Author: Jack Robles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Evolution
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
Three Essays in Evolutionary Game Theory
Author: Jack Robles
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Evolution
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Evolution
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications
Author: Jun Tanimoto
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431549625
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 223
Book Description
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431549625
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 223
Book Description
This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-strategy game. This game, usually termed a "2×2 game” in the jargon, has been deemed most important because it makes it possible to posit an archetype framework that can be extended to various applications for engineering, the social sciences, and even pure science fields spanning theoretical biology, physics, economics, politics, and information science. The 2×2 game is in fact one of the hottest issues in the field of statistical physics. The book first shows how the fundamental theory of the 2×2 game, based on so-called replicator dynamics, highlights its potential relation with nonlinear dynamical systems. This analytical approach implies that there is a gap between theoretical and reality-based prognoses observed in social systems of humans as well as in those of animal species. The book explains that this perceived gap is the result of an underlying reciprocity mechanism called social viscosity. As a second major point, the book puts a sharp focus on network reciprocity, one of the five fundamental mechanisms for adding social viscosity to a system and one that has been a great concern for study by statistical physicists in the past decade. The book explains how network reciprocity works for emerging cooperation, and readers can clearly understand the existence of substantial mechanics when the term "network reciprocity" is used. In the latter part of the book, readers will find several interesting examples in which evolutionary game theory is applied. One such example is traffic flow analysis. Traffic flow is one of the subjects that fluid dynamics can deal with, although flowing objects do not comprise a pure fluid but, rather, are a set of many particles. Applying the framework of evolutionary games to realistic traffic flows, the book reveals that social dilemma structures lie behind traffic flow.
Understanding Strategic Interaction
Author: Wulf Albers
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642604951
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 526
Book Description
Strategic interaction occurs whenever it depends on others what one finally obtains: on markets, in firms, in politics etc. Game theorists analyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social interaction. The volume contains innovative contributions, surveys of previous work and two interviews which shed new light on these important topics of the research agenda. The contributions come from highly regarded researchers from all over the world who like to express in this way their intellectual inspiration by the Nobel-laureate Reinhard Selten.
Essays on Epistemology and Evolutionary Game Theory
Author: Elias Tsakas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 90
Book Description
Evolution, Rationality and Cognition
Author: Antonio Zilhao
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134230613
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 200
Book Description
Evolutionary thinking has expanded in the last decades, spreading from its traditional stronghold – the explanation of speciation and adaptation in biology - to new domains. Fascinating pieces of work, the essays in this collection attest to the illuminating power of evolutionary thinking when applied to the understanding of the human mind. The contributors to Cognition, Evolution and Rationality use an evolutionary standpoint to approach the nature of the human mind, including both cognitive and behavioural functions. Cognitive science is by its nature an interdisciplinary subject and the essays in this collection investigate the workings of the mind through a variety of disciplines including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, game theory, robotics and computational neuroanatomy. Topics covered range from general methodological issues to long-standing philosophical problems such as how rational human beings actually are. With contributions from leading experts in the areas involved, this book will be of interest across a number of fields, including philosophy, evolutionary theory and cognitive science.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134230613
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 200
Book Description
Evolutionary thinking has expanded in the last decades, spreading from its traditional stronghold – the explanation of speciation and adaptation in biology - to new domains. Fascinating pieces of work, the essays in this collection attest to the illuminating power of evolutionary thinking when applied to the understanding of the human mind. The contributors to Cognition, Evolution and Rationality use an evolutionary standpoint to approach the nature of the human mind, including both cognitive and behavioural functions. Cognitive science is by its nature an interdisciplinary subject and the essays in this collection investigate the workings of the mind through a variety of disciplines including the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind, game theory, robotics and computational neuroanatomy. Topics covered range from general methodological issues to long-standing philosophical problems such as how rational human beings actually are. With contributions from leading experts in the areas involved, this book will be of interest across a number of fields, including philosophy, evolutionary theory and cognitive science.
Three Essays on Firm Learning
Author: William Martín Tracy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 320
Book Description
The Evolution of Cooperation
Author: Robert Axelrod
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Publisher: Basic Books
ISBN: 0786734884
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 258
Book Description
A famed political scientist's classic argument for a more cooperative world We assume that, in a world ruled by natural selection, selfishness pays. So why cooperate? In The Evolution of Cooperation, political scientist Robert Axelrod seeks to answer this question. In 1980, he organized the famed Computer Prisoners Dilemma Tournament, which sought to find the optimal strategy for survival in a particular game. Over and over, the simplest strategy, a cooperative program called Tit for Tat, shut out the competition. In other words, cooperation, not unfettered competition, turns out to be our best chance for survival. A vital book for leaders and decision makers, The Evolution of Cooperation reveals how cooperative principles help us think better about everything from military strategy, to political elections, to family dynamics.
Rational Decisions
Author: Ken Binmore
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400833094
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400833094
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 214
Book Description
It is widely held that Bayesian decision theory is the final word on how a rational person should make decisions. However, Leonard Savage--the inventor of Bayesian decision theory--argued that it would be ridiculous to use his theory outside the kind of small world in which it is always possible to "look before you leap." If taken seriously, this view makes Bayesian decision theory inappropriate for the large worlds of scientific discovery and macroeconomic enterprise. When is it correct to use Bayesian decision theory--and when does it need to be modified? Using a minimum of mathematics, Rational Decisions clearly explains the foundations of Bayesian decision theory and shows why Savage restricted the theory's application to small worlds. The book is a wide-ranging exploration of standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty. Ken Binmore discusses the various philosophical attitudes related to the nature of probability and offers resolutions to paradoxes believed to hinder further progress. In arguing that the Bayesian approach to knowledge is inadequate in a large world, Binmore proposes an extension to Bayesian decision theory--allowing the idea of a mixed strategy in game theory to be expanded to a larger set of what Binmore refers to as "muddled" strategies. Written by one of the world's leading game theorists, Rational Decisions is the touchstone for anyone needing a concise, accessible, and expert view on Bayesian decision making.
Evolutionary Games and Poverty Traps
Author: Edgar J. Sánchez Carrera
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
ISBN: 1443886343
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
This book explores how persistent states of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than fully rational. Standard growth theory teaches that poverty traps are stable, low-level balanced growth paths to which economies gravitate due to adverse initial conditions or poor equilibrium selection. In other words, societies fail to take off into sustained growth because they started out as poor, with, for example, low longevity or poor human capital, or because they cannot invent institutions that successfully coordinate their investments. Evolutionary Games and Poverty Traps explains this pernicious form of coordination failure as a game between economic agents, such as, for example, firms investing in research and development and workers investing in human capital. Rates of return on research and development depend on average human capital, and rates of return on human capital depend on aggregate research and development spending. The outcome is a self-confirming equilibrium in evolutionary stable strategies in which unsuccessful players imitate successful ones. This equilibrium is particularly interesting in that in poor economies with a large fraction of low-human-capital workers or low research and development firms, imitative strategies do not support a take-off into sustained growth. To achieve such a take-off, society should subsidize the cost of education or research and development until the economy builds a critical mass of human capital or research and development.
Publisher: Cambridge Scholars Publishing
ISBN: 1443886343
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Book Description
This book explores how persistent states of underdevelopment can arise in strategic environments in which players are imitative rather than fully rational. Standard growth theory teaches that poverty traps are stable, low-level balanced growth paths to which economies gravitate due to adverse initial conditions or poor equilibrium selection. In other words, societies fail to take off into sustained growth because they started out as poor, with, for example, low longevity or poor human capital, or because they cannot invent institutions that successfully coordinate their investments. Evolutionary Games and Poverty Traps explains this pernicious form of coordination failure as a game between economic agents, such as, for example, firms investing in research and development and workers investing in human capital. Rates of return on research and development depend on average human capital, and rates of return on human capital depend on aggregate research and development spending. The outcome is a self-confirming equilibrium in evolutionary stable strategies in which unsuccessful players imitate successful ones. This equilibrium is particularly interesting in that in poor economies with a large fraction of low-human-capital workers or low research and development firms, imitative strategies do not support a take-off into sustained growth. To achieve such a take-off, society should subsidize the cost of education or research and development until the economy builds a critical mass of human capital or research and development.
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Author: John Maynard Smith
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521288842
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521288842
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 244
Book Description
This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.