The Impact of Capacity Costs on Bidding Strategies in Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Jörg Budde
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the impact of capacity costs on bidding strategies of firms participating in procurement auctions. More efficient firms will invest in advance due to their high probability of winning the auction while less efficient bidders prefer to wait with their investments until the outcome of the auction is known. However, in equilibrium both types of firms include a coverage for their investment costs into their bids and therefore adopt a full cost pricing policy.
Author: Jörg Budde
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the impact of capacity costs on bidding strategies of firms participating in procurement auctions. More efficient firms will invest in advance due to their high probability of winning the auction while less efficient bidders prefer to wait with their investments until the outcome of the auction is known. However, in equilibrium both types of firms include a coverage for their investment costs into their bids and therefore adopt a full cost pricing policy.
Author: Jörg Budde
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the impact of capacity costs on bidding strategies of firms participating in procurement auctions. More efficient firms will invest in advance due to their high probability of winning the auction while less efficient bidders prefer to wait with their investments until the outcome of the auction is known. However, in equilibrium both types of firms include coverage for their investment costs into their bids and therefore adopt a full cost pricing policy.
Author: Jörg Budde
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Sebastian Schwenen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Christopher S. Chapman
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080467563
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 745
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Book Description
Volume two of the Handbooks of Management Accounting Research consists of two groups of chapters. The first draw together research that has focussed on particular management accounting practices. The second set synthesise contributions to the literature that have been focussed within particular organisational contexts. Volume two concludes with a review of research on how management accounting practice and research varies around the world. Special pricing available if purchased as a set with Volume 1. Documents the scholarly management accounting literature Publishing both in print, and online through Science Direct International in scope
Author: Viplav Saini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We utilize laboratory experiments to study behavior in sequential procurement auctions where winning an auction round increases a bidder's future costs. The game admits competitive as well as bid-rotation style collusive equilibria. We find that (a) bidders show some propensity to account for the opportunity cost of winning an auction, but underestimate its magnitude; (b) revealing all bids (instead of only the winning bid) after each round leads to dramatically higher procurement costs. The rise in procurement costs is accompanied by an increase in very high (extreme) bids, a fraction of which appear to be collusive in nature.
Author: Xiaoyong Zheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 406
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Book Description
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 47
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Book Description
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers' cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
Author: Niels Blomgren-Hansen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The paper analyzes the excess entry hypothesis for sealed-bid first-price public procurement auctions. The hypothesis is proved analytically for any feasible combination of bid preparation cost and bid evaluation cost when the bidders face a rectangular cost density function and confirmed in numerical simulations based on a family of flexible cost density functions. The excess entry hypothesis implies that the procurer may reduce both his own cost and the social cost by imposing a positive fee on the bids. Sequential search is a superior strategy to a public procurement auction whether or not the procurer imposes an optimal fee on the bids.
