Author: Jack Snyder
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468620
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions—biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks. The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war.
The Ideology of the Offensive
Author: Jack Snyder
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468620
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions—biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks. The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war.
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468620
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
Jack Snyder's analysis of the attitudes of military planners in the years prior to the Great War offers new insight into the tragic miscalculations of that era and into their possible parallels in present-day war planning. By 1914, the European military powers had adopted offensive military strategies even though there was considerable evidence to support the notion that much greater advantage lay with defensive strategies. The author argues that organizational biases inherent in military strategists' attitudes make war more likely by encouraging offensive postures even when the motive is self-defense. Drawing on new historical evidence of the specific circumstances surrounding French, German, and Russian strategic policy, Snyder demonstrates that it is not only rational analysis that determines strategic doctrine, but also the attitudes of military planners. Snyder argues that the use of rational calculation often falls victim to the pursuit of organizational interests such as autonomy, prestige, growth, and wealth. Furthermore, efforts to justify the preferred policy bring biases into strategists' decisions—biases reflecting the influences of parochial interests and preconceptions, and those resulting from attempts to simplify unduly their analytical tasks. The frightening lesson here is that doctrines can be destabilizing even when weapons are not, because doctrine may be more responsive to the organizational needs of the military than to the implications of the prevailing weapons technology. By examining the historical failure of offensive doctrine, Jack Snyder makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the causes of war.
Myths of Empire
Author: Jack Snyder
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468590
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 342
Book Description
Overextension is the common pitfall of empires. Why does it occur? What are the forces that cause the great powers of the industrial era to pursue aggressive foreign policies? Jack Snyder identifies recurrent myths of empire, describes the varieties of overextension to which they lead, and criticizes the traditional explanations offered by historians and political scientists.He tests three competing theories—realism, misperception, and domestic coalition politics—against five detailed case studies: early twentieth-century Germany, Japan in the interwar period, Great Britain in the Victorian era, the Soviet Union after World War II, and the United States during the Cold War. The resulting insights run counter to much that has been written about these apparently familiar instances of empire building.
Publisher: Cornell University Press
ISBN: 0801468590
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 342
Book Description
Overextension is the common pitfall of empires. Why does it occur? What are the forces that cause the great powers of the industrial era to pursue aggressive foreign policies? Jack Snyder identifies recurrent myths of empire, describes the varieties of overextension to which they lead, and criticizes the traditional explanations offered by historians and political scientists.He tests three competing theories—realism, misperception, and domestic coalition politics—against five detailed case studies: early twentieth-century Germany, Japan in the interwar period, Great Britain in the Victorian era, the Soviet Union after World War II, and the United States during the Cold War. The resulting insights run counter to much that has been written about these apparently familiar instances of empire building.
Conservative Ideology in the Making
Author: Ivan Zoltan Denes
Publisher: Central European University Press
ISBN: 6155211787
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 294
Book Description
The fifty years or so preceding the watershed of 1848–49 witnessed the emergence of liberal nationalism in Hungary, along with a transmutation of conservatism which appeared then as a party and an ideological system in the political arena. The specific features of the conservatism, combining the protection of the status quo with some reform measures, its strategic vision, conceptual system, argumentation, assessment criteria and values require an in depth exploration and analysis. Different conservative groups were in the background or in opposition from 1848 to 1918, while in the period between the two World Wars, they constituted the overwhelming majority of ruling parties. During the one-party system, from 1949 to 1989, the liberals and conservatives—like all other political groups—were illegal, a status from which they could later emerge upon the change of the political system. The inheritance of the autocratic system frozen up and undigested by the one-party state was thawed after the peaceful regime change, the constitutional revolution and its discrete components began to be reactivated, including the enemy images of earlier discourses. "Liberal" and "conservative" had become state-party stigmas in line with fascist, reactionary, rightist, and bourgeois. In reaction to that, at first conservative then liberal, intellectual fashions and renascences unfolded in the 1980s. The attempts by liberal and conservative advocates to find predecessors did not favor an objective approach.The first step toward objectivity is establishing distance from the different kinds of enemy images and their political idioms. This is a pressing need because, although several pioneering works have appeared on different variants of the Hungarian liberalisms and conservatisms, there are no serious unbiased syntheses. This work is urgent because the political poles of the constitutional revolution and the ensuing period have up till now been described in terms of different conspiracy theories.
Publisher: Central European University Press
ISBN: 6155211787
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 294
Book Description
The fifty years or so preceding the watershed of 1848–49 witnessed the emergence of liberal nationalism in Hungary, along with a transmutation of conservatism which appeared then as a party and an ideological system in the political arena. The specific features of the conservatism, combining the protection of the status quo with some reform measures, its strategic vision, conceptual system, argumentation, assessment criteria and values require an in depth exploration and analysis. Different conservative groups were in the background or in opposition from 1848 to 1918, while in the period between the two World Wars, they constituted the overwhelming majority of ruling parties. During the one-party system, from 1949 to 1989, the liberals and conservatives—like all other political groups—were illegal, a status from which they could later emerge upon the change of the political system. The inheritance of the autocratic system frozen up and undigested by the one-party state was thawed after the peaceful regime change, the constitutional revolution and its discrete components began to be reactivated, including the enemy images of earlier discourses. "Liberal" and "conservative" had become state-party stigmas in line with fascist, reactionary, rightist, and bourgeois. In reaction to that, at first conservative then liberal, intellectual fashions and renascences unfolded in the 1980s. The attempts by liberal and conservative advocates to find predecessors did not favor an objective approach.The first step toward objectivity is establishing distance from the different kinds of enemy images and their political idioms. This is a pressing need because, although several pioneering works have appeared on different variants of the Hungarian liberalisms and conservatisms, there are no serious unbiased syntheses. This work is urgent because the political poles of the constitutional revolution and the ensuing period have up till now been described in terms of different conspiracy theories.
Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War
Author: Steven E. Miller
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780691023496
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 301
Book Description
These five essays from the prestigious journal International Security analyze the outbreak of the First World War from the standpoint of power politics and military strategy. "The disaster of 1914 continues to haunt the contemporary security debate," writes Steven E. Miller in his introduction. "In the nuclear age, the images that remain from the summer of 1914--the escalation from an isolated event in a far corner of Europe to a global war, the apparent loss of control of the situation by key decision-makers, the crowding out of diplomacy by military exigencies, the awful, protracted, often senseless slaughter on the battlefield--raise troubling doubts about our ability to forever conduct affairs of state safely in an international environment plagued by the ever-present risk of thermonuclear war." The book includes Paul Kennedy's "The First World War and the International Power System," Michael Howard's "Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," Stephen Van Evera's "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," Jack Snyder's "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Richard Ned Lebow's "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?"
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780691023496
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 301
Book Description
These five essays from the prestigious journal International Security analyze the outbreak of the First World War from the standpoint of power politics and military strategy. "The disaster of 1914 continues to haunt the contemporary security debate," writes Steven E. Miller in his introduction. "In the nuclear age, the images that remain from the summer of 1914--the escalation from an isolated event in a far corner of Europe to a global war, the apparent loss of control of the situation by key decision-makers, the crowding out of diplomacy by military exigencies, the awful, protracted, often senseless slaughter on the battlefield--raise troubling doubts about our ability to forever conduct affairs of state safely in an international environment plagued by the ever-present risk of thermonuclear war." The book includes Paul Kennedy's "The First World War and the International Power System," Michael Howard's "Men Against Fire: Expectations of War in 1914," Stephen Van Evera's "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," Jack Snyder's "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Richard Ned Lebow's "Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump Through Them?"
Command Of The Air
Author: General Giulio Douhet
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782898522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 620
Book Description
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1782898522
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 620
Book Description
In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.
˜Theœ Ideology of the Offensive
Author: Jack Snyder
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780801495847
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 267
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780801495847
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 267
Book Description
A History of Military Thought
Author: Azar Gat
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780199247622
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 916
Book Description
From the ideas of Clausewitz to contemporary doctrines of containment and cold war, this is a definitive history of modern military thought. A one-volume collection of Azar Gat's acclaimed trilogy, it traces the quest for a general theory of war from its origins in the Enlightenment.Beginning with a provocative critique of Clausewitz's classic work On War, the author unravels the endemic difficulties in Clausewitz's work that have baffled scholars for so long, clearly explaining the development of his ideas against the background of the Napoleonic revolution in war and theRomantic critique of the Enlightenment. He continues the story through the strategic ideas of the Prussian-German military school during the nineteenth century, the factors that shaped the 'cult of the offensive' in the French Army before the First World War, and the competing doctrines whichdominated naval warfare during the ages of sail and steam. In the final part of the trilogy, he shows how theories of mechanized war emerged throughout the industrial world in the first decades of the twentieth century and explains why their leading exponents were associated with fascism.Drastically re-evaluating B.H. Liddell Hart's contribution to strategic theory, the author argues that in the wake of the trauma of the First World War, and in response to the Axis challenge, Liddell Hart developed the doctrine of containment and cold war long before the advent of nuclear weapons.He reveals Liddell Hart as a pioneer of the modern western liberal way in warfare which is still with us today.
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780199247622
Category : Military art and science
Languages : en
Pages : 916
Book Description
From the ideas of Clausewitz to contemporary doctrines of containment and cold war, this is a definitive history of modern military thought. A one-volume collection of Azar Gat's acclaimed trilogy, it traces the quest for a general theory of war from its origins in the Enlightenment.Beginning with a provocative critique of Clausewitz's classic work On War, the author unravels the endemic difficulties in Clausewitz's work that have baffled scholars for so long, clearly explaining the development of his ideas against the background of the Napoleonic revolution in war and theRomantic critique of the Enlightenment. He continues the story through the strategic ideas of the Prussian-German military school during the nineteenth century, the factors that shaped the 'cult of the offensive' in the French Army before the First World War, and the competing doctrines whichdominated naval warfare during the ages of sail and steam. In the final part of the trilogy, he shows how theories of mechanized war emerged throughout the industrial world in the first decades of the twentieth century and explains why their leading exponents were associated with fascism.Drastically re-evaluating B.H. Liddell Hart's contribution to strategic theory, the author argues that in the wake of the trauma of the First World War, and in response to the Axis challenge, Liddell Hart developed the doctrine of containment and cold war long before the advent of nuclear weapons.He reveals Liddell Hart as a pioneer of the modern western liberal way in warfare which is still with us today.
Offense and Defense in the International System
Author: George H. Quester
Publisher: Transaction Pub
ISBN: 9780765809650
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 219
Book Description
The importance of military factors in international relations may seem obvious, but the causal linkages are often difficult to define. Surveying a long sweep of history, and the ins and outs of offensive weaponry, George H. Quester offers an overview of how military technology has shaped our international system. Contemporary events have made this book as timely as ever. As Americans renew the debate on mi"ssile defense, and as the danger of nuclear-capable rogue states and their terrorist allies is evident as never before, the need to understand the differences between defensive and offensive weapons has taken on a new urgency. Quester shows that very careful analysis is required here, as some important elementary distinctions need to be drawn. His analysis covers naval and air warfare, as well as ground combat, and he deals with the offensive or defensive leanings of guerrilla warfare. Quester compares the post-World War II nuclear balance with military situations before 1945. Quester also ties in domestic economic, social, political, and scientific trends, and how they influence international politics. Quester considers when a military situation favors striking first in a crisis(an offensive situation), and when a nation may be better off waiting for the other side to begin a war(defensive). In his new introduction, Quester reviews the post-Cold War debate among political and military analysts as to the contemporary relevance of these concepts and offers a powerful rebuttal to those who would dismiss the offense/defense distinction as outmoded, illusory, or a function of propaganda. Above all, the book demonstrates that we can learn a great deal from our recent and not-so-recent historical experience with nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons and their proliferation make the area of international conflict more perilous than ever. This book will be of interest to military analysts and students of international affairs. George H. Quester is professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. His books include Nuclear Monopoly, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (both available from Transaction), Nuclear Diplomacy, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, and American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus.
Publisher: Transaction Pub
ISBN: 9780765809650
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 219
Book Description
The importance of military factors in international relations may seem obvious, but the causal linkages are often difficult to define. Surveying a long sweep of history, and the ins and outs of offensive weaponry, George H. Quester offers an overview of how military technology has shaped our international system. Contemporary events have made this book as timely as ever. As Americans renew the debate on mi"ssile defense, and as the danger of nuclear-capable rogue states and their terrorist allies is evident as never before, the need to understand the differences between defensive and offensive weapons has taken on a new urgency. Quester shows that very careful analysis is required here, as some important elementary distinctions need to be drawn. His analysis covers naval and air warfare, as well as ground combat, and he deals with the offensive or defensive leanings of guerrilla warfare. Quester compares the post-World War II nuclear balance with military situations before 1945. Quester also ties in domestic economic, social, political, and scientific trends, and how they influence international politics. Quester considers when a military situation favors striking first in a crisis(an offensive situation), and when a nation may be better off waiting for the other side to begin a war(defensive). In his new introduction, Quester reviews the post-Cold War debate among political and military analysts as to the contemporary relevance of these concepts and offers a powerful rebuttal to those who would dismiss the offense/defense distinction as outmoded, illusory, or a function of propaganda. Above all, the book demonstrates that we can learn a great deal from our recent and not-so-recent historical experience with nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons and their proliferation make the area of international conflict more perilous than ever. This book will be of interest to military analysts and students of international affairs. George H. Quester is professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland. His books include Nuclear Monopoly, Deterrence Before Hiroshima (both available from Transaction), Nuclear Diplomacy, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, and American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus.
Knowing the Enemy
Author: Mary R. Habeck
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 9780300122572
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
A penetrating look into the inner logic of al-Qa'ida and like-minded extremist groups by which they justify September 11 and other terrorist attacks includes specific ideologies of jihadism, a new movement that allows members to call for the destruction of democracy and to murder innocent men, women, and children.
Publisher: Yale University Press
ISBN: 9780300122572
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 262
Book Description
A penetrating look into the inner logic of al-Qa'ida and like-minded extremist groups by which they justify September 11 and other terrorist attacks includes specific ideologies of jihadism, a new movement that allows members to call for the destruction of democracy and to murder innocent men, women, and children.
Airpower And The Cult Of The Offensive
Author: Major John R. Carter
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252767
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 186
Book Description
The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the “cult of the offensive” by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower’s professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences? The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force’s air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one’s actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252767
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 186
Book Description
The belief that airpower is inherently offensive is a recurrent theme throughout airpower theory and doctrine. Before World War I, dogmatic belief in the dominance of the offense in land warfare affected the military decisions which resulted in the disaster of the trenches. Termed the “cult of the offensive” by scholars, faith in offense became so unshakable in pre-1914 Europe that military organizations dismissed as irrelevant the numerous indications of the waning power of the offense as technological developments strengthened the defense. With airpower’s professed inclination for offense, could a cult of the offensive perniciously trap airpower doctrine and lead to similarly disastrous consequences? The study begins by establishing the theoretical background necessary for case study analysis. Airpower defense is defined as those operations conducted to deny another force’s air operations in a designated airspace. Airpower offenses are those operations in the airspace defended by another, or operations conducted outside of one’s actively defended airspace. The relationship between offense and defense is dissected to discover that airpower defense enjoys neither an advantage of position nor of time, so traditional Clausewitzian views relative to the power of the defense do not apply to airpower. Next, the study describes those factors which may inject, or reinforce, a preferential bias for offense into airpower strategy and doctrine. A cult of the offensive is defined as an organizational belief in the power of offense so compelling that the military organization no longer evaluates its offensive doctrine objectively. This leads to an examination of the ramifications postulated to result from offensive ideology.