Spatial Multiproduct Duopoly Pricing PDF Download
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Author: Giovanni Nero
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Giovanni Nero
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Giovanni Nero
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Giovanni Nero
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Airlines
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Alberto Iozzi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper studies a spatial duopoly under uniform delivered pricing when firms do not ration the supply of the good, thus extending to a spatial context the analysis of oligopolistic markets with no rationing. The paper shows the existence of the equilibrium in prices under different tie-breaking rules (TBR) and compare the features of the equilibria found under these rules, thereby allowing to highlight the importance of the choice of the TBR in studying these models. When consumers buy from the nearest firm in case of equal prices (efficient TBR), any symmetric price pair within a given range is a Nash equilibrium, with each firm serving exactly half of the market line. If demand in each local market is equally split between the firms charging the same price (random TBR), the only equilibrium price is the one that gives zero profits to each firm. The degree of competitiveness of the market crucially depends on the TBR. Under the efficient TBR, all (but one) price equilibria deliver positive profits to both firms. Under the random TBR, the market outcome is very competitive in that firms make zero profits. None of the equilibria found under any tie-breaking rule are allocatively efficient.
Author: Boyer, Marcel
Publisher: Montréal : Centre for Research on Transportation = Centre de recherche sur les transports
ISBN: 9782893820729
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Book Description
Author: Alberto Iozzi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24
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Book Description
Author: Alberto Iozzi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Author: Takatoshi Tabuchi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Oligopoly models are usually analyzed in the context of two firms, anticipating that market outcomes would be qualitatively similar in the case of three or more firms. The literature on Hotelling's location-then-price competition is not an exception. In this paper, we show that the main finding of brand bunching in Hotelling's duopoly no longer holds once three or more firms are allowed to enter the market. That is, in oligopoly with three or more firms, firms proliferate brands.
Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
Many multi-product firms incur a complexity fixed cost when offering different product lines in different quality tiers relative to the case when offering all products lines in the same quality tier (high or low). Such fixed costs create an interdependency between firms' choices of quality tiers across different product lines, even when demands are independent. We investigate the effects of this interdependency on equilibrium profits in a Stackelberg duopoly game. Both firms' profits are (weakly) higher when the complexity cost is infinite than when it is 0. The Stackelberg leader's profits are always (weakly) higher with a positive complexity fixed cost, but its profits can be non-monotonic in the magnitude of this cost. The Stackelberg follower's profits can be lower when the complexity fixed cost is positive than when it is equal to 0.
Author: Marco Alderighi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We characterise, for both separate and interdependent markets, the local pure-strategies Nash equilibrium of a spatial duopoly game, where consumers are horizontally and vertically heterogeneous, and firms have different cost structures and ranges of product lines. We show that standard results which emerged in the monopoly context can not be generalised to strategic contexts where firms retain market power and there is sufficient competitive pressure. We prove that in the asymmetric duopoly case, when markets are interdependent, the incentive compatibility constraints are slack, and there is no quality distortion.
