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Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190600861
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 353
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Book Description
An analysis of insurgent warfare, looking at factors that contribute to insurgency.
Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190600861
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 353
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Book Description
An analysis of insurgent warfare, looking at factors that contribute to insurgency.
Author: William C. Banks
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231526563
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Book Description
An internationally-recognized authority on constitutional law, national security law, and counterterrorism, William C. Banks believes changing patterns of global conflict are forcing a reexamination of the traditional laws of war. The Hague Rules, the customary laws of war, and the post-1949 law of armed conflict no longer account for nonstate groups waging prolonged campaigns of terrorism—or even more conventional insurgent attacks. Recognizing that many of today's conflicts are low-intensity, asymmetrical wars fought between disparate military forces, Banks's collection analyzes nonstate armed groups and irregular forces (such as terrorist and insurgent groups, paramilitaries, child soldiers, civilians participating in hostilities, and private military firms) and their challenge to international humanitarian law. Both he and his contributors believe gaps in the laws of war leave modern battlefields largely unregulated, and they fear state parties suffer without guidelines for responding to terrorists and their asymmetrical tactics, such as the targeting of civilians. These gaps also embolden weaker, nonstate combatants to exploit forbidden strategies and violate the laws of war. Attuned to the contested nature of post-9/11 security and policy, this collection juxtaposes diverse perspectives on existing laws and their application in contemporary conflict. It sets forth a legal definition of new wars, describes the status of new actors, charts the evolution of the twenty-first-century battlefield, and balances humanitarian priorities with military necessity. While the contributors contest each other, they ultimately reestablish the legitimacy of a long-standing legal corpus, and they rehumanize an environment in which the most vulnerable targets, civilian populations, are themselves becoming weapons against conventional power.
Author: Michael L. Gross
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1316194302
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 343
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Book Description
As insurgencies rage, a burning question remains: how should insurgents fight technologically superior state armies? Commentators rarely ask this question because the catchphrase 'we fight by the rules, but they don't' is nearly axiomatic. But truly, are all forms of guerrilla warfare equally reprehensible? Can we think cogently about just guerrilla warfare? May guerrilla tactics such as laying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), assassinating informers, using human shields, seizing prisoners of war, conducting cyber strikes against civilians, manipulating the media, looting resources, or using nonviolence to provoke violence prove acceptable under the changing norms of contemporary warfare? The short answer is 'yes', but modern guerrilla warfare requires a great deal of qualification, explanation, and argumentation before it joins the repertoire of acceptable military behavior. Not all insurgents fight justly, but guerrilla tactics and strategies are also not always the heinous practices that state powers often portray them to be.
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
Author: Max Boot
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 0871404249
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 809
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Book Description
As fitting for the 21st century as von Clausewitz's "On War" was in its own time, "Invisible Armies" is a complete global history of guerrilla uprisings through the ages.
Author: Seth G. Jones
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 1324006218
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 361
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Book Description
How three key figures in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran built ruthless irregular warfare campaigns that are eroding American power. In Three Dangerous Men, defense expert Seth Jones argues that the US is woefully unprepared for the future of global competition. While America has focused on building fighter jets, missiles, and conventional warfighting capabilities, its three principal rivals—Russia, Iran, and China—have increasingly adopted irregular warfare: cyber attacks, the use of proxy forces, propaganda, espionage, and disinformation to undermine American power. Jones profiles three pioneers of irregular warfare in Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran who adapted American techniques and made huge gains without waging traditional warfare: Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov; the deceased Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani; and vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia. Each has spent his career studying American power and devised techniques to avoid a conventional or nuclear war with the US. Gerasimov helped oversee a resurgence of Russian irregular warfare, which included attempts to undermine the 2016 and 2020 US presidential elections and the SolarWinds cyber attack. Soleimani was so effective in expanding Iranian power in the Middle East that Washington targeted him for assassination. Zhang Youxia presents the most alarming challenge because China has more power and potential at its disposal. Drawing on interviews with dozens of US military, diplomatic, and intelligence officials, as well as hundreds of documents translated from Russian, Farsi, and Mandarin, Jones shows how America’s rivals have bloodied its reputation and seized territory worldwide. Instead of standing up to autocratic regimes, Jones demonstrates that the United States has largely abandoned the kind of information, special operations, intelligence, and economic and diplomatic action that helped win the Cold War. In a powerful conclusion, Jones details the key steps the United States must take to alter how it thinks about—and engages in—competition before it is too late.
Author: Jon Lee Anderson
Publisher: Hachette UK
ISBN: 0349140014
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Prior to gaining international renown for his definitive biography of Che Guevara and his firsthand reports on the war in Iraq in the acclaimed THE FALL OF BAGHDAD, Jon Lee Anderson wrote GUERRILLAS, a daring on-the-ground account of five diverse insurgent movements around the world: the mujahedin of Afghanistan, the FMLN of El Salvador, the Karen of Burma, the Polisario of Western Sahara, and a group of young Palestines fighting against Israel in the Gaza Strip. Making the most of unprecedented, direct access to his subjects, Anderson combines powerful storytelling with a balanced, penetrating analysis of each situation. A work of phenomenal range, analytical acuity, and human empathy, GUERRILLAS amply demonstrates why Jon Lee Anderson is one of our most important chroniclers of societies in crisis.
Author: Geraint Hughes
Publisher: Apollo Books
ISBN: 9781845194499
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 254
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Book Description
Suitable for contemporary security scholars, and those involved in political/military policy, this title offers terminology intends to clarify scholarly understanding of proxy warfare, a framework for understanding why states seek to use proxies in order to fulfil strategic objectives.
Author: Bard E. O'Neill
Publisher: Manas Publications
ISBN: 9788170492849
Category : Guerrilla warfare
Languages : en
Pages : 248
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Book Description
A Systematic, Comprehensive, And Straightforward Book That Analyse And Compares Insurgencies And Terrorist Movements. It Covers Activity That Has Since Occurred In Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, China, Burma, Iraq, Sudan, The Philippines, Colombia, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, And Elsewhere And Highlights The New Tactics And Weapons Used By Insurgent Groups Including Al Qaida - And Threatened. Author Bard E. O'Neill, The Director Of Studies Of Insurgencies And Revolution At The National War College, Addresses Insurgencies With Respect To Ultimate Goals, Strategies, Organization, The Role And Means Of Acquiring Popular Support, Causes And Effects Of Disunity, Types Of External Support, And Government Responses. To Suppress Terrorism, To Undermine Terrorism'S Ideological Support, And To Win The War Of Ideas, A National Security Expert Needs Some Of The Better Ideas Found In This Book. Thus The Book Is Also An Ideal Textbook For Soldiers, Analysts, Students, And Scholars Who Seek A Better Understanding Of Contemporary Conflicts. ( Published In Collaboration With Potomac Books, Inc. Formerly Brassey S, Inc.)
Author: Fred Kaplan
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1451642660
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 432
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Book Description
A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize The inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars who—against fierce resistance from within their own ranks—changed the way the Pentagon does business and the American military fights wars. The Insurgents is the inside story of the small group of soldier-scholars, led by General David Petraeus, who plotted to revolutionize one of the largest, oldest, and most hidebound institutions—the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight the new kind of war in the post–Cold War age: not massive wars on vast battlefields, but “small wars” in cities and villages, against insurgents and terrorists. These would be wars not only of fighting but of “nation building,” often not of necessity but of choice. Based on secret documents, private emails, and interviews with more than one hundred key characters, including Petraeus, the tale unfolds against the backdrop of the wars against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the main insurgency is the one mounted at home by ambitious, self-consciously intellectual officers—Petraeus, John Nagl, H. R. McMaster, and others—many of them classmates or colleagues in West Point’s Social Science Department who rose through the ranks, seized with an idea of how to fight these wars better. Amid the crisis, they forged a community (some of them called it a cabal or mafia) and adapted their enemies’ techniques to overhaul the culture and institutions of their own Army. Fred Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered the idea through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. This is a story of power, politics, ideas, and personalities—and how they converged to reshape the twenty-first-century American military. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists—today’s “best and brightest”—can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. Petraeus and his fellow insurgents made the US military more adaptive to the conflicts of the modern era, but they also created the tools—and made it more tempting—for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
