The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution PDF Author: Matthew Adler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195343298
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 412

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Book Description
A volume of original essays that discusses the applicability of H. L. A. Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U. S. Constitutional law as discussed in his book "The concept of law".

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution PDF Author: Matthew Adler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195343298
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 412

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Book Description
A volume of original essays that discusses the applicability of H. L. A. Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U. S. Constitutional law as discussed in his book "The concept of law".

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution PDF Author: Kenneth Einar Himma
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780199867806
Category : Concept of law
Languages : en
Pages : 389

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Book Description
This volume includes both jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a 'test case' that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model, and constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, and much more.

The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution

The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution PDF Author: Anthony J. Bellia (Jr)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 019984125X
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 321

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Book Description
The law of nations and the Constitution -- The law merchant and the Constitution -- The law of state-state relations and the Constitution -- The law of state-state relations in federal courts -- The law maritime and the Constitution -- Modern customary international law -- The inadequacy of existing theories of customary -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against foreign nations -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against the United States -- Judicial enforcement of customary international law against U.S. states

Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule of Recognition, and the Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism

Constitutional Fidelity, the Rule of Recognition, and the Communitarian Turn in Contemporary Positivism PDF Author: Matthew D. Adler
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 25

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Book Description
Contemporary positivism has taken a communitarian turn. Hart, in the Postscript to quot;The Concept of Law,quot; clarifies that the rule of recognition is a special sort of social practice: a convention. It is not clear whether Hart, here, means convention in the strict sense elaborated by David Lewis, or in some weaker sense. A number of contemporary positivists, including Jules Coleman (at one point), Andrei Marmor, and Gerald Postema, have argued that the rule of recognition is something like a Lewis-convention. Others have suggested that the rule of recognition is conventional in a weaker sense - specifically, by figuring in a shared cooperative activity (SCA) among officials. Chris Kutz, Scott Shapiro, and Jules Coleman (more recently) have adopted this model. This Article criticizes the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, drawing on U.S. constitutional theory. Imagine a society of U.S. officials who are committed to the text of the 1787 Constitution in a strong way: each official would continue to accept the text as supreme law even if every other official defected to an alternative text, and no official is prepared to bargain or negotiate with the others about the supremacy of the text. The social practice among these officials is neither a Lewis-convention (since there is no alternative text to which every official would shift if every other official did), nor an SCA (since the officials have no general intention to mesh their conceptions of legal validity, and in particular have no intention to compromise with officials who deny the supremacy of the 1787 text). Therefore, under the Lewis-convention and SCA models, a hypothetical society of U.S. officials who are committed, first and foremost, to the 1787 text rather than to the community of officials, is not a full-fledged legal system. But this is deeply counterintuitive. The hypothetical society simply embodies, in a particularly pure form, an attitude of fidelity to the 1787 text that many officials and citizens currently profess. The tension between the Lewis-convention and SCA models of the rule of recognition, and constitutional fidelity, points the way to a different model of the rule of recognition: namely, that the rule of recognition is a social norm.

The Concept Of Law (Oip)

The Concept Of Law (Oip) PDF Author: Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780195664171
Category : Jurisprudence
Languages : en
Pages : 328

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Book Description
The Book Has Extensive Notes On The Theoretical Work Of Other Jurists Including References To Austin`S Imperative Theory, Kelson`S Theory Of Basic Norm, And Fuller`S Natural Law Theory.

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution

The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution PDF Author: Matthew Adler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190208740
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 412

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Book Description
The Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution is a volume of original essays that discuss the applicability of Hart's rule of recognition model of a legal system to U.S. constitutional law. The contributors are leading scholars in analytical jurisprudence and constitutional theory, including Matthew Adler, Larry Alexander, Mitchell Berman, Michael Dorf, Kent Greenawalt, Richard Fallon, Michael Green, Kenneth Einar Himma, Stephen Perry, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Jeremy Waldron, and Wil Waluchow. The volume makes a contribution both in jurisprudence, using the U.S. as a "test case" that highlights the strengths and limitations of the rule of recognition model; and in constitutional theory, by showing how the model can illuminate topics such as the role of the Supreme Court, the constitutional status of precedent, the legitimacy of unwritten sources of constitutional law, the choice of methods for interpreting the text of the Constitution, and popular constitutionalism.

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court

Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court PDF Author: Richard H. Fallon
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674975812
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 237

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Book Description
Legitimacy and judicial authority -- Constitutional meaning : original public meaning -- Constitutional meaning : varieties of history that matter -- Law in the Supreme Court : jurisprudential foundations -- Constitutional constraints -- Constitutional theory and its relation to constitutional practice -- Sociological, legal, and moral legitimacy : today and tomorrow

Thoughts and Ways of Thinking

Thoughts and Ways of Thinking PDF Author: Benjamin Brown
Publisher: Ubiquity Press
ISBN: 1911529218
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 188

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Book Description
Why do we think differently from one another? Why do religious people adhere to their faith even against reason, whilst atheist thinkers label it “nonsense”? Why do some judges turn more to moral values and others less? Why do we attach different meanings to the same words? These questions can be tackled on psychological or sociological levels, but we can also analyze the subjects on the epistemological level. That is the purpose of this book. Thoughts and Ways of Thinking offers Source Theory as a single explanation for epistemic processes and their religious, legal and linguistic derivatives. The idea is simple: our senses, our understanding, our memory, the testimonies that we trust, and many other objects transmit data to us and so shape our beliefs. In this function they serve as our truth sources. Different beliefs stem from different sources or different hierarchies between same sources. This notion is formalized here through the new tool of Source Calculus, and, after balancing its relativistic consequences by adding pragmatic constraints, it is applied to the philosophies of religion, law and language. With this unified theory, old doubts are framed in new perspectives, and some of them even find their solution.

Keeping Faith with the Constitution

Keeping Faith with the Constitution PDF Author: Goodwin Liu
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199752834
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 274

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Book Description
Chief Justice John Marshall argued that a constitution "requires that only its great outlines should be marked [and] its important objects designated." Ours is "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." In recent years, Marshall's great truths have been challenged by proponents of originalism and strict construction. Such legal thinkers as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argue that the Constitution must be construed and applied as it was when the Framers wrote it. In Keeping Faith with the Constitution, three legal authorities make the case for Marshall's vision. They describe their approach as "constitutional fidelity"--not to how the Framers would have applied the Constitution, but to the text and principles of the Constitution itself. The original understanding of the text is one source of interpretation, but not the only one; to preserve the meaning and authority of the document, to keep it vital, applications of the Constitution must be shaped by precedent, historical experience, practical consequence, and societal change. The authors range across the history of constitutional interpretation to show how this approach has been the source of our greatest advances, from Brown v. Board of Education to the New Deal, from the Miranda decision to the expansion of women's rights. They delve into the complexities of voting rights, the malapportionment of legislative districts, speech freedoms, civil liberties and the War on Terror, and the evolution of checks and balances. The Constitution's framers could never have imagined DNA, global warming, or even women's equality. Yet these and many more realities shape our lives and outlook. Our Constitution will remain vital into our changing future, the authors write, if judges remain true to this rich tradition of adaptation and fidelity.

Democracy and Distrust

Democracy and Distrust PDF Author: John Hart Ely
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674263294
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 281

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Book Description
This powerfully argued appraisal of judicial review may change the face of American law. Written for layman and scholar alike, the book addresses one of the most important issues facing Americans today: within what guidelines shall the Supreme Court apply the strictures of the Constitution to the complexities of modern life? Until now legal experts have proposed two basic approaches to the Constitution. The first, “interpretivism,” maintains that we should stick as closely as possible to what is explicit in the document itself. The second, predominant in recent academic theorizing, argues that the courts should be guided by what they see as the fundamental values of American society. John Hart Ely demonstrates that both of these approaches are inherently incomplete and inadequate. Democracy and Distrust sets forth a new and persuasive basis for determining the role of the Supreme Court today. Ely’s proposal is centered on the view that the Court should devote itself to assuring majority governance while protecting minority rights. “The Constitution,” he writes, “has proceeded from the sensible assumption that an effective majority will not unreasonably threaten its own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it treats itself. It has done so by structuring decision processes at all levels in an attempt to ensure, first, that everyone’s interests will be represented when decisions are made, and second, that the application of those decisions will not be manipulated so as to reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in theory.” Thus, Ely’s emphasis is on the procedural side of due process, on the preservation of governmental structure rather than on the recognition of elusive social values. At the same time, his approach is free of interpretivism’s rigidity because it is fully responsive to the changing wishes of a popular majority. Consequently, his book will have a profound impact on legal opinion at all levels—from experts in constitutional law, to lawyers with general practices, to concerned citizens watching the bewildering changes in American law.