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Author: David Waterman
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
ISBN: 9780844740676
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
The authors address claims that vertical ownership ties reduce programming diversity, restrict entry of competitors to cable, or have other socially undesirable effects
Author: David Waterman
Publisher: American Enterprise Institute
ISBN: 9780844740676
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
The authors address claims that vertical ownership ties reduce programming diversity, restrict entry of competitors to cable, or have other socially undesirable effects
Author: David Waterman
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780732603625
Category : Cable television
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Author: Richard James Wegener
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cable television
Languages : en
Pages : 174
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
Author: Benjamin Klein
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cable television
Languages : en
Pages : 79
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Book Description
Author: EunKyoung Kwack
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The Korean cable television industry has recently experienced a strong tendency toward the vertical integration of system operators (SOs)/cable operators and program providers (PPs)/cable networks, resulting in multiple system program providers (MSPs). This formation of MSPs may lead to either vertical foreclosures or unfair treatment for competitors, particularly independent PPs. In fact, a simple count shows that SOs affiliated with five MSPs tend to carry affiliated PPs more frequently than independent PPs and to provide more accessible channel numbers to these affiliated PPs. This study examines the effects of this vertical integration on channel carriage and channel numbers of affiliated and unaffiliated PPs. An empirical analysis is conducted using cross-sectional data obtained in 2013 on analog channel numbers. Excluding uncarried PPs in the regression equation for the channel number may produce some sample selection bias. To address this bias, Heckman's two-step procedure (the so-called "Heckit estimation method") is adopted. The empirical results indicate that, with other variables for SO and PP characteristics controlled for, vertically integrated SOs are more likely to carry affiliated PPs than unaffiliated ones and more likely to provide accessible channel numbers to affiliated PPs. As a general practice, terrestrial, total TV programming, and home shopping channels are given lower channel numbers. The results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of these channels. In addition, SOs tend to carry PPs with higher viewing rates more frequently and assign lower channel numbers to them. The larger the number of available analog channels, the higher the probability of the channel carriage is. The results suggest that vertically integrated SOs may unfairly discriminate against unaffiliated or independent PPs. In this regard, broadcasting regulatory policy should be carefully devised by considering the status of competition in the broadcast program market.
Author: David Waterman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Empirical research about the effects of vertical integration in cable television suggests that in spite of differences in the economic architectures of cable and Internet broadband, integrated ISPs have economic incentives in some realistic circumstances to favor vertically integrated content services and to restrict entry of (or foreclose) relatively less established -- rival content services. We also develop a simple -- discrimination shifting model to show that while a non-discrimination access rule such as that proposed by the FCC in October, 2009, is likely to diminish discrimination behavior by vertically integrated ISPs overall, it may have the effect of shifting similar ISP behavior downstream to the consumer retail level unless that market is also regulated. We further conjecture that certain beneficial effects of vertical integration on financing and entry of programming networks that were identified in the cable industry are present, but likely to prove less important for ISPs, due to development since the 1980s and 90s of a large and robust programming supply industry that is mostly disintegrated with cable operators, other MVPDs, or ISPs. Finally, the history of both the cable and ISP industries makes evident that the fundamental policy concerns from an economic perspective are not vertical integration but horizontal market control of ISPs within local market areas and also via their significant national market shares of all broadband Internet subscribers.
Author: United States. National Telecommunications and Information Administration
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cable television
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 658
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Book Description
