The Effect of Market Incentives on Analyst Forecast Management and Analyst Forecast Error PDF Download
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Author: Vahid Biglari
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Vahid Biglari
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Thomas J. Lopez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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This paper focuses on two distinct, but related, issues with respect to managers' incentives to report earnings that meet or exceed analysts' expectations. First, we assess the differential stock price sensitivity to earnings that meet or exceed analysts' expectations compared to those that do not. Second, we examine whether the market implicitly revises analysts' earnings forecasts for firms that systematically report earnings that exceed forecasts. We find that the earnings response coefficient (ERC) is significantly higher for firms that meet analysts' forecasts. Additionally, we find that the market recognizes and adjusts the forecast error of firms that exhibit a systematic pattern of reporting positive or negative unexpected earnings. The market fully adjusts for the systematic component of the forecast error when it is negative; however, only a partial adjustment is made when the systematic component is positive. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers who try to report earnings that meet analysts' forecasts are responding to two market incentives. First, the market provides a premium to positive forecast errors and assigns a higher multiple to the level of positive unexpected earnings. Second, though the market recognizes systematic bias in analysts' forecasts, it does not fully adjust for systematically positive forecast errors. Our evidence provides, at a minimum, a partial explanation for managers' fixation on reporting positive unexpected earnings.
Author: Scott A. Richardson
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an earnings guidance game where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk-down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk-down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.
Author: Claudia Qi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Based on a unique dataset that identifies the locations of 19,832 financial analysts covering 21,885 firms from 49 countries during 1996-2013, we find that individualism of analysts' country of residence is negatively associated with their earnings forecast optimism and positively associated with their forecast accuracy. Using multiple proxies for economic incentives and cognitive biases, we find that individualism affects analyst forecast optimism and accuracy through the economic incentives that analysts face, rather than their cognitive biases (irrationality). Our results highlight the importance for regulators and investors to factor in culture values when battling against biased analyst research.
Author: Dawn A. Matsumoto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Recent reports in the popular press allege that managers guide analysts' forecasts downward to improve their chances of meeting or beating these forecasts when earnings are announced. Since the majority of this alleged guidance is unobservable, I use systematic patterns in analysts' forecast errors as a proxy for firm-provided guidance and examine both the change in guidance over time as well as the characteristics of firms exhibiting evidence of this guidance. The evidence is consistent with an increase in firm-provided guidance in recent years and differences across firms in the propensity to guide forecasts downward. In particular, I find: 1) an increasing number of forecast errors exactly equal to zero particularly for firms with initially high forecasts; 2) when firms miss analysts' expectations at the earnings announcement, the proportion that miss quot;highquot; (positive earnings surprise) versus miss quot;lowquot; (negative earnings surprise) has increased in recent years particularly for firms with initially high forecasts; 3) firms with higher growth prospects, higher institutional ownership, and higher litigation risk are more likely to guide analysts' forecasts downward to ensure reported earnings meet expectations at the earnings announcement, while firms with low value relevance of earnings are less likely to do so; and 4) firms with high institutional ownership and reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders tend to exceed rather than fall short of expectations at the earnings announcement.
Author: William Kross
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business forecasting
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Cheng Few Lee
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9811202400
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 5053
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Book Description
This four-volume handbook covers important concepts and tools used in the fields of financial econometrics, mathematics, statistics, and machine learning. Econometric methods have been applied in asset pricing, corporate finance, international finance, options and futures, risk management, and in stress testing for financial institutions. This handbook discusses a variety of econometric methods, including single equation multiple regression, simultaneous equation regression, and panel data analysis, among others. It also covers statistical distributions, such as the binomial and log normal distributions, in light of their applications to portfolio theory and asset management in addition to their use in research regarding options and futures contracts.In both theory and methodology, we need to rely upon mathematics, which includes linear algebra, geometry, differential equations, Stochastic differential equation (Ito calculus), optimization, constrained optimization, and others. These forms of mathematics have been used to derive capital market line, security market line (capital asset pricing model), option pricing model, portfolio analysis, and others.In recent times, an increased importance has been given to computer technology in financial research. Different computer languages and programming techniques are important tools for empirical research in finance. Hence, simulation, machine learning, big data, and financial payments are explored in this handbook.Led by Distinguished Professor Cheng Few Lee from Rutgers University, this multi-volume work integrates theoretical, methodological, and practical issues based on his years of academic and industry experience.
Author: Stanimir Markov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Prior research on financial analysts' consensus earnings forecast errors has tended to explore either incentives-based or inefficient information use-based explanations for the properties of the analysts' forecast errors. This has limited our understanding of financial analysts' expectation formation process as incentives and cognitive biases are likely to simultaneously affect the properties of the analysts' consensus forecast errors. Our main contribution is in separating these two effects. In particular, using consensus quarterly earnings forecast data, we document that analysts have asymmetric loss function, and that they do not fully use past earnings and forecast errors information in minimizing their expected loss.
Author: Henock Louis
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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We analyze whether analysts sacrifice forecast accuracy for informativeness by examining: (1) the association between analysts' deviations from management guidance and earnings management; (2) the effect of the deviations on analyst forecast accuracy; and (3) the effect of the deviations on prices. The evidence indicates that analysts apparently deviate from management guidance to correct for perceived earnings management. Although the deviations reduce the analysts' forecast accuracy, they improve the informativeness of their earnings estimates. More specifically, they bring the analysts' estimates closer to the true (unmanaged) earnings number and reduce mispricing. An implicit assumption in the literature is that more accurate analyst forecasts (i.e., earnings estimates that are closer to the actual reported earnings) are better for investors, and that analysts' primary objective is to forecast the reported (managed) earnings number accurately. Our analysis suggests that this is not necessarily the case and that an inaccurate forecast can actually be more informative than an accurate one. Prior studies on analyst deviations from management guidance focus on analysts' incentives to provide earnings estimates that managers can beat. These studies implicitly assume that analysts side with management against the interests of their clients. Our analysis indicates that analysts could also deviate from management guidance to provide useful valuation information to their clients.
Author: Scott A. Richardson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Security regulators and the business press have alleged that firms play an 'earnings-guidance game' where analysts make optimistic forecasts at the start of the year and then 'walk down' their estimates to a level the firm can beat by the end of the year. In a comprehensive sample of I/B/E/S individual analysts' forecasts of annual earnings from 1983-1998, we find strong support for the claim in the post-1992 period. We examine whether the 'walk down' to beatable targets is associated with managers' incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (via new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (insider trades). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the 'walk down' to beatable targets is most pronounced in firms that are either net issuers of equity or in firms where managers are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on how capital market incentives affect communications between managers and analysts.
