The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games and Continuous Decision Rules PDF Download
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Author: James W. Friedman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: James W. Friedman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: James W. Friedman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940111398X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Coordination is extremely important in economic, political, and social life. The concept of economic equilibrium is based on the coordination of producers and consumers in buying and selling. This book reviews the topic of coordination from an economic, theoretical standpoint. The aim of this volume is twofold: first, the book contributes to the ongoing research on the economics of coordination; and second, it disseminates results and encourages interest in the topic. The volume contains original research on coordination including general game-theoretic questions, particular coordination issues within specific fields of economics (i.e. industrial organization, international trade, and macroeconomics), and experimental research.
Author: Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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In the current mobile world, repeated relationships must be self-sustained by the members. We extend the framework of infinitely repeated games to incorporate the possibility that the game is strategically terminated by players. Specifically, we add a voting stage at the beginning of each period where some or all players vote on whether to continue or end the interaction, and if the game ends, players receive predetermined payoffs. We study general majority rules and show that the appropriately modified folk theorem holds except for the unanimity rule. We also derive sufficient conditions for the folk theorem under the unanimity rule.
Author: Benjamin Bernard
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 184
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This thesis treats continuous-time models of repeated interactions with imperfect public monitoring. In such models, players do not directly observe each other's actions and instead see only the impacts of the chosen actions on the distribution of a random signal. Often, there are two reasons why this signal imperfectly reflects the chosen actions: (a) information is continuously available but it is noisy, or (b) events are observable but occur only at intermittent occasions. In a continuous-time setting, these two different types of information can be cleanly distinguished, where Brownian motion is used to model noise in the continuous information and Poisson processes indicate the arrival of informative events with an intensity that depends on players' actions. The first major result of this thesis is a folk theorem for continuous-time repeated games even when players receive only noisy information about past play. The folk theorem gives sufficient conditions such that players achieve asymptotic efficiency as they get arbitrarily patient. Because more outcomes are sustainable in equilibrium when more information is observed, this result also applies when players receive both aforementioned types of imperfect information. In the proof, we restrict ourselves to strategies that are adjusted only at identical copies of certain stopping times. This has two important implications: (1) despite the possibility of switching actions infinitesimally fast, players do not need to do so to attain asymptotic efficiency, and (2) continuous-time equilibria can be attained as limits of equilibria in discrete-time repeated games where the length of the time period is random, rather than fixed. The other main result of this thesis is a characterization of all payoffs that are attainable in equilibrium in such games with two finitely patient players. Relating optimal actions and incentives to the boundary of the equilibrium payoff set, we obtain a differential equation describing the curvature of the set at almost every point. The equilibrium payoff set is obtained from an iterative procedure, which is similar to that known for discrete-time repeated games but leads to an explicit characterization in our setting. Our result shows that the two types of information have drastically different impacts on the equilibrium payoff set. This is due to the fundamental difference in which the two types of information are used to provide incentives: while the continuous information can be used only to transfer value between players, the discontinuous information may be used to transfer or destroy value upon the arrival of an infrequent event. The quantitative nature of the result makes it possible to precisely measure the impact of abrupt information on the efficiency of players' payoffs in equilibrium. Thus, one can compare the value of additional information to the cost of procuring or providing it, which may lead to interesting applications in mechanism design and information disclosure.
Author: Stephen J. Guastello
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 113567194X
Category : Psychology
Languages : en
Pages : 478
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Book Description
Chaos, catastrophe, self-organization, and complexity theories (nonlinear dynamics) now have practical and measurable roles in the functioning of work organizations. Managing Emergent Phenomena begins by describing how the concept of an organization has changed from a bureaucracy, to a humanistic and organic system, to a complex adaptive system. The dynamics concepts are then explained along with the most recent research methods for analyzing real data. Applications include: work motivation, personnel selection and turnover, creative thinking by individuals and groups, the development of social networks, coordination in work groups, the emergence of leaders, work performance in organizational hierarchies, economic problems that are relevant to organizations, techniques for predicting the future, and emergency management. Each application begins with a tight summary of standard thinking on a subject, followed by the new insights that are afforded by nonlinear dynamics and the empirical data supporting those ideas. Unusual concepts are also encountered, such as the organizational unconscious, collective intelligence, and the revolt of the slaved variables. The net results are a new perspective on what is really important in organizational life, original insights on familiar experiences, and some clear signposts for the next generation of nonlinear social scientists.
Author: Dilip Abreu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 11
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Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Wolfgang Tschacher
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9789810238377
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Book Description
This volume focuses on the modeling of cognition, and brings together contributions from psychologists and researchers in the field of cognitive science. The shared platform of this work is to advocate a dynamical systems approach to cognition. Several aspects of this approach are considered here: chaos theory, artificial intelligence and Alife models, catastrophe theory and, most importantly, self-organization theory or synergetics. The application of nonlinear systems theory to cognitive science in general, and to cognitive psychology in particular, is a growing field that has gained further momentum thanks to new contributions from the science of robotics. The recent development in cognitive science towards an account of embodiment, together with the general approach of complexity theory and dynamics, will have a major impact on our psychological understanding of reasoning, thinking and behavior.
Author: Evelyn C. Fink
Publisher: SAGE
ISBN: 9780761910169
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 84
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PLEASE UPDATE SAGE UK AND SAGE INDIA ADDRESSES ON IMPRINT PAGE.
Author: Johannes Hörner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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