Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Bettina Kuon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642487777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information

Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Bettina Kuon
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642487777
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 305

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Book Description
Think of the following situation: A project yielding a gross profit of 100 is offered to two firms. The project can only be conducted by a cooperation of the two firms. No firm is able to conduct the project alone. In order to receive the project the firms have to agree on the allocation of the gross profit. Each of both firms has an alternative project it conducts in case the joint project is not realized. The profitability of an allocation of the joint gross profit for a firm depends on the gross profit from its alternative project. The gross profit from an alternative project can be either 0 (low alternative value) or O

Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements

Incomplete Information Two Person Bargaining with a Finite Set of Possible Agreements PDF Author: Clara Ponsati-Obiols
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 158

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Book Description


Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information

Solutions for Two-person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Roger B. Myerson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description


A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information

A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information PDF Author: John C. Harsanyi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 106

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Book Description


Differential Information Economies

Differential Information Economies PDF Author: Dionysius Glycopantis
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540269797
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 656

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Book Description
One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

Two-Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information

Two-Person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information PDF Author: James E. Parco
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781423509103
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 246

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Book Description
New theoretical developments and recent experimental studies involving the sealed-bid kappa-double auction mechanism for bilateral bargaining under incomplete information have raised new questions about procedures that induce efficient bargaining behavior and about the applicability of extant adaptive learning models. It is now generally accepted that a theory of bargaining behavior for individuals who typically do not meet the stringent assumptions about common knowledge of rationality cannot be complete without systematic empirical investigations of the properties of the various mechanisms that structure bargaining. The aim of this dissertation is to critically explore the extent to which efficient bargaining outcomes can be achieved while dynamically accounting for individual behavior across repeated play of the game. In the first study, an endogenous bonus is introduced into the baseline single- stage game. Although theoretically doing so induces truth-telling behavior for both players, the experimental data provide very limited support. In the second study, the baseline game is extended by incorporating an additional, costless period of bargaining, thereby giving players an increased opportunity to reveal information about their respective reservation values. The data show that subjects quickly learn not to reveal information about their private valuation despite the increased opportunity to bilaterally improve efficiency. Finally, the third study investigates behavior sensitivity to variation in the trading parameter, kappa. Instead of following the historical precedent of setting kappa = 1/2, extreme values of kappa are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing a player with exclusive price-setting power.

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Repeated Games with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262011471
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 372

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Book Description
The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others.

Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation

Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation PDF Author: D. Marc Kilgour
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9048190975
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 473

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Book Description
Publication of the Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation marks a milestone in the evolution of the group decision and negotiation (GDN) eld. On this occasion, editors Colin Eden and Marc Kilgour asked me to write a brief history of the eld to provide background and context for the volume. They said that I am in a good position to do so: Actively involved in creating the GDN Section and serving as its chair; founding and leading the GDN journal, Group Decision and Negotiation as editor-in-chief, and the book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” as editor; and serving as general chair of the GDN annual meetings. I accepted their invitation to write a brief history. In 1989 what is now the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) established its Section on Group Decision and Negotiation. The journal Group Decision and Negotiation was founded in 1992, published by Springer in cooperation with INFORMS and the GDN Section. In 2003, as an ext- sion of the journal, the Springer book series, “Advances in Group Decision and Negotiation” was inaugurated.

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining PDF Author: Alvin E. Roth
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521267579
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 402

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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory.

Bargaining with Incomplete Information

Bargaining with Incomplete Information PDF Author: Peter B. Linhart
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Negotiation
Languages : en
Pages : 576

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Book Description
These 22 contributions to the economic theory of non co-operative bargaining show how incomplete information, small numbers of agents, and the rules governing negotiation interact to cause inefficiency, indeterminacy and delay in bargaining outcomes.