Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation PDF Download
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Author: Susanne Ohlendorf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Susanne Ohlendorf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
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Book Description
Author: Susanne Ohlendorf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Limited liability
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Steven M. Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
Author: Steven A. Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Benjamin Edward Hermalin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
Author: Rohan Pitchford
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Book Description
Author: Hiroshi Osano
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We examine renegotiation in a double moral hazard model with an ex ante budget balancing constraint when both the principal and the agent are allowed to make a renegotiation offer even though the principal proposes an initial contract. Under a belief restriction, any perfect-Bayesian equilibrium leads to an allocation that is superior to the second-best allocation of the standard double moral hazard model without renegotiation. The result of this paper gives some reasons for the existence of intermediary organizations such as holding companies, law houses, consulting firms, investment banks or venture capital. The result can also provide the rationalization for a fund set up by a group of firms of the industry in which their product is legally required to be recyclable.
Author: Steven A. Matthews
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
Author: Swapnendu Banerjee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Using the classic moral hazard problem with limited liability we characterize the optimal contracts when an other-regarding principal interacts with a self-regarding agent. The optimal contract differs considerably when the principal is 'inequity averse' vis-a-vis the self-regarding case. Also the agent is generally (weakly) better-off under an 'inequity- averse' principal compared to a 'status seeking' principal.
Author: Georges Dionne
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461401550
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1133
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Book Description
This new edition of the Handbook of Insurance reviews the last forty years of research developments in insurance and its related fields. A single reference source for professors, researchers, graduate students, regulators, consultants and practitioners, the book starts with the history and foundations of risk and insurance theory, followed by a review of prevention and precaution, asymmetric information, risk management, insurance pricing, new financial innovations, reinsurance, corporate governance, capital allocation, securitization, systemic risk, insurance regulation, the industrial organization of insurance markets and other insurance market applications. It ends with health insurance, longevity risk, long-term care insurance, life insurance financial products and social insurance. This second version of the Handbook contains 15 new chapters. Each of the 37 chapters has been written by leading authorities in risk and insurance research, all contributions have been peer reviewed, and each chapter can be read independently of the others.
