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Author: David H. Ucko
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589017285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Author: David H. Ucko
Publisher: Georgetown University Press
ISBN: 1589017285
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Get Book Here
Book Description
Confronting insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has recognized the need to “re-learn” counterinsurgency. But how has the Department of Defense with its mixed efforts responded to this new strategic environment? Has it learned anything from past failures? In The New Counterinsurgency Era, David Ucko examines DoD’s institutional obstacles and initially slow response to a changing strategic reality. Ucko also suggests how the military can better prepare for the unique challenges of modern warfare, where it is charged with everything from providing security to supporting reconstruction to establishing basic governance—all while stabilizing conquered territory and engaging with local populations. After briefly surveying the history of American counterinsurgency operations, Ucko focuses on measures the military has taken since 2001 to relearn old lessons about counterinsurgency, to improve its ability to conduct stability operations, to change the institutional bias against counterinsurgency, and to account for successes gained from the learning process. Given the effectiveness of insurgent tactics, the frequency of operations aimed at building local capacity, and the danger of ungoverned spaces acting as havens for hostile groups, the military must acquire new skills to confront irregular threats in future wars. Ucko clearly shows that the opportunity to come to grips with counterinsurgency is matched in magnitude only by the cost of failing to do so.
Author: Alan J. Vick
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833042548
Category : Study Aids
Languages : en
Pages : 205
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Book Description
United States has engaged in counterinsurgency around the globe for more than a century. But insurgencies have rarely been defeated by outside powers. Rather, the afflicted nation itself must win the war politically and militarily, and the best way to help is to offer advice, training, and equipment. Air power, and the U.S. Air Force, can play an important role in such efforts, which suggests making them an institutional priority.
Author: Celeste Ward Gventer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137336943
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 384
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Book Description
The notion of counter-insurgency has become a dominant paradigm in American and British thinking about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This volume brings together international academics and practitioners to evaluate the broader theoretical and historical factors that underpin COIN, providing a critical reappraisal of counter-insurgency thinking.
Author: Douglas S. Blaufarb
Publisher: Simon & Schuster Books For Young Readers
ISBN:
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 392
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Book Description
Forfatteren behandler generelt og i en række eksempler amerikansk intervention i nationale opstande, befrielseskampe m.v. Analyserer endvidere årsager og resultater af denne - i det store og hele - fejlslagne politik.
Author: Douglas Porch
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107027381
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 449
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Book Description
Controversial new history of counterinsurgency which challenges its claims as an effective strategy of waging war.
Author: Roger Trinquier
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 142891689X
Category : France
Languages : en
Pages : 131
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Book Description
Author: Douglas S. Blaufarb
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 356
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Book Description
Author: Spencer C. Tucker
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 1610692802
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 710
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Book Description
A fascinating look at the insurgencies and counterinsurgencies throughout history with a concentration on the 20th and 21st centuries. This encyclopedia examines insurgencies—and the counterinsurgency efforts they prompt—through history, addressing military actions and the techniques and technologies employed in each conflict, significant insurgency leaders, and the leading theorists, with emphasis on the "small wars" of the 20th century and most recent decades. The clear, concise entries provide a breadth of coverage that ranges from the Maccabean Revolt in 168–143 BCE and the Peasants' Revolt in Germany in the 1500s to the American Revolutionary War and the ongoing insurgency in Syria. Readers will gain a solid understanding of how insurgency warfare and counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy has played a key role in the U.S. conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century, and grasp how this important military strategy has evolved during modern times.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
With insurgency growing in importance as a national security problem, it is receiving new interest across the services, in the Department of Defense (DoD), and elsewhere in the U.S. Government. Although ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq give particular immediacy to the problem, the challenge of insurgency extends well beyond these specific conflicts. It is important, therefore, that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) consider how to meet the growing demand for air power in joint, combined, and interagency counterinsurgency operations and that other services' and DoD-wide reassessments of the subject take the potential roles of air power in counterinsurgency fully into account. In particular, airmen should take the lead in exploring how air power might work in combination with other military and civil instruments to help avert the development of an insurgency or perhaps to check a growing insurgency long enough to allow political and social initiatives (the heart of any successful counterinsurgency strategy) to take hold. To address these and related policy challenges, RAND Project AIR FORCE conducted a fiscal year 2005 study entitled "The USAF's Role in Countering Insurgencies." This study addressed four major policy questions: (1) What threat do modern insurgencies pose to U.S. interests? (2) What strategy should the United States pursue to counter insurgent threats? (3) What role does military power play in defeating insurgencies? and (4) What steps should the USAF take to most effectively contribute to counterinsurgency? The monograph seeks to be a short primer on the problem of insurgency, counterinsurgency principles, and the role of air power in countering insurgencies. It is hoped that the analysis on the potential demand for advisory assistance, as well as the data collection and analysis of recent 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS) missions, will offer new insights to counterinsurgency practitioners in the USAF.
Author: John Nagl
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313077037
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
Armies are invariably accused of preparing to fight the last war. Nagl examines how armies learn during the course of conflicts for which they are initially unprepared in organization, training, and mindset. He compares the development of counterinsurgency doctrine and practice in the Malayan Emergency from 1948-1960 with that developed in the Vietnam Conflict from 1950-1975, through use of archival sources and interviews with participants in both conflicts. In examining these two events, he argues that organizational culture is the key variable in determining the success or failure of attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Differences in organizational culture is the primary reason why the British Army learned to conduct counterinsurgency in Malaya while the American Army failed to learn in Vietnam. The American Army resisted any true attempt to learn how to fight an insurgency during the course of the Vietnam Conflict, preferring to treat the war as a conventional conflict in the tradition of the Korean War or World War II. The British Army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational characteristics that its history and the national culture created, was better able to quickly learn and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency. This is the first study to apply organizational learning theory to cases in which armies were engaged in actual combat.
