Synergies in Recurring Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44).
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This article examines the impact of synergies on bidder behavior in recurring road construction procurement auctions. The study reveals that projects are spatially correlated. When bidders with potential synergies participate, the results indicate that their probability of bidding and winning increases and they bid more aggressively. Finally, the study shows that a firm that is capacity unconstrained will bid more aggressively than one that is capacity constrained. (JEL D44).
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Asunción Mochón
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319088130
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
In recent years, auctions have become an important field and many markets have designed new and sophisticated auction models to assign different types of items. The prime goal of this book is to set an organized classification of the main auction mechanisms in a way that readers can understand the importance of auction design and the advantages and drawbacks of each model. Given the relevance of the subject, there is a great volume of research about this topic. Nevertheless, most of these contributions use complex mathematical language difficult to understand for the average reader. In this book, the authors summarize the main ideas of the auction theory and explain them with simple language and plenty of examples. This book is a good starting point for any researcher interested in embracing the auction design as it also includes numerous real-world examples to engage the reader in the topic. “This book fills an important gap by making the main ideas and findings of auction research accessible.” Professor Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University.
Author: Ces Reo Hern Ndez
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642029574
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
Simulation is used in economics to solve large econometric models, for large-scale micro simulations, and to obtain numerical solutions for policy design in top-down established models. But these applications fail to take advantage of the methods offered by artificial economics (AE) through artificial intelligence and distributed computing. AE is a bottom-up and generative approach of agent-based modelling developed to get a deeper insight into the complexity of economics. AE can be viewed as a very elegant and general class of modelling techniques that generalize numerical economics, mathematical programming and micro simulation approaches. The papers presented in this book address methodological questions and applications of AE to macroeconomics, industrial organization, information and learning, market dynamics, finance and financial markets.
Author:
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0323988881
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 784
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Book Description
Handbook of Industrial Organization Volume 4 highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters. Each chapter is written by an international board of authors. Part of the renowned Handbooks in Economics series Chapters are contributed by some of the leading experts in their fields A source, reference and teaching supplement for industrial organizations or industrial economists
Author: Lu Ji
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Book Description
My dissertation contributes to auction studies. It analyzes the bidding behavior in multi-round auctions. It is motivated by an interesting multi-round feature observed in the procurement auctions held by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT hereafter), which adopts secret reserve prices. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices usually lead to no trade. However, prior research has not paid much attention to the possibility that the seller can auction unsold objects from previous rounds and a trade is therefore still likely to occur. My dissertation provides new theoretical and empirical analyses of auctions with multiple rounds. It first develops a game-theoretic bidding model for the multi-round auctions with non-forward looking bidders. It then establishes a structural econometric model in order to conduct a structural analysis of the INDOT data. Lastly it introduces dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and uses a dynamic control approach to analyze the bidding behavior and policy issues. The main findings are: (1) rational bidders reduce their markup across periods in multi-round auctions; (2) simulations show that using secret reserve price is sometimes better than public reserve price for the procurement auctioneer; (3) counterfactual analyses indicate that on one hand, when bidders are not forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price; on the other hand, when bidders are forward looking, it is better for the INDOT to use a secret reserve price when the discount factor is low and to use a public reserve price when the discount factor is sufficiently high.
Author: Leandro Arozamena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 56
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Book Description
Author: Xiaoyong Zheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 406
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Book Description
Author: Joachim Groeger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This article studies repeated entry and bidding decisions in construction procurement auctions. I find evidence in the data that suggests the presence of significant cost savings from entering contracts of the same type. I estimate a dynamic auction model to measure the gains to experience for bidders. I allow for endogenous entry, synergies in entry, and unobserved auction heterogeneity. I find that a bidder can halve entry costs by focusing on specific contract types. An auctioneer can increase competition by awarding contracts of the same type in sequence. As a result, procurement costs for each contract can be lowered by 7%, a saving of $110,000.
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.
