The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers' cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers' cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
Author: David R. Barrus
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
In government procurement auctions of construction contracts, entrants are typically less informed and bid more aggressively than incumbent firms. This bidding behavior makes them more susceptible to losses affecting their prospect of survival. In April of 2000, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation started releasing the internal cost estimates to complete highway construction projects. Using newly developed quantile regression approaches, this paper examines the impact of the policy change on aggressive entrants. First, we find that the information release eliminates the bidding differential between entrants and incumbents attributed to informational asymmetries. Second, we argue that the policy change affects the prospects of survival of entrants in the market. We find that those who used to exit the market relatively soon are now staying 37 percent longer, while at the median level bidding duration increased by roughly 68 percent. The policy has the potential to encourage entry in government procurement auctions and thus increase competition.
Author: Stéphane Saussier
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319680501
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 241
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Book Description
This book investigates the economic decisions behind the implementation of public-private partnerships (PPPs). The first part of the book discusses different forms of public procurement contracts, in particular in France and the UK, and provides an economic analysis of the potential advantages and pitfalls of public-private partnerships. This exploration of PPPs’ efficiency also includes an examination of the financing conditions of public procurements, as well as regulatory requirements. By reviewing empirical studies on PPPs, the second part of the book compares their advantages over purely public solutions and offers practical guidance on their implementation. Practitioners will also learn best practices on how to involve stakeholders in calls for bids.
Author: Antonio Estache
Publisher: CEPR
ISBN: 1907142355
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Book Description
This book presents a comprehensive review of the vast economic literature covering the governance issues of network industries and suggests paths to improve their efficiences.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Book Description
I study the effect of lump sum contracts on bidding behavior and procurement costs in highway construction. For highway construction projects we usually observe ex-post changes in design due to unforeseen site condition. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) offers two different contract types regarding compensations for ex-post quantity changes of work item. Under the standard contract, the department provides a list of work items and their quantities. If there is a quantity change, the contractor's unit price bid on that work item is used to make pay adjustment. On the other hand, under the lump sum contract, bidders are allowed to design the project themselves and no pay adjustments are made for ex-post quantity changes. In Chapter 1, I propose a theoretical model to describe bidding behavior under the lump sum. They are willing to inflate bids to self-insure against ex-post changes, while they should make a cost-efficient design to win the contract. Compared to the standard, lump sum contracts may increase or decrease bids, but they reduce the expected payments in many cases. In Chapter 2, I estimate the effect of lump sum contracts on (winning) bids and procurement costs. I assume that the outcome variables are independent of the assignment conditional on observables. And I use regressions and propensity score methods to estimate the effects. Specifically, I use a trimmed sample for regressions in which some seemingly extreme observations are dropped based on the propensity scores. With miscellaneous projects, lump sum does not increase the outcome variables. And I allow the assignment decision to be endogenous and use the treatment effect model to quantify the impact. In particular, I use district and task dummies as instrumental variables. It turns out that the outcome variables do not increase under the lump sum. And I test for unobserved project heterogeneity conditional on all the covariates by exploiting multiple bids within an auction. Using the FDOT data, the correlation coefficient for the trimmed sample is close to zero, which implies no serious unobserved project heterogeneity. Thus, the regression results with the trimmed sample are supported.
Author: Song Yao
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601982283
Category : Brand loyalty
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities
Author: Edward L. Glaeser
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022680061X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 479
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Book Description
Policy makers often call for increased spending on infrastructure, which can encompass a broad range of investments, from roads and bridges to digital networks that will expand access to high-speed broadband. Some point to the near-term macroeconomic benefits, such as job creation, associated with infrastructure spending; others point to the long-term effects of such spending on productivity and economic growth. Economic Analysis and Infrastructure Investment explores the links between infrastructure investment and economic outcomes, analyzing key economic issues in the funding and management of infrastructure projects. It includes new research on the short-run stimulus effects of infrastructure spending, develops new estimates of the stock of US infrastructure capital, and explores incentive aspects of public-private partnerships with particular attention to their allocation of risk. The volume provides a reference for researchers seeking to study infrastructure issues and for policymakers tasked with determining the appropriate level and allocation of infrastructure spending.
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We provide a comparison of bidding behavior between multi-round and single-round auctions considering bid lettings for asphalt construction contracts. Using a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach as well as the nonparametric estimation technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) we find that, bidding is more aggressive in a sequential multi-round setting than in a simultaneous single-round format. We explore potential causes for the bidding difference across formats related to synergies and level of bidder participation.
Author: Elena Krasnokutskaya
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper proposes a semi-parametric method to uncover the distribution of bidders' private information in the market for highway procurement when unobserved auction heterogeneity is present. I derive sufficient conditions under which the model is identified and show that the estimation procedure produces uniformly consistent estimators of the distributions in question. The estimation procedure is applied to data from Michigan highway procurement auctions. I estimate that 75% of the variation in bidders' costs may be attributed to the factors known to all bidders and only 25% may be generated by private information. My results suggest that failing to account for unobserved auction heterogeneity may lead to overestimating uncertainty that bidders face when submitting their bids. As a result both inefficiency of the auction mechanism and mark-ups over the bidders' costs may be overestimated.
