Author: William M. Donnelly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War
Author: William M. Donnelly
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government publications
Languages : en
Pages : 104
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War: Designing the Modular Force, 1991-2005
Author: William M. Donnelly
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 0160867320
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 123
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN: 0160867320
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 123
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
War Transformed
Author: Mick Ryan
Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 9781682477410
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
"War Transformed provides insights for those involved in the design of military strategy, and the forces that must execute that strategy. Emphasizing the impacts of technology, new era strategic competition, demography, and climate change, Mick Ryan uses historical as well as contemporary anecdotes throughout the book to highlight key challenges faced by nations in a new era of great power rivalry"--
Publisher: US Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 9781682477410
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Book Description
"War Transformed provides insights for those involved in the design of military strategy, and the forces that must execute that strategy. Emphasizing the impacts of technology, new era strategic competition, demography, and climate change, Mick Ryan uses historical as well as contemporary anecdotes throughout the book to highlight key challenges faced by nations in a new era of great power rivalry"--
Transforming Military Power since the Cold War
Author: Theo Farrell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107044324
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
An empirically rich account of how the West's main war-fighting armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107044324
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 321
Book Description
An empirically rich account of how the West's main war-fighting armies have transformed since the end of the Cold War.
Transforming and Army at War
Author: William M Donnelly
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781072574170
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units - combat, support, and headquarters - that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army's ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army's program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN: 9781072574170
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 100
Book Description
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for developing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units - combat, support, and headquarters - that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army's ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army's program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
After the Trenches
Author: William O. Odom
Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
ISBN: 9780890968383
Category : Military doctrine
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
At the end of the Great War, the U.S. Army faced the challenge of integrating what it had learned in the failures and ultimate success of its war effort. During the interwar years the army sought to balance readiness and modernization in a period of limited resources and technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. In After the Trenches, William O. Odom traces the development of combat doctrine between the world wars through an examination of the army's primary doctrine manuals, the Field Service Regulations. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 successfully assimilated the experiences of the First World War and translated them into viable tactical practice, Odom argues in this unique study. Rapidly developing technologies generated more efficient tools of war and greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. Personnel and materiel shortages led to a decline in the quality of army doctrine evidenced in the 1939 regulations. Examining the development of doctrine and the roles of key personalities such as John Pershing, Hugh Drum, George Lynch, Frank Parker, and Lesley McNair, Odom concludes that the successive revisions of the manual left the army scurrying to modernize its woefully outdated doctrine on the eve of the new war. This impressively researched study of the doctrine of the interwar army fills a significant gap in our understanding of the development of the U.S. Army during the first half of the twentieth century. It will serve scholars and others interested in military history as the standard reference on the subject. Moreover, many of the challenges and conditions that existed seventy years ago resemble those faced by today's army. This study of the army's historical responses to a declining military budget and an ever-changing technology will broaden the perspectives of those who must deal with these important contemporary issues.
Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
ISBN: 9780890968383
Category : Military doctrine
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Book Description
At the end of the Great War, the U.S. Army faced the challenge of integrating what it had learned in the failures and ultimate success of its war effort. During the interwar years the army sought to balance readiness and modernization in a period of limited resources and technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. In After the Trenches, William O. Odom traces the development of combat doctrine between the world wars through an examination of the army's primary doctrine manuals, the Field Service Regulations. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 successfully assimilated the experiences of the First World War and translated them into viable tactical practice, Odom argues in this unique study. Rapidly developing technologies generated more efficient tools of war and greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. Personnel and materiel shortages led to a decline in the quality of army doctrine evidenced in the 1939 regulations. Examining the development of doctrine and the roles of key personalities such as John Pershing, Hugh Drum, George Lynch, Frank Parker, and Lesley McNair, Odom concludes that the successive revisions of the manual left the army scurrying to modernize its woefully outdated doctrine on the eve of the new war. This impressively researched study of the doctrine of the interwar army fills a significant gap in our understanding of the development of the U.S. Army during the first half of the twentieth century. It will serve scholars and others interested in military history as the standard reference on the subject. Moreover, many of the challenges and conditions that existed seventy years ago resemble those faced by today's army. This study of the army's historical responses to a declining military budget and an ever-changing technology will broaden the perspectives of those who must deal with these important contemporary issues.
100 Turning Points in Military History
Author: Alan Axelrod
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1493037463
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 369
Book Description
The typical military history presents a chronicle of battles and wars and the commanders and troops who fought them. This book takes a different approach. It presents battles and wars and people aplenty, but they are not its ultimate subjects. This book is about the turning points that not only make military history dynamic but crucial to the story of humanity and civilization. This book is about the decisions, acts, innovations, errors, ideas, successes, and failures that shaped the evolution of military art and science—strategy, tactics, and technology—and, in doing so, shaped the course of world history. Here are the 100 points—from the birth of warfare in the Battle of Megiddo, 1457 BC, to the ongoing evolution of military history on its newest battlefield, cyberspace—at which the path of the warrior decisively turned on its long journey to where we find ourselves today.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1493037463
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 369
Book Description
The typical military history presents a chronicle of battles and wars and the commanders and troops who fought them. This book takes a different approach. It presents battles and wars and people aplenty, but they are not its ultimate subjects. This book is about the turning points that not only make military history dynamic but crucial to the story of humanity and civilization. This book is about the decisions, acts, innovations, errors, ideas, successes, and failures that shaped the evolution of military art and science—strategy, tactics, and technology—and, in doing so, shaped the course of world history. Here are the 100 points—from the birth of warfare in the Battle of Megiddo, 1457 BC, to the ongoing evolution of military history on its newest battlefield, cyberspace—at which the path of the warrior decisively turned on its long journey to where we find ourselves today.
Mars Adapting
Author: Francis Hoffman
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682475905
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Book Description
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 1682475905
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 297
Book Description
As Clausewitz observed, “In war more than anywhere else, things do not turn out as we expect.” The essence of war is a competitive reciprocal relationship with an adversary. Commanders and institutional leaders must recognize shortfalls and resolve gaps rapidly in the middle of the fog of war. The side that reacts best (and absorbs faster) increases its chances of winning. Mars Adapting examines what makes some military organizations better at this contest than others. It explores the institutional characteristics or attributes at play in learning quickly. Adaptation requires a dynamic process of acquiring knowledge, the utilization of that knowledge to alter a unit’s skills, and the sharing of that learning to other units to integrate and institutionalize better operational practice. Mars Adapting explores the internal institutional factors that promote and enable military adaptation. It employs four cases, drawing upon one from each of the U.S. armed services. Each case was an extensive campaign, with several cycles of action/counteraction. In each case the military institution entered the war with an existing mental model of the war they expected to fight. For example, the U.S. Navy prepared for decades to defeat the Japanese Imperial Navy and had developed carried-based aviation. Other capabilities, particularly the Fleet submarine, were applied as a major adaptation. The author establishes a theory called Organizational Learning Capacity that captures the transition of experience and knowledge from individuals into larger and higher levels of each military service through four major steps. The learning/change cycle is influenced, he argues, by four institutional attributes (leadership, organizational culture, learning mechanisms, and dissemination mechanisms). The dynamic interplay of these institutional enablers shaped their ability to perceive and change appropriately.
The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76
Author: Robert A. Doughty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 68
Book Description
This paper focuses on the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than ever before. Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to the business of how the Army's doctrine has developed historically, with a view to improving methods of future development.
Innovation, Transformation, and War
Author: James Russell
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804777489
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 284
Book Description
Within a year of President George W. Bush announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, dozens of attacks by insurgents had claimed hundreds of civilian and military lives. Through 2004 and 2005, accounts from returning veterans presaged an unfolding strategic debacle—potentially made worse by U.S. tactics being focused on extending conventionally oriented military operations rather than on adapting to the insurgency. By 2007, however, a sea change had taken place, and some U.S. units were integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect. In the main, the government and the media cited three factors for having turned the tide on the battlefield: the promulgation of a new joint counterinsurgency doctrine, the "surge" in troop numbers, and the appointment of General David Petraeus as senior military commander. James Russell, however, contends that local security had already improved greatly in Anbar and Ninewah between 2005 and 2007 thanks to the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders—evidenced most notably in the turning of tribal leaders against Al Qaeda. In Innovation, Transformation, and War, he goes behind the headlines to reveal—through extensive field research and face-to-face interviews with military and civilian personnel of all ranks—how a group of Army and Marine Corps units successfully innovated in an unprecedented way: from the bottom up as well as from the top down. In the process they transformed themselves from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations into ones with a unique array of capabilities for a full spectrum of combat operations. As well as telling an inspiring story, this book will be an invaluable reference for anyone tasked with driving innovation in any kind of complex organization.
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 0804777489
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 284
Book Description
Within a year of President George W. Bush announcing the end of major combat operations in Iraq in May 2003, dozens of attacks by insurgents had claimed hundreds of civilian and military lives. Through 2004 and 2005, accounts from returning veterans presaged an unfolding strategic debacle—potentially made worse by U.S. tactics being focused on extending conventionally oriented military operations rather than on adapting to the insurgency. By 2007, however, a sea change had taken place, and some U.S. units were integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect. In the main, the government and the media cited three factors for having turned the tide on the battlefield: the promulgation of a new joint counterinsurgency doctrine, the "surge" in troop numbers, and the appointment of General David Petraeus as senior military commander. James Russell, however, contends that local security had already improved greatly in Anbar and Ninewah between 2005 and 2007 thanks to the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders—evidenced most notably in the turning of tribal leaders against Al Qaeda. In Innovation, Transformation, and War, he goes behind the headlines to reveal—through extensive field research and face-to-face interviews with military and civilian personnel of all ranks—how a group of Army and Marine Corps units successfully innovated in an unprecedented way: from the bottom up as well as from the top down. In the process they transformed themselves from organizations structured and trained for conventional military operations into ones with a unique array of capabilities for a full spectrum of combat operations. As well as telling an inspiring story, this book will be an invaluable reference for anyone tasked with driving innovation in any kind of complex organization.