Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428980105
Category : Antimissile missiles
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Alternatives for Boost-phase Missile Defense
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428980105
Category : Antimissile missiles
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428980105
Category : Antimissile missiles
Languages : en
Pages : 76
Book Description
Defense acquisitions status of Ballistic Missile Defense Program in 2004 : report to congressional committees.
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428930744
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 137
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428930744
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 137
Book Description
Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense
Author:
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN:
Category : Antimissile missiles
Languages : en
Pages : 78
Book Description
Publisher: Government Printing Office
ISBN:
Category : Antimissile missiles
Languages : en
Pages : 78
Book Description
Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309216109
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 239
Book Description
The Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives set forth to provide an assessment of the feasibility, practicality, and affordability of U.S. boost-phase missile defense compared with that of the U.S. non-boost missile defense when countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. To provide a context for this analysis of present and proposed U.S. boost-phase and non-boost missile defense concepts and systems, the committee considered the following to be the missions for ballistic missile defense (BMD): protecting of the U.S. homeland against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or conventional ballistic missile attacks; protection of U.S. forces, including military bases, logistics, command and control facilities, and deployed forces, including military bases, logistics, and command and control facilities. They also considered deployed forces themselves in theaters of operation against ballistic missile attacks armed with WMD or conventional munitions, and protection of U.S. allies, partners, and host nations against ballistic-missile-delivered WMD and conventional weapons. Consistent with U.S. policy and the congressional tasking, the committee conducted its analysis on the basis that it is not a mission of U.S. BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on space agreements not adversely impact missile defense effectiveness. This report also explains in further detail the findings of the committee, makes recommendations, and sets guidelines for the future of ballistic missile defense research.
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309216109
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 239
Book Description
The Committee on an Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives set forth to provide an assessment of the feasibility, practicality, and affordability of U.S. boost-phase missile defense compared with that of the U.S. non-boost missile defense when countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack. To provide a context for this analysis of present and proposed U.S. boost-phase and non-boost missile defense concepts and systems, the committee considered the following to be the missions for ballistic missile defense (BMD): protecting of the U.S. homeland against nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD); or conventional ballistic missile attacks; protection of U.S. forces, including military bases, logistics, command and control facilities, and deployed forces, including military bases, logistics, and command and control facilities. They also considered deployed forces themselves in theaters of operation against ballistic missile attacks armed with WMD or conventional munitions, and protection of U.S. allies, partners, and host nations against ballistic-missile-delivered WMD and conventional weapons. Consistent with U.S. policy and the congressional tasking, the committee conducted its analysis on the basis that it is not a mission of U.S. BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China. Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives suggests that great care should be taken by the U.S. in ensuring that negotiations on space agreements not adversely impact missile defense effectiveness. This report also explains in further detail the findings of the committee, makes recommendations, and sets guidelines for the future of ballistic missile defense research.
Missile Defense
Author: Robert E. Levin
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 9780756742478
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
The DoD has treated ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a priority since the mid-1980s and has invested tens of billions of dollars to R&D such capabilities. In 2002, 2 key events transformed DoD's approach in this area: (1) the Sec. of Def. consolidated existing BMD elements into a single acq'n. program and placed them under the mgmt. of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); and (2) the Pres. directed MDA to begin fielding an initial configuration, or block, of BMD capabilities in 2004. MDA estimates that it will need $53 billion between FY 2004 and 2009 to continue the development, fielding, and evolution of BMDs. This report assessed the extent to which MDA achieved program goals in FY 2003. Also considers shortcomings in how MDA defines its goals. Charts and tables.
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 9780756742478
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Book Description
The DoD has treated ballistic missile defense (BMD) as a priority since the mid-1980s and has invested tens of billions of dollars to R&D such capabilities. In 2002, 2 key events transformed DoD's approach in this area: (1) the Sec. of Def. consolidated existing BMD elements into a single acq'n. program and placed them under the mgmt. of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA); and (2) the Pres. directed MDA to begin fielding an initial configuration, or block, of BMD capabilities in 2004. MDA estimates that it will need $53 billion between FY 2004 and 2009 to continue the development, fielding, and evolution of BMDs. This report assessed the extent to which MDA achieved program goals in FY 2003. Also considers shortcomings in how MDA defines its goals. Charts and tables.
The Continuing Quest for Missile Defense
Author: Peter Pella
Publisher: Morgan & Claypool Publishers
ISBN: 1681749424
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
For almost three quarters of a century, the United States has spent billions of dollars and countless person-hours in the pursuit of a national missile defense system that would protect the country from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) carrying nuclear warheads. The system currently in place consists of 44 long-range antiballistic missiles stationed in Alaska and California to protect the United States from a possible nuclear weapon carrying ICBM attack from North Korea. After all this effort, this systemis still imperfect, being successful only 10 out of 18 tests. This book will provide an historical description of past efforts in national missile defenses to understand the technical difficulties involved. It will also explain how national security concerns, the evolving international environment, and the complexities of US politics have all affected the story. The book will also describe the current systems in place to protect allies and troops in the field from the threat of shorter range missiles. Finally, the book will describe the current US vision for the future of missile defenses and provide some suggestions for alternative paths.
Publisher: Morgan & Claypool Publishers
ISBN: 1681749424
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 89
Book Description
For almost three quarters of a century, the United States has spent billions of dollars and countless person-hours in the pursuit of a national missile defense system that would protect the country from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) carrying nuclear warheads. The system currently in place consists of 44 long-range antiballistic missiles stationed in Alaska and California to protect the United States from a possible nuclear weapon carrying ICBM attack from North Korea. After all this effort, this systemis still imperfect, being successful only 10 out of 18 tests. This book will provide an historical description of past efforts in national missile defenses to understand the technical difficulties involved. It will also explain how national security concerns, the evolving international environment, and the complexities of US politics have all affected the story. The book will also describe the current systems in place to protect allies and troops in the field from the threat of shorter range missiles. Finally, the book will describe the current US vision for the future of missile defenses and provide some suggestions for alternative paths.
Complex Air Defense
Author: Tom Karako
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1538140543
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 69
Book Description
In the past five years, Russia, China, and others have accelerated their development of hypersonic missiles to threaten U.S. forces in the homeland and abroad. The current Ballistic Missile Defense System, largely equipped to contend with legacy ballistic missile threats, must be adapted to this challenge. The same characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also hold the key to defeating them. This CSIS report argues how a new hypersonic defense architecture should exploit hypersonic weapons’ unique vulnerabilities and employ new capabilities, such as a space sensor layer, to secure critical nodes. These changes are not only necessary to mitigate the hypersonic threat but to defeat an emerging generation of maneuvering missiles and aerial threats.
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 1538140543
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 69
Book Description
In the past five years, Russia, China, and others have accelerated their development of hypersonic missiles to threaten U.S. forces in the homeland and abroad. The current Ballistic Missile Defense System, largely equipped to contend with legacy ballistic missile threats, must be adapted to this challenge. The same characteristics that make hypersonic missiles attractive may also hold the key to defeating them. This CSIS report argues how a new hypersonic defense architecture should exploit hypersonic weapons’ unique vulnerabilities and employ new capabilities, such as a space sensor layer, to secure critical nodes. These changes are not only necessary to mitigate the hypersonic threat but to defeat an emerging generation of maneuvering missiles and aerial threats.
Author:
Publisher: Odile Jacob
ISBN: 2738188141
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 573
Book Description
Publisher: Odile Jacob
ISBN: 2738188141
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 573
Book Description
Arguments that Count
Author: Rebecca Slayton
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262316544
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
How differing assessments of risk by physicists and computer scientists have influenced public debate over nuclear defense. In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities—physicists and computer scientists—constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires—the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view. In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software—most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262316544
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 338
Book Description
How differing assessments of risk by physicists and computer scientists have influenced public debate over nuclear defense. In a rapidly changing world, we rely upon experts to assess the promise and risks of new technology. But how do these experts make sense of a highly uncertain future? In Arguments that Count, Rebecca Slayton offers an important new perspective. Drawing on new historical documents and interviews as well as perspectives in science and technology studies, she provides an original account of how scientists came to terms with the unprecedented threat of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). She compares how two different professional communities—physicists and computer scientists—constructed arguments about the risks of missile defense, and how these arguments changed over time. Slayton shows that our understanding of technological risks is shaped by disciplinary repertoires—the codified knowledge and mathematical rules that experts use to frame new challenges. And, significantly, a new repertoire can bring long-neglected risks into clear view. In the 1950s, scientists recognized that high-speed computers would be needed to cope with the unprecedented speed of ICBMs. But the nation's elite science advisors had no way to analyze the risks of computers so used physics to assess what they could: radar and missile performance. Only decades later, after establishing computing as a science, were advisors able to analyze authoritatively the risks associated with complex software—most notably, the risk of a catastrophic failure. As we continue to confront new threats, including that of cyber attack, Slayton offers valuable insight into how different kinds of expertise can limit or expand our capacity to address novel technological risks.
U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities
Author: National Research Council
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309298741
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities identifies the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century. This report describes and assesses tools, methods - including behavioral science-based methods - and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces. The report recommends criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.
Publisher: National Academies Press
ISBN: 0309298741
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 286
Book Description
Since the early 1960s, the U.S. strategic nuclear posture has been composed of a triad of nuclear-certified long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Since the early 1970s, U.S. nuclear forces have been subject to strategic arms control agreements. The large numbers and diversified nature of the U.S. nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear forces, which cannot be ignored as part of the overall nuclear deterrent, have decreased substantially since the Cold War. While there is domestic consensus today on the need to maintain an effective deterrent, there is no consensus on precisely what that requires, especially in a changing geopolitical environment and with continued reductions in nuclear arms. This places a premium on having the best possible analytic tools, methods, and approaches for understanding how nuclear deterrence and assurance work, how they might fail, and how failure can be averted by U.S. nuclear forces. U.S. Air Force Strategic Deterrence Analytic Capabilities identifies the broad analytic issues and factors that must be considered in seeking nuclear deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies in the 21st century. This report describes and assesses tools, methods - including behavioral science-based methods - and approaches for improving the understanding of how nuclear deterrence and assurance work or may fail in the 21st century and the extent to which such failures might be averted or mitigated by the proper choice of nuclear systems, technological capabilities, postures, and concepts of operation of American nuclear forces. The report recommends criteria and a framework for validating the tools, methods, and approaches and for identifying those most promising for Air Force usage.