Three Essays on Public Economics and Heterogeneity PDF Download
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Author: Anderson Luís Schneider
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Book Description
Author: Anderson Luís Schneider
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 262
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Book Description
Author: Angela Christine Milano Oliveira
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 220
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Book Description
I conduct three studies to explore the variability in individual social preferences, the stability of these preferences across decision contexts, and the relationship between these preferences and public good provision. In my first essay, I use an experimental design to elicit both unconditional and conditional (based on others' contribution decisions) provision strategies from each participant. I systematically vary the homogeneity of group composition and the information made available to subjects about it. I examine the effects of an individual's own type, group composition and information on contributions.
Author: Sarani Saha
Publisher: ProQuest
ISBN: 9780549363200
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 238
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This thesis considers the problem of provision of public good--both global and domestic. The first part of the thesis looks at how heterogeneity among countries affect their incentives to join an international environmental agreement (IEA). Understanding the effects of heterogeneity is important in designing international treaties like the Kyoto protocol. The countries differ in damage costs from emissions. A two-stage game of IEA formation is solved and analyzed to reflect the effect of heterogeneity. Given the damage costs, the model can predict analytically the size and type of an agreement. The results indicate that the agreement is larger in presence of heterogeneity than it is when all the countries are homogeneous. The trade-off result between depth and breadth of an agreement, as found in the models with identical countries, is present in the heterogeneous case as well. Broad agreements are found to be shallow while deep agreements are narrow.
Author: Robert Laurent Scharff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Author: Jeffrey Andrew Hemmeter
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Author: Manfredo Alejandro Dix
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Author: Christian Rafael Jaramillo Herrera
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Author: Jeffrey Robert Traczynski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 105
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Author: Lee Kangoh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public goods
Languages : en
Pages : 204
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The first essay extends the theory of clubs by stating new conditions, spatially-limited altruism, under which mixed clubs are optimal. With such altruism, the nonpoor members of society care more about the poor living near them than about those living farther away. While the proximity of the poor gives mixed communities an altruistic advantage over homogeneous communities, the intermixing of rich and poor generates an efficiency loss in public consumption. As a result, a mixed community configuration may or may not be superior to a homogeneous configuration. The second essay addresses the potential optimality of multiproduct clubs when the joint cost function of such clubs exhibits economies of scope. On the one hand, the joint provision of public goods in multiproduct clubs leads to cost savings under economies of scope. However, there is an efficiency loss from such clubs, since consumption group sizes cannot be set individually for each good. The analysis formalizes these costs and benefits and deriving conditions under which multiproduct clubs are desirable. The third essay analyses the effect of public provision of a loss-preventive good on competitive equilibrium of an insurance market under moral hazard. The primary advantage of public provision lies in its ability to produce information, which eliminates moral hazard. On the other hand, it leads to a different cost of providing the good because of scale (dis)economies in public consumption and production as well as consumption inefficiency with nonidentical individuals. The analysis formalizes this benefit and cost involved in public provision.
Author: Jose Gabriel Castillo Garcia
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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The three essays in this thesis foster the identification of unexpected influences of different institutional arrangements on economic outcomes. The first two essays, experimental in nature, analyze the impact of two different contexts within Public Goods Games (PGG) environments. The first essay documents exact replications of four classic experiments in PGG and cast unexpected results in contribution behavior. First, it shows how the attenuation effect in replication studies, well documented in other disciplines, is also pervasive in experimental economics. Not all previous findings replicate, and effects found in successful replications are much smaller. Second, it shows that experimental context matters; experimental subjects in Texas tend to contribute more and free ride less, across different experiments. The second essay analyzes whether democratic institutions have any impact on agency problems where group members face a centralized arrangement of sanctioning power. It offers novel evidence, although a weak effect, of the intrinsic incentives for pro-social behavior attached to legitimacy in democratic institutions to promote collective action and higher economic efficiency. Finally, the last essay offers an empirical alternative to unravel heterogeneous unobserved traits on credit market customers. Through the use of mixture density estimation methods and rich administrative data, it identifies different quality-types of clients for credit demand and default decisions. Credit customers differ in their individual preferences, as well as levels of foresight, strategic behavior; all unobserved by the principal (lender). Accounting for these unobserved traits improves the forecast of potential clients' behavior and offers alternatives for different contracts and risk-pricing strategies to reduce credit rationing. The electronic version of this dissertation is accessible from http://hdl.handle.net/1969.1/155533
