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Author: Pallavi Pal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper, I derive a new method to identify the distribution of the advertiser's ad-value in the sponsored search auction, explicitly looking at weighted Generalized Second Price auction (GSPw henceforth). Compared to previous literature, this method incorporates a weaker and more realistic assumption of 'incomplete information' on advertisers' private information. Additionally, I evaluate how much the advertisers shade their bid below their value, defined as bid shading amount. The results show that the bid shading is very small; the 50th percentile of the bid shading upper bound is below by 0.2% of their value. The low amount of bid shading is due to high competition intensity in the online ad market as the number of competing bids in the online ad market is very large. The bid shading calculation can also shed light on how the change of ad auction will impact the ad revenue.
Author: Pallavi Pal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper, I derive a new method to identify the distribution of the advertiser's ad-value in the sponsored search auction, explicitly looking at weighted Generalized Second Price auction (GSPw henceforth). Compared to previous literature, this method incorporates a weaker and more realistic assumption of 'incomplete information' on advertisers' private information. Additionally, I evaluate how much the advertisers shade their bid below their value, defined as bid shading amount. The results show that the bid shading is very small; the 50th percentile of the bid shading upper bound is below by 0.2% of their value. The low amount of bid shading is due to high competition intensity in the online ad market as the number of competing bids in the online ad market is very large. The bid shading calculation can also shed light on how the change of ad auction will impact the ad revenue.
Author: Song Yao
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601982283
Category : Brand loyalty
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Sponsored Search Auctions reviews current academic research on this nascent topic with a focus on future practical and research opportunities
Author: Maryam Farboodi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
We study the optimal mechanism in position auctions in a common-value setting where only ordinal information about the advertisers is posted and auctioneer revenue depends on consumer belief about ad qualities. We show that when bidder valuations are correlated, existence of a simple non-ironed optimal mechanism requires a stronger condition that the usual increasing virtual valuation assumption. With fixed number of positions, the corresponding optimal decision rule (among all mixed and pure strategies) is to allocate the ad positions to advertisers in decreasing order of quality. More importantly, when the search engine also chooses the number of ads to post, ignoring the consumer belief endogeneity will lead to posting too many ads compared to what maximizes the search engine revenue. We also show that when only one ad position is available, the optimal allocation rule uses a reserve price which is higher than what is implied by Myerson 1981 seminal work. Finally, we characterize the optimal mechanism when cardinal information about advertiser quality is posted, and we provide results on how search engine revenue compares under the two regimes.
Author: Jianqing Chen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Internet advertising
Languages : en
Pages : 298
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Book Description
Advances in information technology have created radically new business models, most notably the integration of advertising with keyword-based targeting, or "keyword advertising." Keyword advertising has two main variations: advertising based on keywords employed by users in search engines, often known as "sponsored links," and advertising based on keywords embedded in the content users view, often known as "contextual advertising." Keyword advertising providers such as Google and Yahoo! use auctions to allocate advertising slots. This dissertation examines the design of keyword auctions. It consists of three essays. The first essay "Ex-Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions" focuses on how to incorporate available information into auction design. In our keyword auction model, advertisers bid their willingness-to-pay per click on their advertisements, and the advertising provider can weigh advertisers' bids differently and require different minimum bids based on advertisers' click-generating potential. We study the impact and design of such weighting schemes and minimum-bids policies. We find that weighting scheme determines how advertisers with different click-generating potential match in equilibrium. Minimum bids exclude low-valuation advertisers and at the same time may distort the equilibrium matching. The efficient design of keyword auctions requires weighting advertisers' bids by their expected click-through-rates, and requires the same minimum weighted bids. The revenue-maximizing weighting scheme may or may not favor advertisers with low click-generating potential. The revenue-maximizing minimum-bid policy differs from those prescribed in the standard auction design literature. Keyword auctions that employ the revenue-maximizing weighting scheme and differentiated minimum bid policy can generate higher revenue than standard fixed-payment auctions. The dynamics of bidders' performance is examined in the second essay, "Keyword Auctions, Unit-price Contracts, and the Role of Commitment." We extend earlier static models by allowing bidders with lower performance levels to improve their performance at a certain cost. We examine the impact of the weighting scheme on overall bidder performance, the auction efficiency, and the auctioneer's revenue, and derive the revenue-maximizing and efficient policy accordingly. Moreover, the possible upgrade in bidders' performance levels gives the auctioneer an incentive to modify the auction rules over time, as is confirmed by the practice of Yahoo! And Google. We thus compare the auctioneer's revenue-maximizing policies when she is fully committed to the auction rule and when not, and show that she should give less preferential treatment to low-performance advertisers when she is fully committed. In the third essay, "How to Slice the Pie? Optimal Share Structure Design in Keyword Auctions," we study the design of share structures in keyword auctions. Auctions for keyword advertising resources can be viewed as share auctions in which the highest bidder gets the largest share, the second highest bidder gets the second largest share, and so on. A share structure problem arises in such a setting regarding how much resources to set aside for the highest bidder, for the second highest bidder, etc. We address this problem under a general specification and derive implications on how the optimal share structure should change with bidders' price elasticity of demand for exposure, their valuation distribution, total resources, and minimum bids.
Author: Ashish Agarwal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Sponsored search accounts for 40% of the total online advertising market. These ads appear as ordered lists along with the regular search results in search engine results pages. The conventional wisdom in the industry is that the top position is the most desirable position for advertisers. This has led to intense competition among advertisers to secure the top positions in the results pages. We evaluate the impact of ad placement on revenues and profits generated from sponsored search using data from for several hundred keywords from the ad campaign of an online retailer. Using a hierarchical Bayesian model, we measure the impact of ad placement on both click-through rate and conversion rate for these keywords. We find that while click through rate decreases with position, conversion rate first increases and then decreases with position. The net effect is that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the topmost position in sponsored search advertisements is not necessarily the revenue- or profit-maximizing position. Using a theoretical model we show that one potential driver of these results is the heterogeneity in search costs across consumers and the additional browsing cost incurred in evaluating products across multiple websites. Our results inform the advertising strategies of firms participating in sponsored search auctions and provide insight into consumer behavior in these environments. Specifically, they help correct a significant misunderstanding among advertisers regarding the value of the top position. Further, they reveal potential inefficiencies in present auction mechanisms used by the search engines.
Author: Kinshuk Jerath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
As sponsored search becomes increasingly important as an advertising medium for firms, search engines are exploring more advanced bidding and ranking mechanisms to increase their revenue from auctions for sponsored search advertising. For instance, Google, Yahoo! and Bing are experimenting with auction mechanisms in which each advertiser can bid to be displayed exclusively. In such an auction, each advertiser submits two bids: one bid for the standard display format in which multiple advertisers are displayed, and one bid for being shown exclusively. The search engine decides the outcome as non-exclusive or exclusive based on revenue generated -- if the exclusive-placement bid by an advertiser is high enough then only that advertiser is displayed, otherwise multiple advertisers are displayed and ranked based on their multiple-placement bids. We find that allowing advertisers to bid for exclusivity has two countervailing effects for search engine revenue. First, competition is heightened because bidders can express their display preferences more flexibly and compete not only for positions in the non-exclusive outcome but also compete for the outcome to be exclusive or non-exclusive; this is good for search engine revenue. Second, competition between non-exclusive and exclusive outcomes gives bidders the incentive to reduce their bids for their non- preferred outcome; this is bad for search engine revenue. Under different parametric conditions, either force can prevail and search engine revenue may increase or decrease accordingly. We also find counterintuitive results on the bidding strategies of advertisers; for instance, we find that, under certain conditions, advertisers have the incentive to bid above their true valuations.
Author: Burkhard Monien
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540793089
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 371
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the First International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2008, held in Paderborn, Germany, in April/May 2008. The 28 revised full papes presented together with 3 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 60 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on routing and scheduling, markets, mechanism design, potpourri of games, solution concepts, and cost sharing.
Author: Harish Parandur Krishnan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Google
Languages : en
Pages : 123
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Book Description
Sponsored search auctions are commonplace these days and search engine marketing companies such as Google make billions of dollars in revenue every year. Advertisers spend a significant portion of their marketing budget on sponsored search and this is only expected to increase in the future. Mitre 10 New Zealand Ltd. is one such advertiser. This research thesis discusses the experiments conducted on Mitre 10’s sponsored search auction data and the subsequent findings. When a user enters a search term, search engine companies such as Google matches it against a pool of keywords. It then invites advertisers who are interested in the keywords to participate in an auction. It is conjectured that Google solves a complex optimisation problem every time an auction is conducted. Each advertiser would have specified a bid–the maximum amount they are willing to pay if their ads are clicked. Advertisers would be invited to participate in auctions until their daily budgets are exhausted. The existing body of literature on sponsored search can be broadly classified into Search Engine Company focused, User-focused, and Advertisers focused. Search Engine Company focused literature proposes various models that help search engine companies optimise their objectives such as increasing their revenue, improving user experience, or increasing advertisers’ return on investment. User-focused literature proposes models that explain user behaviour such as clicking an ad under different conditions. Advertiser focused literature proposes models that help advertisers plan their budgets, bids and keywords better. Experiments were conducted by changing the bids, bidding strategies, budget, keywords and geographical scope of an ad. Key Performance Indicators for Mitre 10 such as the number of auctions won (Impressions), number of ads clicked (Clicks), the probability of an ad getting clicked (Click-Thru-Rate), and the cost paid per click (Cost-Per-Click) are measured. The data thus gathered is used to test various hypotheses and insights are drawn from them. Linear regression models are constructed to understand the impact of the bid and budget change on various KPIs. The thesis concludes with a summary of the findings and proposes future work in this area.
Author: Yu-Wei Hsieh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
Using data from "WebsiteX", one of the largest online marketplaces in the world, we estimate a structural model of sponsored search auctions where bidders have heterogeneous click-through curves. Unlike earlier studies, our model accommodates two stylized empirical facts: the advertiser prominence eff ect and the position paradox. Using our estimates, we simulate the e ffects of introducing bid-scoring to the auctions. We fi nd that scoring reduces equilibrium per-click prices, but boosts the number of clicks by sorting prestigious merchants to the top positions. Overall there is only a very modest reduction in total revenues from introducing bid-scoring, despite the intent to reward high-quality merchants with price discounts. Methodologically, this paper also illustrates an application of a novel "approximate Bayesian" estimation method to a structural multi-item auction model.
Author: William F. Samuelson
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1119554918
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 560
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Book Description
Managerial Economics, 9th Edition, introduces undergraduates, MBAs, and executives to the complex decision problems today’s managers face, providing the knowledge and analytical skills required to make informed decisions and prosper in the modern business environment. Going beyond the traditional academic approach to teaching economic analysis, this comprehensive textbook describes how practicing managers use various economic methods in the real world. Each in-depth chapter opens with a central managerial problem—challenging readers to consider and evaluate possible choices—and concludes by reviewing and analyzing the decision through the lens of the concepts introduced in the chapter. Extensively updated throughout, the text makes use of numerous extended decision-making examples to discuss the foundational principles of managerial economics, illustrate key concepts, and strengthen students' critical thinking skills. A range of problems, building upon material covered in previous chapters, are applied to increasingly challenging applications as students advance through the text. Favoring practical skills development over complicated theoretical discussion, the book includes numerous mini-problems that reinforce students' quantitative understanding without overwhelming them with an excessive amount of mathematics.
