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Author: Gene F. Ott
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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Author: Gene F. Ott
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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Author: Mara Cameran
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Mandatory auditor rotation was recently proposed for the European Union and is also under consideration in the United States. There has been little research into either the benefits or costs of rotation in a true mandatory setting that could inform intelligent policy making. Our paper helps fill this gap by examining Italy where mandatory rotation of auditors has been required since 1975. We find that outgoing auditors do not shirk on effort (or quality), but final year fees are 7 percent higher than normal which may indicate opportunistic pricing. The fees of incoming auditors are discounted by 16 percent even though they have abnormally higher engagement hours in the first year (17 percent), which is suggestive of low balling. However, subsequent fees are abnormally higher and exceed the initial fee discount. Thus the costs of mandatory rotation are nontrivial. Higher costs could be acceptable if rotation improves audit quality, but we find evidence of the opposite. Namely, the quality of audited earnings is lower in the first three years following rotation, relative to later years of auditor tenure. Since rotation is costly and earnings quality improves with longer auditor tenure, the evidence from Italy does not support the case for mandatory rotation.
Author: Jennifer Blouin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The collapse of Arthur Andersen provides a unique quasi-experimental setting to study the implications of mandatory auditor rotation for public firms. Consistent with the extant literature on mandatory auditor rotation, we hypothesize the selection of a new auditor is a function of agency and switching costs. Using a unique dataset identifying whether or not former Andersen clients followed their audit team to a new auditor, we are able to find support for both hypotheses. Further, we find firms with greater performance adjusted discretionary accruals were more likely to follow their Andersen audit team to a new auditor, consistent with these firms trying to mitigate the costs of switching auditors. However, tests of accruals in the subsequent year reveal the most aggressive firms who followed Andersen staff were no longer aggressive in the following year relative to the group who chose new non-Andersen auditors. This is inconsistent with mandatory auditor rotation directly improving financial reporting since we expect the non followers to exhibit the greatest degree of accrual correction. However, our results must be interpreted with caution since the rotation described in the paper is quite atypical. Further, whether the benefits outweigh the costs is still difficult to determine since we cannot empirically quantify these aspects.
Author: Christopher Bleibtreu
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680839005
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Audit Regulations, Audit Market Structure, and Financial Reporting Quality provides a structured overview of the empirical and analytical literature on the effects of audit market regulations. After a short introduction, the monograph is organized as follows. Chapter II addresses the structure of the audit markets of industrialized countries. First presenting an overview of the concentration metrics used to describe the structure of an audit market or a market segment, then providing the empirical findings on audit market concentration at the national level and presenting an overview of the main reasons that led to the currently high degree of concentration. Chapter III summarizes the reasons why regulators worldwide consider a high degree of concentration to be a concern. In particular, it reviews the regulator's assumption that a high degree of concentration inevitably leads to a low degree of competition and to the corresponding effects of low audit quality and high audit fees. It also provides an overview of the empirical findings on the association between concentration and audit quality and fees, respectively. Chapter IV introduces the mandatory audit firm rotation, the prohibition on the joint supply of audit and non-audit services, and joint audits as examples for regulations that are likely to have both incentive and market structure effects. Chapter V summarizes the empirical findings on the effects of these regulations on audit quality and market structure. Chapter VI summarizes models that regard the market structure as given. The results from these models show that the effects of regulations are not straightforward, but depend on various factors related to the auditor, the client, and the legal environment. Chapter VII gives an overview of analytical research that simultaneously considers incentive effects and market structure effects. It also provides a brief overview of industrial organization models that seem suitable to expand the models applied to investigate the effects of audit regulations. Chapter VIII concludes and highlights avenues for future research.
Author: Kathleen Harris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Accounting
Languages : en
Pages :
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This study investigates whether mandatory auditor rotation rules are associated with changes in audit quality using available data from three countries that have adopted mandatory auditor rotation (MAR) rules. Consistent with prior literature, I assume that earnings management measures capture the various methods employed by corporate insiders to exercise their discretion to manage earnings that is not constrained by the audit firm. The more discretion, ceteris paribus, in earnings, the lower the audit quality. First, I investigate the debonding effect of an MAR policy. Debonding describes the effect that is often the primary motivation for adopting MAR rules. That is, end the possibility of long-term audit engagements and the economic bond of audit firms to their clients will be broken (by enhancing auditor independence and objectivity). In the sample after adoption of MAR rules, the data show evidence of less earnings management, less managing to earnings targets, and more timely loss recognition compared to the sample before adopting MAR rules. From these results, I conclude that audit markets appear to improve, on average, from enactment of MAR rules. I then investigate the allowed discretion in the year before and the year after auditor changes in which rotation rules have been adopted (termed the low client-specific knowledge effect). I find evidence of lower audit quality in both years. These results highlight the importance, particularly to regulators of audit markets, of considering ways to mitigate the erosion of audit quality when making the transition to new auditors under MAR rules (e.g., the use of detailed handover files between predecessor and successor audit firms or "four-eyes principle" in years of initial audits).
Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428937056
Category : Accounting firms
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Author: Hassan El Hajj
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Aysa Dordzhieva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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This study addresses the international debate over whether the rotation of audit firms should be mandatory. Mandatory rotation rules have been adopted by the European Union, but have not been established in the United States. Proponents of the policy believe that a long tenure auditor-client relationship leads to the auditor building an excessive economic bond with the client which erodes auditor independence. Motivated by this claim, I build a theoretical model that compares auditor incentives to issue independent reports under the regimes with and without mandatory rotation. The model demonstrates conditions under which mandatory rotation could actually impair auditor independence, contrary to the popular view.
Author: Mr.Atilla Arda
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484375505
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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This paper takes stock of external audit arrangements at central banks. Its focus is on the annual audit of central bank financial statements, as well as legal and institutional measures that support audit quality and independence. The paper outlines good practices in these areas and provides a summary of actual practices observed based on a review of audited financial statements and central bank legislation. While the audit frameworks for central banks differ depending on their legal and institutional circumstances, central banks’ external audits increasingly follow international standards. Most of them are audited by auditors with international affiliations and embrace modern governance structures that provide for audit oversight. However, the paper also notes that a sizeable number of central banks do not publish the audit results in a timely manner, which leaves room for improvement in transparency practices.
Author: Paul Lynn Walker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auditors
Languages : en
Pages : 94
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