Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring PDF Download
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Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: Ichiro Obara
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Book Description
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
Author: Flavio M. Menezes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumption (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198041217
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author: Xue Xu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We experimentally examine whether communicating private signals after each stage game affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma where players can only observe imperfect and private signals about the partner's actions. Based on evidence from two specifications of stage payoffs, we find that when the return to cooperation is low, communication increases the probability of cooperation; however, this effect is not significant when the return to cooperation is high. We also show that subjects use various strategies to reveal their private observations, with the majority of their messages being truthful. By comparing games with communication to games with imperfect public signals, we further demonstrate that subjects respond to the message received from the partner in the same way that they respond to the public signal about their own past action. This finding suggests that the mechanism by which communication works is similar to that of public monitoring.
Author: Tadashi Sekiguchi (economist.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
Author: George J. Mailath
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195300793
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 664
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Book Description
Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make important advances in understanding such relationships. Repeated Games and Reputations begins with a careful development of the fundamental concepts in these theories, including the notions of a repeated game, strategy, and equilibrium. Mailath and Samuelson then present the classic folk theorem and reputation results for games of perfect and imperfect public monitoring, with the benefit of the modern analytical tools of decomposability and self-generation. They also present more recent developments, including results beyond folk theorems and recent work in games of private monitoring and alternative approaches to reputations. Repeated Games and Reputations synthesizes and unifies the vast body of work in this area, bringing the reader to the research frontier. Detailed arguments and proofs are given throughout, interwoven with examples, discussions of how the theory is to be used in the study of relationships, and economic applications. The book will be useful to those doing basic research in the theory of repeated games and reputations as well as those using these tools in more applied research.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 250
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Book Description
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper studies repeated games with imperfect public monitoring where the players are uncertain both about the payoff functions and about the relationship between the distribution of signals and the actions played. We introduce the concept of perfect public ex post equilibrium (PPXE), and show that it can be characterized with an extension of the techniques used to study perfect public equilibria. We develop identifiability conditions that are sufficient for a folk theorem; these conditions imply that there are PPXE in which the payoffs are approximately the same as if the monitoring structure and payoff functions were known. Finally, we define perfect type-contingently public ex post equilibria (PTXE), which allows players to condition their actions on their initial private information, and we provide its linear programming characterization.
