the organization supports, which has long been carried out, has intensified in recent years. IMF analysts have sought to “open up the black box” by more closely examining program design and implementation, as well as how these influence programs’ effectiveness. Their efforts have also focused on identifying the lending, signaling, and monitoring features of the IMF that may affect member countries’ economic performance. This book reports on a large portion of both the new and the continuing research. It concludes that IMF programs work best where domestic politics and institutions permit the timely implementation of the necessary measures and when a country is vulnerable to, but not yet in, a crisis. It points to the need for a wider recognition of the substantial diversity among IMF member countries and for programs to be tailored accordingly while broadly maintaining the IMF’s general principle of uniformity of treatment.

Expenditure Conditionality in IMF-supported Programs

Expenditure Conditionality in IMF-supported Programs PDF Author: Mr.Sanjeev Gupta
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484389077
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description
This paper studies the impact of expenditure conditionality in IMF programs on the composition of public spending. A granular dataset on different government expenditure conditions covering 115 countries for the 1992-2016 period is compiled. The results support the view that while conditionality on specific elements of spending could help achieve a program’s short-term objectives, it is structural conditionality which delivers lasting benefits. Structural public financial management conditionality (such as on budget execution and control) has proven to be effective in boosting the long-term level of education, health, and public investment expenditures. The results further indicate that conditionality on raising such spending may come at the expense of other expenditures. Finally, the successful implementation (and not mere existence) of the conditionality is crucial for improved outcomes. These findings are relevant for policy makers targeting achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs

Structural Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs PDF Author: International Monetary Fund. Independent Evaluation Office
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1589067029
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 52

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Book Description
This evaluation examines factors influencing the effectiveness of the IMF structural conditionality in bringing about structural reform. It assesses the impact of the streamlining initiative launched in 2000 and of the 2002 Conditionality Guidelines. These guidelines aimed at reducing the volume and scope of structural conditionality by requiring “parsimony” in the use of conditions and stipulated that conditions must be “critical” to the achievement of the program goals. The evaluation finds that during the period 1995–2004, there was extensive use of structural conditionality in IMF-supported programs, with an average of 17 conditions per program/year.

How to Gain the Most from Structural Conditionality of IMF-Supported Programs

How to Gain the Most from Structural Conditionality of IMF-Supported Programs PDF Author: Mr. Jochen R. Andritzky
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513572695
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description
Structural conditionality of IMF-supported programs is designed to support structural reforms by countries borrowing from the IMF. Taking stock of program conditions and their implementation, this paper finds that conditionality focuses on fiscal, monetary and financial issues—areas where IMF expertise is strong—and shies away from structural areas such as labor or product market reforms. Hence, tackling deep-rooted structural issues during IMF-supported programs often remained elusive. To ensure countries gain most from IMF conditionality, the paper outlines an evaluation matrix for prioritizing and designing structural reforms, and applies it to case studies.

Imf Conditionality and Program Ownership

Imf Conditionality and Program Ownership PDF Author: S. Nuri Erbas
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 24

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Book Description
Program conditionality and ownership are important considerations in the IMF's current rethinking of program design. This paper contributes to the literature by developing a theory of program conditionality and ownership on the basis of Cumulative Prospect Theory. The policymaker may value a set of programs, each with fewer conditions, more than an extended program with as many conditions. This valuation bias is greater in ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty) than under uncertainty. If greater valuation of a program engenders more explicit and implicit ownership, then programs with fewer conditions may have a better chance of success. Less is more.

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS

STRUCTURAL CONDITIONALITY IN IMF-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS PDF Author: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781484353035
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


Policy Statement on IMF Technical Assistance

Policy Statement on IMF Technical Assistance PDF Author: International Monetary Fund
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 9781589060371
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 32

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Book Description
This chapter presents policy statement on IMF technical assistance (TA) programs. The TA programs provide a cooperative framework for the sharing of knowledge and international experience, in a lasting manner, with member countries. The IMF seeks to provide technical assistance as efficiently and effectively as possible in its core substantive areas of competency namely macroeconomic policy formulation and management among others. Technical assistance is provided in a variety of forms. These include IMF staff missions from headquarters; the placement of experts for periods ranging from a few months to a few years. Technical assistance is provided only when requested by a country's authorities. Since the demand for such assistance normally exceeds the resources available from the IMF, a number of considerations are considered in prioritizing country requests. The IMF encourages member countries who have not yet done so to consider providing such complementary financial support to enhance the resources available for technical assistance, preferably in a manner that is as unrestricted as possible.

What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs?

What Determines the Implementation of IMF-Supported Programs? PDF Author: Wolfgang Mayer
Publisher: INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISBN: 9781451842531
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47

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Book Description
This paper assesses the implementation of IMF-supported programs using measures of program interruptions, compliance with conditionality, and the share of committed funds disbursed. The econometric model allows an evaluation of the importance for program implementation of political conditions in borrowing countries, IMF effort, conditionality, as well as initial and external conditions. The paper concludes that program implementation depends primarily on borrowing countries' domestic political economy. Strong special interests, political instability, inefficient bureaucracies, lack of political cohesion, and ethno-linguistic divisions weaken program implementation. IMF effort, the extent and structure of conditionality, and initial and external conditions do not materially influence program prospects.