Synergies and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Flavio F. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: Flavio F. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
Author: Kasper Leufkens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Author: Paul Pezanis-Christou
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
We analyze sequential Dutch and Vickrey auctions where risk averse, or risk preferring, bidders may have heterogeneous risk exposures. We derive and characterize a pure strategy equilibrium of both auctions for arbitrary number of identical objects. A sufficient, and to certain extent necessary, condition for this result is that bidders' marginal utilities are log-submodular in income and type. We then show that when bidders are risk averse (preferring), the equilibrium price sequences should be downward (upward) drifting, and in each period the conditional expected revenue is higher (lower) in the Dutch than in the Vickrey sequential auctions. In particular, the "declining price anomaly" is perfectly consistent with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion when bidders have exposures to background risk.
Author: Dakshina G. De Silva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider sequential construction contracts in which bidders may benefit from one auction to the next due to synergistic tasks across the projects auctioned. Theoretical considerations indicate that winners in the former auctions are more likely to participate in latter auctions. Moreover, conditional on participation, past winners place lower bids, on average, and are so more likely to win in later auctions. We present evidence in support of these predictions using sequential construction auctions conducted by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation.
Author: Kasper Leufkens
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Author: Fernando Branco
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
Author: Audrey Hu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
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Book Description
A common assumption in the analysis of symmetric auctions is that the bidders' value estimates exhibit positive informational externalities (PIE). This assumption implies upward drifting price sequences at sequential auctions, which is challenged by an empirical regularity, known as the "declining price anomaly," that observed price sequences at real sequential auctions tend to be downward-drifting. This paper extends the existing analysis to a generalized interdependent values environment, in which the bidders' values can exhibit both PIE and NIE (negative informational externalities). The case of NIE can arise naturally when competing bidders are also competitors in the same product market. If a bidder's type is related to his or his firm's ensuing competitive advantage, then an increase of a bidder's type increases his own but may decrease other bidders' expected values.We consider a general sequential auction mechanism that sells m identical objects through K (≤m) consecutive rounds, each round involving possibly a different number of objects for sale and a different payment rule. For risk neutral bidders having unit demand and independent types, we obtain two major results. First, the direct sequentially incentive compatible auction mechanisms, which implement the performance of essentially all standard auctions, are feasible under both PIE and NIE. Second, while the total expected revenue is invariant to sequencing and payment rules, the expected selling prices from different rounds of the auction are not the same. In a PIE environment the expected price sequence tends to be upward drifting, whereas in an NIE environment the expected price sequence is strongly downward drifting: the expected lowest price in round k exceeds the expected highest price in round k 1. The declining price "anomaly" could, therefore, be evidence of bidders' values featuring NIE or post-auction competition.
