Three Essays on the Market for Corporate Control

Three Essays on the Market for Corporate Control PDF Author: Jennifer Ariadne Hawkins Van Heeckeren
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 504

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Three Essays on the Market for Corporate Control

Three Essays on the Market for Corporate Control PDF Author: Jennifer Ariadne Hawkins Van Heeckeren
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 504

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Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control

Three Essays on Corporate Governance and Control PDF Author: Susan Christine Sassalos
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 198

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The Market for Corporate Control.The Theory and the Empirical Evidence

The Market for Corporate Control.The Theory and the Empirical Evidence PDF Author: Marius Beckermann
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3656868182
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 29

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Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Business economics - Investment and Finance, grade: 1,3, Otto Beisheim School of Management Vallendar (Chair for Corporate Finance), course: Seminar on Recent Developments in Corporate Governance, language: English, abstract: The market for corporate control, often referred to as the takeover market, is subject to scientific research since many years. This paper starts with Manne‘s (1965) initial essay on the topic, introduce the theory of the market for corporate control. Therefore, it will begin with a definition of the terms “corporate control” and “the market for corporate control”. Following this, it will explain the possibilities of taking over the control of a corporation. Subsequently, it will argue why the market for corporate control is of great importance. Afterwards, a synopsis on the current empirical evidence of its efficiency follows. Finally, the author takes a look on the welfare effects of the market for corporate control, before concluding on its applicability and having a look on solutions to correct the imperfections of the model.

Three Essays on Corporate Governance

Three Essays on Corporate Governance PDF Author: Aazam Virani
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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The Market Value of Corporate Control

The Market Value of Corporate Control PDF Author: Marco Poltera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Essays on the Market for Corporate Control

Essays on the Market for Corporate Control PDF Author: Marc Umber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : de
Pages : 167

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Two Essays on Corporate Activities and the Market for Corporate Control

Two Essays on Corporate Activities and the Market for Corporate Control PDF Author: Zheng Liu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781361330623
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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This dissertation, "Two Essays on Corporate Activities and the Market for Corporate Control" by Zheng, Liu, 刘峥, was obtained from The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong) and is being sold pursuant to Creative Commons: Attribution 3.0 Hong Kong License. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altered the formatting in order to facilitate the ease of printing and reading of the dissertation. All rights not granted by the above license are retained by the author. Abstract: This dissertation addresses concerns regarding corporate activities in relation to agency costs and studies the effect of the market for corporate control. In the first essay, we use the mid-1990s Delaware takeover regime shift as an exogenous shock to examine how the removal of takeover threats affects managerial decisions on corporate financing and investment and how it affects firm value. Based on a differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach, we find that managers reduce debt financing and increase capital investment when they are protected against hostile takeovers, which is consistent with managerial agency models of capital structure and the free cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986). We demonstrate that engaging in these entrenched behaviors consequently destroys firm value. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the effect of the takeover regime shift is more pronounced in firms with fewer institutional holdings or lower managerial ownership, supporting the argument of Jensen (1993) that effective internal control systems can alleviate the negative outcomes of a weakened market for corporate control. The substitution effect of internal controls is more substantial than that of the external product market competition. Finally, we determine that empire building, rather than quiet life, is the main consequence of a weakened market for corporate control. In the second essay, we directly examine the causal relationship between managerial entrenchment and diversification. We demonstrate that more entrenched managers adopt higher levels of diversification than do less entrenched managers. We verify the result by using two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression and treating entrenchment as endogenous. In addition, based on an exogenous change in takeover legislation in Delaware in the mid-1990s, we adopt the differences-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach and demonstrate that managers increase diversification activities when they are protected against hostile takeovers. Given that diversification destroys value, these results are consistent with the agency costs explanation of diversification. We then explore the motivations that drive managers to diversify. We document that entrenched managers diversify to gain private benefits and to reduce firm risk. Finally, we demonstrate that CEO equity-based incentives increase when takeover-protected firms diversify, suggesting that firms proactively respond to counterbalance the increased costs associated with discretional diversification, which is consistent with theories of optimal contract. DOI: 10.5353/th_b5153698 Subjects: Capital investments Corporate governance Corporations - Finance

Three Essays on Corporate Governance

Three Essays on Corporate Governance PDF Author: Michael John Fleming
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 236

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Governance and the Market for Corporate Control

Governance and the Market for Corporate Control PDF Author: John L. Teall
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317834712
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 288

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Book Description
Governance and the Market for Corporate Control is a textbook for use on business courses dealing with mergers, acquisitions, governance restructuring and corporate control. Three key features distinguish this book from competing texts. First, following up on recent developments in the corporate arena, it places a heavy emphasis on managerial compensation, incentives and corporate performance. Second, its conciseness allows for flexibility of use. Third, its coverage is broad and examines many topics including: significant discussions of corporate governance power and voting managerial compensation takeovers going private transactions corporate restructuring event study methodology. As well as combining theoretical, empirical, quantitative and practitioner-oriented matter, the material in this key book provides the academic foundation necessary to ensure students’ understanding of important concepts.

Three Essays on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism, and Economic Policy Risk

Three Essays on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Activism, and Economic Policy Risk PDF Author: Marcel Maier
Publisher:
ISBN: 9783750240575
Category :
Languages : de
Pages :

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