Three Essays in Applied Market Design PDF Download
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Author: Juan Francisco Fung
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Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Juan Francisco Fung
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Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Lucien Frys
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Category :
Languages : en
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Author: Rustamdjan Hakimov
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Category :
Languages : en
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Author: Deddy Priatmodjo Koesrindartoto
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 346
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Three papers in this dissertation are entirely self-contained. The papers are linked both through the methodologies used and through the issues addressed. Each of the paper seeks to understand the complexity effects of market design issues by using agent-based computational economic approach. The first essay addresses the question of which auction pricing rule should Treasury use that yields the highest revenue, especially whether the Treasury should use a discriminatory-price rule or a uniform-price one. Computational experiments are carefully designed based on four treatment factors: (1) the buyers' learning representation; (2) the number of buyers participating in the auction; (3) the total security demand capacity of buyers relative to the Treasury offered security supply (4) volatility of security prices in the secondary market. Key findings in this study show that Treasury revenue varies systematically with changes of treatments factor. The second essay tries to answer the question of what is the best bidding rule for multi-unit sealed-bid double auctions. Extending the earlier theoretical work which suggested that submitting supply offers in the form of price-quantity supply functions P(Q) will benefit the seller under one-sided auction with uncertain demand. However, this study results show that under double-sided multi-unit auction in which seller face a similar uncertain demand, submitting P(Q) supply offers not necessarily benefited sellers. Moreover, strategic interaction effects among players using P(Q) rules can lower sellers profit and overall market efficiency. Such insights are critical, especially to market designers who are concerned about the detailed aspects of market design implementation. The third essay addresses the experimental testing of the recently proposed wholesale power market design by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. This Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP) is a complex market that requires market participants to simultaneously bid into real-time, day-ahead, ancillary, and transmission rights markets. The study main goals are to gain understanding the nature of this complex market design, at the same time to test whether WPMP design results in efficient, fair, robust market operations overtime, especially under conditions in which participants' strive to gain market power through strategic pricing, capacity withholding, and any other imaginable strategies.
Author: Andrew Seong Kiat Tan
Publisher:
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Category : Futures market
Languages : en
Pages : 398
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Author: Kentaro Tomoeda
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Category :
Languages : en
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This thesis consists of three essays on mechanism and market design.
Author: Eric Samuel Mayefsky
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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I explore fundamental behavioral aspects of several market design environments in a variety of projects using both theoretical models and laboratory experiments. I show that human tendencies can drastically shift potential outcomes away from those which would result if individuals were fully 'rational' and unbiased in decision problems similar to those found frequently in the field. I explore two common classes of centralized matching mechanisms--Deferred Acceptance and Priority--which have wildly different success rates in practice despite both being open to manipulation by agents who have incomplete information about the other participants in the match. For this reason, theory predicts both mechanisms in equilibrium will yield match outcomes which are unstable, meaning some agents will desire to renegotiate with one another after receiving their match assignments, and thus reduce participants' confidence in using the match. I provide laboratory evidence that out-of-equilibrium truth telling by agents is substantially more frequent in the Deferred Acceptance environment and thus Deferred Acceptance matches will generally be more stable in practice than matches using a Priority mechanism. This may explain why Deferred Acceptance mechanisms appear to be more viable in the field. I also explore two different models of decentralized two-sided matching environments where establishing scarce signaling methods can improve market outcomes. In a laboratory experiment, I show that allowing potential receiving job offers to send a single signal to their favorite potential employer before job offers are made increases overall match rates in the market, but is potentially damaging to the firms making offers when compared to the market without such a signal. Then, in a theoretical model where pre-offer communication takes the form of an interview process where workers have natural limits on the number of interviews in which they can participate, I show that in many cases firms can benefit themselves and the market as a whole by voluntarily restricting the number of interviews they offer to participate in. While not traditionally thought of as market design problems, voting mechanisms are fundamentally goods allocation problems as well and have many of the same issues as traditional markets do. I explore the effects of voter bias on outcomes in an otherwise standard voting model and find that even slight external pressure on individuals in a committee tasked with coming to a collective decision can destroy the ability of that committee to arrive at the correct result, even when individuals have good information about the best decision to make. Furthermore, the quality of the decision made by such a committee can actually degrade as the committee size increases, in contrast with the canonical Condorcet Jury Theorem which predicts that a committee's ability to choose the right outcome increases quickly as more members are added.
Author: Joseph E. Duggan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 119
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The third chapter of the dissertation studies a one sided many-to-many matching model called the Stable Fixtures problem. First studied by Irving and Scott (2007), the Stable Fixtures Problem is a generalization of the Stable Roommates problem. A pair-wise stable matching is not guaranteed to exist for a given instance of the fixtures problem. In this chapter, a psychologically motivated class of preferences that guarantees the existence of a pair-wise stable matching are explored and potential applications of this model for electricity markets are discussed.
Author: Tim Brühn
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Iván Blanco
Publisher: Ed. Universidad de Cantabria
ISBN: 8481028770
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Do financial derivatives enhance or impede innovation? We aim to answer this question by examining the relationship between equity options markets and standard measures of firm innovation. Our baseline results show that firms with more options trading activity generate more patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D invested. We then investigate how more active options markets affect firms' innovation strategy. Our results suggest that firms with greater trading activity pursue a more creative, diverse and risky innovation strategy. We discuss potential underlying mechanisms and show that options appear to mitigate managerial career concerns that would induce managers to take actions that boost short-term performance measures. Finally, using several econometric specifications that try to account for the potential endogeneity of options trading, we argue that the positive effect of options trading on firm innovation is causal.
