Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory

Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory PDF Author: Kersting, Jan
Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing
ISBN: 3731507005
Category : Business
Languages : en
Pages : 254

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Book Description
International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable.

Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory

Stability of cooperation in the international climate negotiations - An analysis using cooperative game theory PDF Author: Kersting, Jan
Publisher: KIT Scientific Publishing
ISBN: 3731507005
Category : Business
Languages : en
Pages : 254

Get Book Here

Book Description
International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable.

Stability of Cooperation in the International Climate Negotiations - An Analysis Using Cooperative Game Theory

Stability of Cooperation in the International Climate Negotiations - An Analysis Using Cooperative Game Theory PDF Author: Jan Kersting
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781013283703
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 250

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Book Description
International cooperation on greenhouse gas emission reductions is needed to avoid dangerous climate change. This work analyses the stability of global cooperation on climate change using cooperative game theory. Numerical and theoretical models are applied to evaluate the impact of several real-world properties. It is shown that the introduction of these properties into the game-theoretical model substantially affects the results and can make global climate cooperation unstable. This work was published by Saint Philip Street Press pursuant to a Creative Commons license permitting commercial use. All rights not granted by the work's license are retained by the author or authors.

Economics, Game Theory And International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures

Economics, Game Theory And International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures PDF Author: Henry Tulkens
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9813141247
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 459

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Book Description
The science and management of environmental problems is a vast area, comprising both the natural and social sciences, and the multidisciplinary links often make these issues challenging to comprehend. Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements: The Ca' Foscari Lectures aims to introduce students to the multidimensional character of international environmental problems in general, and climate change in particular.Ecology, economics, game theory and diplomacy are called upon and brought together in the common framework of a basic mathematical model. Within that framework, and using tools from these four disciplines, the book develops a theory that aims to explain and promote cooperation in international environmental affairs.Other books on the topic tend to be research-oriented volumes of various papers. Instead, this is a book that offers a reasonably-sized synthesis of the multidimensional societal problems of transfrontier pollution, particularly of climate change. It uses mathematical modeling of economic and game theory concepts to examine these environmental issues and demonstrate many results in an accessible fashion. Readers interested in understanding the links between ecology and economics, as well as the connection between economics and institutional decision-making, will find in this text not only answers to many of their queries but also questions for further thinking.

Averting Climate Catastrophe Together

Averting Climate Catastrophe Together PDF Author: Martin Zapf
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG
ISBN: 3110777584
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 209

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Book Description
Humanity has so far failed to respect some essential compatibility limits to ensure sustainable development. Is it possible to change the course? This book revolves around this question, focusing on climate change. Averting Climate Catastrophe Together addresses the necessity of meeting the Paris Agreement temperature target and explores what framework could enable climate action in an effective, efficient and equitable manner that is consistent with that goal. It also looks at the contribution of technological change within the economic system, including the feasibility of a global energy transition. Whether humanity can avoid catastrophic climate change appears to depend not on the availability of technological solutions, but rather on international cooperation and coordination. Given the various sustainability issues, this book also discusses whether it is possible to derive a general approach to them. It argues that dealing with compatibility limits in complex systems requires a holistic change in the system structure. Therefore, systems science is discussed together with economics, technological change, and sustainable development. This book targets scientists and experts from different disciplines due to the interdisciplinary topic, but especially from environmental economics and energy technology; policy makers, as policy recommendations are provided to address climate change; as well as the general public due to the pressing common challenge of addressing climate change and comprehensive efforts for sustainable development. Provides evidence based on climate science research on the necessity of meeting the Paris Agreement temperature target Highlights the feasibility of the global energy transition as one major option to mitigate climate change, also going into detail about the process of technological change Brings together systems science with economics, technological change, and sustainable development Derives a framework to meet the Paris Agreement temperature target, enabling coordinated climate action in an effective and efficient manner while pursuing distributive justice

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation

Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781784713201
Category : Environmental economics
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This Research Review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements

A Game-Theoretic Model of International Climate Change Negotiations

A Game-Theoretic Model of International Climate Change Negotiations PDF Author: Shi-Ling Hsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
Exactly why the nations of the world have had difficulty in reaching agreement on reducing greenhouse gases that cause climate change is something of a puzzle. Although the future generations that will suffer the greater costs from climate change will probably be wealthier, the non-trivial risks that climate change will be catastrophic would seem to merit the collective purchase of some insurance in the form of greenhouse gas mitigation. Political economy, collective action, and psychological explanations all play a part in accounting for the international impasse, but all are incomplete. This article presents a simple game-theoretic model that illustrates the strategic interdependencies between countries, and how they affect prospects for international cooperation in reducing greenhouse gases. The model is a game of perfect information involving two players and three periods - the first two in which the players may undertake mitigation to reduce greenhouse gases, and a third in which the players will suffer the costs of climate change if mitigation is unsuccessful. The analysis of the dynamics of international climate negotiations is undertaken by relaxing various assumptions of the model and examining the outcomes. The insights obtained from analysis of this model include: (i) early mitigation measures play an important role in affecting the decision environment for other countries; (ii) strategic behavior in attempting to extract side payments may lead to suboptimal failures to cooperate in mitigation; and (iii) adaptation and geo-engineering pose alternatives to mitigation that may render cooperation less likely.

Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

Simulating Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem PDF Author: Johan Eyckmans
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Emissions trading
Languages : en
Pages : 31

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Book Description


Economics of Climate Change: A Game Theoretic Approach

Economics of Climate Change: A Game Theoretic Approach PDF Author: Rajendra Kumar Kaushal
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783659768705
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60

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Book Description
Global accumulation of heat-trapping from the greenhouse gases results in global climate change has become a dominant environmental issue. An economic argument can be made, so that reducing greenhouse gas emissions would essentially be transferring wealth to an even wealthier future. This book argues cooperative and non-cooperative game theoretic approach for international climate change negotiations. Game theory is an obvious fit, since international climate negotiations are strongly driven by strategic interdependencies.

Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation

Economic Theories of International Environmental Cooperation PDF Author: Carsten Helm
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781782541349
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 216

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Book Description
'Helm's book is impressive for its combination of rigorous theory in real world contexts . . . highly recommended.' - David Pearce, Environmental and Resource Economics To deal effectively with transboundary environmental problems such as climate change, it is important to have an idea of the model for an 'efficient' and 'fair' policy. An understanding of the strategic interactions involved in the international decision-making process is also essential. Carsten Helm uses rigorous theoretical reasoning and applications to address these issues.

Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity

Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations Due to a Preference for Equity PDF Author: Andreas Lange
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper demonstrates that cooperation in international environmental negotiations can be explained by preferences for equity. Within a N-country prisoner's dilemma in which agents can either cooperate or defect, in addition to the standard non-cooperative equilibrium, cooperation of a large fraction or even of all countries can establish a Nash equilibrium. In an emission game, however, where countries can choose their abatement level continuously, equity preferences cannot improve upon the standard inefficient Nash-equilibrium. Finally, in a two stage game on coalition formation, the presence of equity-interested countries increases the coalition size and leads to efficiency gains. Here, even a stable agreement with full cooperation can be reached.