The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival PDF full book. Access full book title The Effect of Issuing Biased Earnings Forecasts on Analysts' Access to Management and Survival by Bin Ke. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Bin Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
Get Book Here
Book Description
This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard-to-predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.
Author: Bin Ke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 63
Get Book Here
Book Description
This study offers evidence on the earnings forecast bias analysts use to please firm management and the associated benefits they obtain from issuing such biased forecasts in the years prior to Regulation Fair Disclosure. Analysts who issue initial optimistic earnings forecasts followed by pessimistic earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement produce more accurate earnings forecasts and are less likely to be fired by their employers. The effect of such biased earnings forecasts on forecast accuracy and firing is stronger for analysts who follow firms with heavy insider selling and hard-to-predict earnings. The above results hold regardless of whether a brokerage firm has investment banking business or not. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analysts use biased earnings forecasts to curry favor with firm management in order to obtain better access to management's private information.
Author: Beverly R. Walther
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
We examine the association between investor expectations and its components and sell-side analysts' short-run quarterly earnings forecast bias and forecast accuracy. To measure investor expectations, we use the Index of Consumer Expectations (ICE) survey and decompose it into the “fundamental” component related to underlying economic factors (FUND) and the “sentiment” component unrelated to underlying economic factors (SENT). We find that analysts are the most optimistic and the least accurate when SENT is higher. Management long-horizon earnings forecasts attenuate the effects of SENT on forecast optimism and forecast accuracy. Analysts are also the most accurate when FUND is higher. Last, the market places more weight on unexpected earnings when SENT is high. These findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment and the market reacts more strongly to unexpected earnings when analyst forecasts are the least accurate. The last result potentially explains why prior research (for example, Baker and Wurgler 2006) finds an association between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.
Author: Senyo Y. Tse
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
Get Book Here
Book Description
The likelihood that earnings announcements meet or beat analyst expectations differs substantially and systematically across firms. Prior research explores managers incentives to meet analyst expectations. In this paper, we examine analysts incentives to issue systematically biased earnings forecasts and thereby influence the likelihood that firms report good earnings news. We first document that forecast biases are systematically different, as large firms and firms with low forecast dispersion - labeled high-information firms - are more likely to report positive earning surprises, while small firms and firms with large forecast dispersion - labeled low-information firms - tend to have optimistically biased forecasts that often lead to negative earnings surprises. We also show that potential financing needs induce more optimistic forecasts for low-information firms, but this effect is greatly mitigated for high-information firms. We find that career concerns help explain analysts' systematic forecast bias. An analyst's career longevity is enhanced by issuing pessimistic forecasts for high-information firms and optimistic forecasts for low-information firms. Optimistic forecast bias for high-financing-need firms has no consequence for an analyst's career longevity, but optimistic bias for low-financing-need firms hurts. Our results suggest that career concerns contribute to a systematic pattern of forecasting that aligns with managerial preferences.
Author: Jeffery S. Abarbanell
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
We demonstrate the role of three empirical properties of cross-sectional distributions of analysts' forecast errors in generating evidence pertinent to three important and heretofore separately analyzed phenomena studied in the analyst earnings forecast literature: purported bias (intentional or unintentional) in analysts' earnings forecasts, forecaster over/underreaction to information in prior realizations of economic variables, and positive serial correlation in analysts' forecast errors. The empirical properties of interest include: the existence of two statistically influential asymmetries found in the tail and the middle of typical forecast error distributions, the fact that a relatively small number of observations comprise these asymmetries and, the unusual character of the reported earnings benchmark used in the calculation of the forecast errors that fall into the two asymmetries that is associated with firm recognition of unexpected accruals. We discuss competing explanations for the presence of these properties of forecast error distributions and their implications for conclusions about analyst forecast rationality that are pertinent to researchers, regulators, and investors concerned with the incentives and judgments of analysts.Previously titled quot;Biased Forecasts or Biased Earnings? The Role of Earnings Management in Explaining Apparent Optimism and Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings Forecastsquot.
Author: Murugappa (Murgie) Krishnan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this paper, we provide an equilibrium explanation for the observed optimism in analysts' earnings forecasts. Our analysis provides theoretical support to the widely held notion that analysts engage in earnings optimism to gain access to management's private information. We show that a strategic analyst, who is motivated by improving the combined accuracy of his forecasts, issues a biased initial forecast to extract information from management, but issues unbiased forecasts subsequently. The management, on the other hand, provides more access because this optimistic bias reduces the proprietary costs associated with disclosure at the margin. An important element of our model is the assumption that analysts also have private information relevant to assessing firm value. Despite rational expectations about analyst bias, analysts' private information cannot be fully unravelled by other agents due to the noise introduced by the diversity in analysts' incentives.
Author: Lawrence D. Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Managerial behavior differs considerably when managers report quarterly profits versus losses. When they report profits, managers seek to just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. When they report losses, managers do not attempt to meet or slightly beat analyst estimates. Instead, managers often do not forewarn analysts of impending losses, and the analyst's signed error is likely to be negative and extreme (i.e., a measured optimistic bias). Brown (1997 Financial Analysts Journal) shows that the optimistic bias in analyst earnings forecasts has been mitigated over time, and that it is less pronounced for larger firms and firms followed by many analysts. In the present study, I offer three explanations for these temporal and cross-sectional phenomena. First, the frequency of profits versus losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. Since an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is less likely to occur when firms report profits, an optimistic bias is less likely to be observed in samples possessing a relatively greater frequency of profits. Second, the tendency to report profits that just meet or slightly beat analyst estimates may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage profits' (and analyst estimates) in this manner reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. Third, the tendency to forewarn analysts of impending losses may differ temporally and/or cross-sectionally. A greater tendency to 'manage losses' in this manner also reduces the measured optimistic bias in analyst forecasts. I provide the following temporal evidence. The optimistic bias in analyst forecasts pertains to both the entire sample and the losses sub-sample. In contrast, a pessimistic bias exists for the 85.3% of the sample that consists of reported profits. The temporal decrease in the optimistic bias documented by Brown (1997) pertains to both losses and profits. Analysts have gotten better at predicting the sign of a loss (i.e., they are much more likely to predict that a loss will occur than they used to), and they have reduced the number of extreme negative errors they make by two-thirds. Managers are much more likely to report profits that exactly meet or slightly beat analyst estimates than they used to. In contrast, they are less likely to report profits that fall a little short of analyst estimates than they used to. I conclude that the temporal reduction in optimistic bias is attributable to an increased tendency to manage both profits and losses. I find no evidence that there exists a temporal change in the profits-losses mix (using the I/B/E/S definition of reported quarterly profits and losses). I document the following cross-sectional evidence. The principle reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that larger firms have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that slightly beat analyst estimates. The principle reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that they are far less likely to report losses. A secondary reason that firms followed by more analysts have relatively less optimistic bias is that their managers are relatively more likely to report profits that exactly meet analyst estimates or beat them by one penny. I find no evidence that managers of larger firms or firms followed by more analysts are relatively more likely to forewarn analysts of impending losses. I conclude that cross-sectional differences in bias arise primarily from differential 'loss frequencies,' and secondarily from differential 'profits management.' The paper discusses implications of the results for studies of analysts forecast bias, earnings management, and capital markets. It concludes with caveats and directions for future research.
Author: Stephen P. Baginski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56
Get Book Here
Book Description
Approximately 90 percent of managers' earnings forecasts are issued simultaneously with their firm's current earnings announcement - a practice referred to as the “bundling” of earnings information. We examine whether managers bias these forecasts conditional on the news conveyed in current earnings, and offer three findings. First, managers appear to release optimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released negative current earnings news. Second, managers appear to release pessimistically biased earnings forecasts with simultaneously released large positive current earnings news. Third, these results (especially for optimistic bias when current earnings news is negative) are stronger when managers: (1) face less analyst monitoring and lower litigation risk, which constrain the ability to bias their forecasts, and (2) face greater career concerns, which create incentives to alter investor perceptions about current earnings. Additional analysis suggests that investors are unable to identify the management forecast bias, but that they unravel the bias subsequently as it is revealed. While no archival study can ascertain management intent, we provide several results that cast doubt on the idea that this management forecast bias behavior is purely unintentional. Overall, our evidence suggests that managers issue biased forecasts with the earnings announcement to influence perceptions of their firm's current earnings news.
Author: Stan Beckers
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Forecasting company earnings is a difficult and hazardous task. In an efficient market where analysts learn from past mistakes, there should be no persistent and systematic biases in consensus earnings accuracy. Previous research has already established how some (single) individual-company characteristics systematically influence forecast accuracy. So far, however, the effect on consensus earnings biases of a company's sector and country affiliation combined with a range of other fundamental characteristics has remained largely unexplored. Using data for 1993-2002, this article disentangles and quantifies for a broad universe of European stocks how the number of analysts following a stock, the dispersion of their forecasts, the volatility of earnings, the sector and country classification of the covered company, and its market capitalization influence the accuracy of the consensus earnings forecast.
Author: Somnath Das
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper examines cross-sectional differences in the optimistic behavior of financial analysts. Specifically, we investigate whether the predictive accuracy of past information (e.g., time-series of earnings, past returns, etc.) is associated with the magnitude of the bias in analysts' earnings forecasts. We posit that there is higher demand for non-public information for firms whose earnings are difficult to accurately predict than for firms whose earnings can be accurately forecasted using public information. Assuming that optimism facilitates access to management's non-public information, we hypothesize that analysts will issue more optimistic forecasts for low predictability firms than for high predictability firms. Our results support this hypothesis.
Author: Armen Hovakimian
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
We examine the spillover effects of the Global Analyst Research Settlement (or Global Settlement) on analysts' earnings forecasts in 40 developed and emerging markets. Prior to the Global Settlement, analysts generally made overly optimistic forecasts, this bias tending to be higher in countries with less investor protection. This forecast bias declined significantly after passage of the Global Settlement, the spillover effect being stronger for countries with lower investor protection. The spillover effect is also stronger for countries with a more significant presence of the analysts of the 12 banks directly involved in the Global Settlement.
