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Author: Kartik Raman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Markets
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Author: Kartik Raman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Markets
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Author: John Andrew Christian Pound
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 105
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Author: Chaoli Guo
Publisher: Open Dissertation Press
ISBN: 9781361276532
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This dissertation, "Three Essays on Capital Market With Incomplete and Asymmetric Information" by Chaoli, Guo, 郭朝莉, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This thesis includes one essay on incomplete information and two essays on the capital market implications of asymmetric information. The acquisition of information and its dissemination to all economic units are central activities in capital markets. Limits to information diffusion may exist when market participants have limited processing ability or when market structure causes information asymmetry to persist. Merton (1987) proposes a simple capital market equilibrium model with incomplete information, in which difference in a stock's investor recognition affects its cost of capital. Myers and Majluf (1984) lay out the theoretical foundation for the role of asymmetric information in corporate finance and its capital market implications. The first essay tests and offers support to Merton's (1987) theory. In the U.S. market, using the breadth of ownership among retail investors as a proxy for investor recognition, I show that a long-short portfolio based on the annual change of shareholder base earns a compounded annual abnormal return of 6.42% after controlling for the Fama-French three factors. These results are more pronounced among young, low visibility and high idiosyncratic volatility stocks. Moreover, I present evidence that the investor recognition effect can explain approximately 20% of the puzzling net equity issuance effect documented by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). The second essay suggests a novel signaling mechanism in the framework of asymmetric information. When a firm's convertible debt is issued, it is not only determined by the fundamentals of the firm such as past stock performance, but also related to whether this performance is realized during the tenure of current CEO who decides the issues. I define the performance that the current CEO achieves in the firm ever since the CEO comes to the helm as CEO-specific performance. Higher CEOspecific performance leads to (1) a higher probability of convertible issues, and (2) a less negative abnormal stock return in response to the convertible issue announcement, controlling for other firm characteristics. These evidences indicate that CEO-specific performance serves as a credible information signal to influence the adverse selection costs between the firm and outside investors in convertible bond financing. The third essay explores the possibility of asymmetric information in explaining the pronounced share issue anomaly in the cross-sectional variations of stock returns, as documented by Pontiff and Woodgate (2008). A lot of equity share issue and repurchase actions are actively determined by the decision of corporate stakeholders, such as employees at the stock options exercises. As these stakeholders hold a large amount of private information about the firm, it is in their optimal decisions to try to time the exercise of their share purchase activity, but outside investors are likely to fail to interpret the information revealed from these actions. I present strong evidence that a negative relation between share issues and stock returns is affected to a greater extent when the information asymmetry problem is more severe. DOI: 10.5353/
Author: Yoonjung Lee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Author: Alessia Testa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Closed-end funds
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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The first part of the thesis consists of three chapters focusing on herd behavior in financial markets. Chapter one reviews the herding literature while chapter two studies a market where informed and noise traders show up sequentially and anonymously in front of a competitive and risk neutral market maker. Traders can in some cases observe whether some of their predecessors were informed, although they cannot observe their private in- formation. This creates an informational asymmetry between the traders and the market maker which generates herd behavior. I find that herd and contrarian behavior is gener- ated more easily in better-informed markets than in poorly informed ones. Informational cascades can never occur and the market learns in the limit. Moreover, I illustrate how a market dominated by herding features a price that is more informative of the asset value than the price of a market where traders always follow their signal. I also discuss how contrarianism has the exact opposite effect by decreasing price informativeness. In chap- ter two I consider the case of multiple trading rooms, where traders can in some cases observe whether some of the predecessors coming from the same room were informed. I first analyze herding conditions for the case of disconnected rooms where agents trading during the same time exhibit information correlation, and find that herding is more likely to occur in a market with positive correlation than in a market without correlation. I then link rooms by means of a network structure which dictates which rooms' predecessors one can observe. I check whether it is possible for a trader to herd with traders outside his own neighborhood instead of with his direct neighbors. I find that the answer to this question is negative and that herding cannot spread from one part of the market to another. Finally, I bring together information correlation and the network structure and I illustrate the example of a market where there are trading histories such that herd behavior can lead to the complete loss of information and, once herding has started, learning can be recovered only if noise traders enter the market. In the second part of the thesis I build a signalling model of delegated portfolio management where the manager can be of different qualities which affect the performance of the closed-end fund under his management. I find that in his effort to appear of high quality, the manager sends signals to the market which affect the share price of the fund in such a way that momentum and reversal are generated. While in the momentum phase, the price accumulates a discount with respect to its net asset value; during the reversal phase, the discount narrows and the price reverses back towards the net asset value of the fund.
Author: Bhanu Balasubramnian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Abstract: This dissertation has two essays on market discipline of banks. In the first essay, we examine whether short sellers can identify and send signals on potentially vulnerable banks through their trading behavior. In the second essay, we identify the reasons for the lack of risk sensitivity of yield spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures. In the first essay, analyzing short sales of bank stocks, we find that short sellers provide credible signals about the future performance of banks through their trading behavior. The short sale characteristics are different for banks relative to a matched sample of non-financial firms. Short sales volume, number of short trades, the ratio of short volume to number of shares outstanding, and the put options outstanding provide signals about future performance of banks. Our results support the conclusions of Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) that banks are not more opaque than less tightly regulated firms for equity traders. Our findings suggest that short sale signals could be used for market discipline and to complement regulation. In the second essay, we find that the determinants of yield spreads vary with market conditions and available information, which has implications for debt pricing models. After the bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998, important firm-specific default risk measures, such as leverage, are not significant factors in determining yield spread levels of bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SND) because these measures do not reflect the true risk of the firm. Return on assets and off-balance sheet items are significant determinants of yield spreads after the LTCM bailout because markets impound a higher cost for higher risk-taking, particularly for the risks from off-balance sheet items, even in the absence of full information. Yield spreads have become less sensitive to firm-specific risks, even prior to the LTCM bailout, after the issuance of trust-preferred securities (TPS) by banks because TPS are junior claims to SND. Yield spreads prior to TPS issuance by banks and the LTCM bailout are sensitive to conventional firm-specific risk measures. Yield spreads at the time of offer on TPS provide market signals about on-balance sheet risks.
Author: Haina Ding
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This dissertation contains three independent essays. The first two essays look at the informational role of stock prices and its impact on the real economy. The last one explores the relationship between managerial incentive and product market competition. In the first essay, two firms compete in a product market and have an opportunity to invest in a risky technology either early on as a leader or later once stock prices reveal the value of the technology. Information leakage thus introduces an option of waiting, which enhances production efficiency. A potential leader may nevertheless be discouraged from investing upfront, when anticipating its competitor to invest later in response to good news. I show that an increase in product market competition increases the option value of waiting but has an ambiguous effect on information production. It may thus be the case that intense competition leads to more leakage such that no firm would invest, especially so in a smaller market. Given a moderate level of competition, price informativeness may improve investment outcome when investment profitability and the market size are relatively large. The second essay examines the feedback effects of certifications in financial markets. A firm has to decide whether to monitor (or to ascertain) internally the prospect of a potential investment or to delegate this task to a certifier who reveals his evaluations to the outsiders. The investment decision is then taken based on all of the information available in the market. The information asymmetry between the firm and lenders is alleviated under delegation, and hence the firm enjoys a lower cost of capital at the financing stage. Delegation however reduces the information advantage of speculators who then make less effort to acquire information. This results in a potential information crowding-out effect. We show that the firm may prefer to delegate when the prior belief about the investment prospect is relatively high, and to choose in-house information production when its own signal is more precise and when its current assets in place generate a higher expected payoff. The third essay considers a spatial competition model with horizontal and vertical differentiation. Two firms are assigned to exogenous locations on a circular city. Consumers, distributed on the circle, need to pay a transportation cost for purchasing. Anticipating a future uncertainty in product quality, firms simultaneously offer incentive contracts to managers to induce an optimal effort level. I show that competition may adversely affects incentives, as a lower transportation cost impairs a firm's local market power and consequently reduces a firm's marginal benefit from producing a high quality product, particularly when its competitor also produces a high quality product. On the other hand, greater competition reduces a firm's profit if it fails to improve product quality. This effect increases the optimal effort level and becomes dominant if the quality improvement is relatively large compared to the effort cost. Moreover, a large decrease in the transportation cost may change the market structure, such that the firm with better quality goods attracts all the demand, and thus the positive effect of competition on managerial effort becomes more significant.
Author: Gerard Debreu
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662046237
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 363
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Book Description
Back in the good old days on the fourth floor of the Altbau of Bonn's Ju ridicum, Werner Hildenbrand put an end to a debate about a festschrift in honor of an economist on the occasion of his turning 60 with a laconic: "Much too early." Remembering his position five years ago, we did not dare to think about one for him. But now he has turned 65. If consulted, he would most likely still answer: "Much too early." However, he has to take his official re tirement, and we believe that this is the right moment for such an endeavor. No doubt Werner Hildenbrand will not really retire. As professor emeritus, free from the constraints of a rigid teaching schedule and the burden of com mittee meetings, he will be able to indulge his passions. We expect him to pursue, with undiminished enthusiasm, his research, travel, golfing, the arts, and culinary pleasures - escaping real retirement.
Author: Sujung Choi
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781267533203
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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Book Description
This dissertation consists of two essays. In the first essay, "Investor misvaluation, signaling, and takeovers: Evidence from closed-end fund discounts", I investigate investor misvaluation as a motivation for closed-end fund mergers and acquisitions (M & As). Following previous studies, I view the closed-end fund discount as a proxy for investor misvaluation at the individual fund level. When a closed-end fund suffers from investor misvaluation in the stock market, closed-end fund M & As can be served to investors to signal a rosy prospect for the closed-end fund, or a synergy effect. Using comprehensive data of closed-end fund M & As from 1994 through 2009, I find that (1) both acquirer and target funds experience deep fund discounts over pre-announcement periods and (2) acquirer funds are less likely to be undervalued than target funds, and target funds are more deeply undervalued than acquirer funds when M & As occur. After M & A announcements, fund discounts shrink for targets, but go slightly deeper for acquirers. In the long run, fund discounts of the combined funds shrink even for acquirers, and the misvaluation on acquirer and target closed-end funds is corrected. Post-merger objective-adjusted performance initially improves for both acquirer and target funds because of the synergies perceived by investors, but generally worsens on average in the third year following the M & As. In the second essay, "Herding among individual investors in the Korean stock market", I investigate whether herding among local individual investors exists in the Korean stock market. I examine the hypothesis of whether a potential investor's decision, such as picking a particular stock within a given period, correlates with the decisions of neighbors living in the same area. Using a unique dataset on individual online and offline trading obtained from a brokerage firm in Korea, I analyze the buying and selling transactions of 10,000 individual accounts from February 1999 to December 2005. By employing the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), I report that individual investors herd on a given stock-month and stock-day. Offline investors in the same local area exhibit stronger herding compared to online investors. Using OLS regressions, I find that own-area effects, or correlated trades by individual investors who are geographically close, are stronger compared to other-area effects in both contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. Investors who are male, wealthy, and non-religious tend to invest more in the stock market compared to investors who are female and Protestant.
Author: Wan-Jung Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Finance
Languages : en
Pages : 130
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Book Description
This dissertation aims to investigate the interaction between financial markets and the real economy both in the short-run and the long-run. The first two chapters study the distinct interactions between different states of stock markets and the real economy at monthly frequencies. The third chapter studies the causality between financial development and the economic growth at business cycle frequencies (i.e., three or five-year spells). The first chapter focuses on forecasting the states of the stock market. While previous literature classifies the stock market into binary states (i.e., bull and bear markets), I further classify U.S. stock bear markets into good bear and bad bear markets. The latter are the bear markets associated with contraction phases of future cash flows, while the former are not. Most bad bear markets are accompanied with NBER declared recessions, whereas good bear markets are not accompanied with serious depressions in the real economy. Commonly used macroeconomic predictors also signal differently in forecasting these two types of bear markets. The value premium has distinct magnitude across the two types of bear markets. By applying a multinomial logit model with three alternatives (bull, good bear, and bad bear markets) to predict stock market states, I provide richer information about stock market states which is beneficial for policy makers and investors. In the second chapter, I examine the reliability and timeliness of using stock bad bear markets as early warning signals of economic recessions. I find that bad bear markets are much more reliable to predict recessions than conventional stock bear markets or the forecasting model that targets recessions directly. The forecasting model that predicts bad bear markets also provide timely information about the starts and the ends of economic recessions over NBER announcements. In the third chapter, I revisit the debate of "too much finance" on economic growth. I use different econometric methods in the dynamic panel data framework to address potential biases induced by the dynamic nature of economic growth and financial development but control the heterogeneity across countries. Particularly, I conduct a battery of robustness tests to examine weak instrument problems in the system GMM estimator, developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), and use Half-Panel Jackknife Fixed-Effect estimator, developed by Chudik, Pesaran, and Yang (2016), as an alternative method. I also take care of the outlier issue, which is particularly sensitive when there is nearly multicollinearity among explanatory variables. My empirical results find no sufficient evidence to support a positive causal effect, nor do I find a quadratic effect of financial development on economic growth.
