The Law and Economics of Property Rights to Radio Spectrum PDF Download
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Author: Institute of Governmental Affairs. Davis, Calif..
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Author: Institute of Governmental Affairs. Davis, Calif..
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Author: Dennis W. Carlton
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Author:
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Category : Radio
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Author: Thomas W. Hazlett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 320
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Author: Bruce M. Owen
Publisher:
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Category : Electromagnetic surface waves
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Thomas W. Hazlett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took until July 25, 1994 for FCC license sales to commence. Today, some 73 U.S. auctions have been held, 27,484 licenses sold, and $52.6 billion paid. The reform is a textbook example of economic policy success. Herein, we examine Coase's seminal 1959 paper on two levels. First, we note its analytical symmetry, comparing administrative to market mechanisms under the assumption of positive transaction costs. This fundamental insight had its beginning in Coase's acclaimed article on the firm, and continued with his subsequent treatment of social cost. Second, we investigate why spectrum policies have stopped well short of the property rights regime that Coase advocated, considering rent-seeking dynamics and the emergence of new theories challenging Coase's property framework. One conclusion is easily rendered: competitive bidding is now the default tool in wireless license awards. By rule of thumb, about $17 billion in U.S. welfare losses have been averted. Not bad for the first 50 years of this, or any, Article appearing in Volume II of the Journal of Law & Economics.
Author: Thomas W. Hazlett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Cell phone systems
Languages : en
Pages : 80
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Author: Thomas W. Hazlett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In most countries, wireless communications rely on administrative allocation of radio spectrum. The inefficiencies associated with this centralized approach have led economists, starting with Coase in 1959, to suggest 'propertyzing' radio spectrum. Critics of this approach assert that property rights impose prohibitive transaction costs and inhibit development of wireless services. Reforms enacted in Guatemala (in 1996) and El Salvador (in 1997) have largely implemented policies suggested by Coase, yielding a natural experiment. Evidence generated in the mobile telephone market suggests that these regimes are associated with a relatively high degree of competitiveness, and correspondingly high rates of deployment, while appearing to avoid high transaction costs in the public or private sectors. We conclude that these liberal reforms tend to produce results consistent with Coase's policy conjecture.
Author: Margaret Oppenheimer
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317466438
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 465
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The economic analysis of legal and regulatory issues need not be limited to the neoclassical economic approach. The expert contributors to this work employ a variety of heterodox legal-economic theories to address a broad range of legal issues. They demonstrate how these various approaches can lead to very different conclusions concerning the role of the law and legal intervention in a wide array of contexts. The schools of thought and methodologies represented here include institutional economics, new institutional economics, socio-economics, social economics, behavioral economics, game theory, feminist economics, Rawlsian economics, radical economics, Austrian economics, and personalist economics. The legal and regulatory issues examined include anti-trust and competition, corporate governance, the environment and natural resources, land use and property rights, unions and collective bargaining, welfare benefits, work-time regulation and standards, sexual harassment in the workplace, obligations of employers and employees to each other, crime, torts, and even the structure of government. Each contributor brings a different emphasis and provides thoughtful, sometimes provocative analysis and conclusions. Together, these heterodox insights will provide valuable supplementary reading for courses in law and economics as well as public policy and business courses at both the graduate and undergraduate levels.
Author: Thomas W. Hazlett
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The traditional system of radio spectrum allocation has inefficiently restricted wireless services. Alternatively, liberal licenses ceding de facto spectrum ownership rights yield incentives for operators to maximize airwave value. These authorizations have been widely used for mobile services in the U.S. and internationally, leading to the development of highly productive services and waves of innovation in technology, applications and business models. Serious challenges to the efficacy of such a spectrum regime have arisen, however. Seeing the widespread adoption of such devices as cordless phones and wifi radios using bands set aside for unlicensed use, some scholars and policy makers posit that spectrum sharing technologies have become cheap and easy to deploy, mitigating airwave scarcity and, therefore, the utility of exclusive rights. This paper evaluates such claims technically and economically. We demonstrate that spectrum scarcity is alive and well. Costly conflicts over airwave use not only continue, but have intensified with scientific advances that dramatically improve the functionality of wireless devices and so increase demand for spectrum access. Exclusive ownership rights help direct spectrum inputs to where they deliver the highest social gains, making exclusive property rules relatively more socially valuable. Liberal licenses efficiently accommodate rival business models (including those commonly associated with unlicensed spectrum allocations) while mitigating the constraints levied on spectrum use by regulators imposing restrictions in traditional licenses or via use rules and technology standards in unlicensed spectrum allocations.
