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Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226435312
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226435312
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
Get Book Here
Book Description
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226435299
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
Why do majority congressional parties seem unable to act as an effective policy-making force? They routinely delegate their power to others—internally to standing committees and subcommittees within each chamber, externally to the president and to the bureaucracy. Conventional wisdom in political science insists that such delegation leads inevitably to abdication—usually by degrees, sometimes precipitously, but always completely. In The Logic of Delegation, however, D. Roderick Kiewiet and Mathew D. McCubbins persuasively argue that political scientists have paid far too much attention to what congressional parties can't do. The authors draw on economic and management theory to demonstrate that the effectiveness of delegation is determined not by how much authority is delegated but rather by how well it is delegated. In the context of the appropriations process, the authors show how congressional parties employ committees, subcommittees, and executive agencies to accomplish policy goals. This innovative study will force a complete rethinking of classic issues in American politics: the "autonomy" of congressional committees; the reality of runaway federal bureaucracy; and the supposed dominance of the presidency in legislative-executive relations.
Author: Neil J. Mitchell
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190904224
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 224
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Book Description
Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. From mundane tasks like choosing a plumber to weightier ones like running a country, the world turns on delegation. We delegate particular tasks to people we believe have more expertise than we do. When it is successful, delegation improves efficiency, expands the range of responsible actors, and even increases happiness. When delegation fails, though, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability. In Why Delegate?, Neil J. Mitchell investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks we take in doing so. He demonstrates how a new, modified understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship-the principal-agent relationship, as economists have described it-simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Using real-world case studies including child abuse in the Catholic Church, the Volkswagen pollution scandal, and FIFA corruption, Mitchell illustrates the broad functionality of delegation logic and the wide range of incentives at work in these relationships. Diverse examples reveal the opportunism of both the leaders and the led and show how accepted accounts of the principal-agent relationship are incomplete. By drawing on multidisciplinary research to address complex questions of motivation, control, responsibility, and accountability, the book builds a broader, more useful logic of delegation. Why Delegate? moves beyond the standard economic accounts of delegation to offer a fresh take on a wide variety of issues and shows how essential the act of delegating is to our society. Mitchell's comprehensive account of the contexts, causes, and effects of delegation develops a new way to understand both the theory and practice of this critical relationship.
Author: Neil James Mitchell
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780197565445
Category : Delegation of authority
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
"Why Delegate? investigates the incentives to delegate and the risks that one takes in doing so. From mundane interactions like choosing a plumber to weightier tasks like the running of a country, and from recreational enjoyments to the protection of human rights, the world turns on delegation. Where it is successful, delegation brings efficiency, shared responsibility, and even happiness. Where it is not, it brings conflict, corruption, and an absence of accountability. One may hear of Saudi hit squads loose in Istanbul, rogue software engineers creating pollution scandals at Volkswagen, and individuals at FIFA selling the rights to host the World Cup, but one may question whether these individuals were out of control. One wonders about the chronic indifference of the Catholic Church to child abusers, and why those in charge ignore the misbehavior of security officials and even the war crimes of their soldiers. Is it can't control, or won't control? An understanding of the simple structure of the delegation relationship, more or less as economists have described it, simplifies a myriad of important and seemingly disparate problems in private and public life. Yet in the collision of principal-agent theory with the practice of delegation, there are further important insights to be found where the principal behaves in ways that are unexpected and puzzling to a rational-choice eye. A broader, more descriptively useful logic of delegation offers a fresh take on a wide variety of issues, whether corruption in sports organizations, war crimes, or the church's child abuse scandal"--
Author: Alec Stone Sweet
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113576896X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
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Book Description
There is a growing interest in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in Europe, following both the spread of principal-agent theory in political science and law and increasing delegation in practice. During the 1980s and 1990s, governments and parliaments in West European nations have delegated powers and functions to non-majoritarian bodies - the EU, independent central banks, constitutional courts and independent regulatory agencies. Whereas elected policymakers had been increasing their roles over several decades, delegation involves a remarkable reversal or at least transformation of their position. This volume examines key issues about the politics of delegation: how and why delegation has taken place; the institutional design of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the consequences of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions; the legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions. The book addresses these questions both theoretically and empirically, looking at central areas of political life - central banking, the EU, the increasing role of courts and the establishment and impacts of independent regulatory agencies.
Author: Fabrizio Gilardi
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780415543569
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
Delegation is an ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched. Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy, electorate to legislature to government within representative democracy together with literature on new forms of delegation such as non-majoritarian institutions, to provide a more complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems. With a broad and comparative approach, this is an important volume for advanced students, researchers and professionals concerned with delegation in the areas of public policy, public administration and democratic theory.
Author: D. Roderick Kiewiet
Publisher: Heinemann Educational Publishers
ISBN: 9780226435336
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 176
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Book Description
Author: Adrienne Héritier
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199653623
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Book Description
Changing Rules of Delegation shows how institutional rules are constantly re-negotiated and may lead to a power-shift between the concerned actors. It particularly shows how the European Parliament has been able to shift the power balance in its own favour.
Author: Matthew Flinders
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191570443
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 1008
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Book Description
The study of British politics has been reinvigorated in recent years as a generation of new scholars seeks to build-upon a distinct disciplinary heritage while also exploring new empirical territory and finds much support and encouragement from previous generations in forging new grounds in relation to theory and methods. It is in this context that The Oxford Handbook of British Politics has been conceived. The central ambition of the Handbook is not just to illustrate both the breadth and depth of scholarship that is to be found within the field. It also seeks to demonstrate the vibrancy and critical self-reflection that has cultivated a much sharper and engaging, and notably less insular, approach to the terrain it seeks to explore and understand. In this emphasis on critical engagement, disciplinary evolution, and a commitment to shaping rather than re-stating the discipline The Oxford Handbook of British Politics is consciously distinctive. In showcasing the diversity now found in the analysis of British politics, the Handbook is built upon three foundations. The first principle that underpins the volume is a broad understanding of 'the political'. It covers a much broader range of topics, themes and issues than would commonly be found within a book on British politics. This emphasis on an inclusive approach also characterises the second principle that has shaped this collection - namely, diversity in relation to commissioned authors. The final principle focuses on the distinctiveness of the study of British politics. Each chapter seeks to reflect on what is distinctive- both in terms of the empirical nature of the issue of concern, and the theories and methods that have been deployed to unravel the nature and causes of the debate. The result is a unique volume that: draws-upon the intellectual strengths of the study of British politics; reflects the innate diversity and inclusiveness of the discipline; isolates certain distinctive issues and then reflects on their broader international relevance; and finally looks to the future by pointing towards emerging or overlooked areas of research.
Author: Kaare Strøm
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199291608
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 784
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Book Description
Comparative Politics is a series for students and teachers of political science that deals with contemporary issues in comparative government and politics. The General Editors are Max Kaase, Professor of Political Science, Vice President and Dean, School of Humanities and Social Science, International University Bremen, Germany; and Kenneth Newton, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Southampton. The series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research. Today, parliamentarism is the most common form of democratic government. Yet knowledge of this regime type has been incomplete and often unsystematic. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies offers new conceptual clarity on the topic. This book argues that representative democracies can be understood as chains of delegation and accountability between citizens and politicians. Under parliamentary democracy, this chain of delegation is simple but also long and indirect. Principal-agent theory helps us to understand the perils of democratic delegation, which include the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Citizens in democratic states, therefore, need institutional mechanisms by which they can control their representatives. The most important such control mechanisms are on the one hand political parties and on the other external constraints such as courts, central banks, referendums, and supranational institutions such as those of the European Union. Traditionally, parliamentary democracies have relied heavily on political parties and presidential systems more on external constraints. This new empirical investigation includes all seventeen West European parliamentary democracies. These countries are compared in a series of cross-national tables and figures, and seventeen country chapters provide a wealth of information on four discrete stages in the delegation process: delegation from voters to parliamentary representatives, delegation from parliament to the prime minister and cabinet, delegation within the cabinet, and delegation from cabinet ministers to civil servants. Each chapter illustrates how political parties serve as bonding instruments which align incentives and permit citizen control of the policy process. This is complemented by a consideration of external constraints. The concluding chapters go on to consider how well the problems of delegation and accountability are solved in these countries. They show that political systems with cohesive and competitive parties and strong mechanisms of external constraint solve their democratic agency problems better than countries with weaker control mechanisms. But in many countries political parties are now weakening, and parliamentary systems face new democratic challenges. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies provides an unprecedented guide to contemporary European parliamentary democracies. As democratic governance is transformed at the dawn of the twenty-first century, it illustrates the important challenges faced by the parliamentary democracies of Western Europe.
