Three essays on random mechanism design

Three essays on random mechanism design PDF Author: Huaxia Zeng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 163

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Book Description
"This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible preferences. Every voter reports a preference in the domain; a preference profile is generated; and the social lottery then is determined by a Random Social Choice Function (or RSCF). This dissertation focuses on RSCFs which provide every voter incentives to truthfully reveal her preference, and hence follows the formulation of strategy proofness in [26] which requires that the lottery under truth telling (first-order) stochastically dominates the lottery under any misrepresentation according to every voter’s true preference independently of others’ behaviors. Moreover, this dissertation restricts attention to the class of unanimous RSCFs, that is, if the alternative is the best for all voters in a preference profile, it receives probability one. A typical class of unanimous and strategy-proof RSCFs is random dictatorships. A domain is a random dictatorship domain if every unanimous and strategy proof RSCF is a random dictatorship... "-- Author's abstract.