Author: Asen Kochov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In a symmetric repeated game with standard preferences, there are no gains from intertemporal trade. In fact, under a suitable normalization of utility, the payoff set in the repeated game is identical to that in the stage game. We show that this conclusion may no longer be true if preferences are recursive and stationary, but not time separable. If so, the players' rates of time preference are no longer fixed, but may vary endogenously, depending on what transpires in the course of the game. This creates opportunities for intertemporal trade, giving rise to new and interesting dynamics. For example, the efficient and symmetric outcome of a repeated prisoner's dilemma may be to take turns defecting, even though the efficient and symmetric outcome of the stage game is to cooperate. A folk theorem shows that such dynamics can be sustained in equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient.
Repeated Games with Endogenous Discounting
Author: Asen Kochov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In a symmetric repeated game with standard preferences, there are no gains from intertemporal trade. In fact, under a suitable normalization of utility, the payoff set in the repeated game is identical to that in the stage game. We show that this conclusion may no longer be true if preferences are recursive and stationary, but not time separable. If so, the players' rates of time preference are no longer fixed, but may vary endogenously, depending on what transpires in the course of the game. This creates opportunities for intertemporal trade, giving rise to new and interesting dynamics. For example, the efficient and symmetric outcome of a repeated prisoner's dilemma may be to take turns defecting, even though the efficient and symmetric outcome of the stage game is to cooperate. A folk theorem shows that such dynamics can be sustained in equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient.
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
In a symmetric repeated game with standard preferences, there are no gains from intertemporal trade. In fact, under a suitable normalization of utility, the payoff set in the repeated game is identical to that in the stage game. We show that this conclusion may no longer be true if preferences are recursive and stationary, but not time separable. If so, the players' rates of time preference are no longer fixed, but may vary endogenously, depending on what transpires in the course of the game. This creates opportunities for intertemporal trade, giving rise to new and interesting dynamics. For example, the efficient and symmetric outcome of a repeated prisoner's dilemma may be to take turns defecting, even though the efficient and symmetric outcome of the stage game is to cooperate. A folk theorem shows that such dynamics can be sustained in equilibrium if the players are sufficiently patient.
Repeated Games
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703020X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 597
Book Description
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 110703020X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 597
Book Description
This landmark work significantly advances the literature on game theory with a masterful conceptual presentation of the CORE working papers published in 1994.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
Author: R.J. Aumann
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444894274
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 824
Book Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 9780444894274
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 824
Book Description
This is the second of three volumes surveying the state of the art in Game Theory and its applications to many and varied fields, in particular to economics. The chapters in the present volume are contributed by outstanding authorities, and provide comprehensive coverage and precise statements of the main results in each area. The applications include empirical evidence. The following topics are covered: communication and correlated equilibria, coalitional games and coalition structures, utility and subjective probability, common knowledge, bargaining, zero-sum games, differential games, and applications of game theory to signalling, moral hazard, search, evolutionary biology, international relations, voting procedures, social choice, public economics, politics, and cost allocation. This handbook will be of interest to scholars in economics, political science, psychology, mathematics and biology. For more information on the Handbooks in Economics series, please see our home page on http://www.elsevier.nl/locate/hes
Endogenous Time Preferences in Social Networks
Author: Marianna A. Klochko
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781958001
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Book Description
'Peter Ordeshook is an outstanding scholar and is addressing a very important question. As he points out on the first page of Chapter 1, social norms do exist and are adhered to, constitutions survive, people cooperate with others in some settings, but not in others. The topic of this book is very exciting and important - this is a real winner.' - Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, US Marianna Klochko and Peter Ordeshook address an under-studied issue from rational choice theory - the common assumption that individual time preferences are exogenous and fixed. They then present empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case, exploring a computer simulation model that allows for the evolutionary change of time preferences. This is done, moreover, in the context of social networks that are themselves endogenously determined.
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781781958001
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Book Description
'Peter Ordeshook is an outstanding scholar and is addressing a very important question. As he points out on the first page of Chapter 1, social norms do exist and are adhered to, constitutions survive, people cooperate with others in some settings, but not in others. The topic of this book is very exciting and important - this is a real winner.' - Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University, US Marianna Klochko and Peter Ordeshook address an under-studied issue from rational choice theory - the common assumption that individual time preferences are exogenous and fixed. They then present empirical evidence to suggest that this is not the case, exploring a computer simulation model that allows for the evolutionary change of time preferences. This is done, moreover, in the context of social networks that are themselves endogenously determined.
A Long-run Collaboration on Long-run Games
Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Publisher: World Scientific
ISBN: 9812818464
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 417
Book Description
This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.
Non-Cooperative Game Theory
Author: Takako Fujiwara-Greve
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431556451
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
Book Description
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, chicken (hawk–dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author’s own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 4431556451
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
Book Description
This is a textbook for university juniors, seniors, and graduate students majoring in economics, applied mathematics, and related fields. Each chapter is structured so that a core concept of that chapter is presented with motivations, useful applications are given, and related advanced topics are discussed for future study. Many helpful exercises at various levels are provided at the end of each chapter. Therefore, this book is most suitable for readers who intend to study non-cooperative game theory rigorously for both theoretical studies and applications. Game theory consists of non-cooperative games and cooperative games. This book covers only non-cooperative games, which are major tools used in current economics and related areas. Non-cooperative game theory aims to provide a mathematical prediction of strategic choices by decision makers (players) in situations of conflicting interest. Through the logical analyses of strategic choices, we obtain a better understanding of social (economic, business) problems and possible remedies. The book contains many well-known games such as the prisoner’s dilemma, chicken (hawk–dove) game, coordination game, centipede game, and Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg models in oligopoly. It also covers some advanced frameworks such as repeated games with non-simultaneous moves, repeated games with overlapping generations, global games, and voluntarily separable repeated prisoner’s dilemma, so that readers familiar with basic game theory can expand their knowledge. The author’s own research is reflected in topics such as formulations of information and evolutionary stability, which makes this book unique.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications: Zero-sum two-person games
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 824
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 824
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks
Author: Yann Bramoullé
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190216832
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190216832
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 857
Book Description
The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks represents the frontier of research into how and why networks they form, how they influence behavior, how they help govern outcomes in an interactive world, and how they shape collective decision making, opinion formation, and diffusion dynamics. From a methodological perspective, the contributors to this volume devote attention to theory, field experiments, laboratory experiments, and econometrics. Theoretical work in network formation, games played on networks, repeated games, and the interaction between linking and behavior is synthesized. A number of chapters are devoted to studying social process mediated by networks. Topics here include opinion formation, diffusion of information and disease, and learning. There are also chapters devoted to financial contagion and systemic risk, motivated in part by the recent financial crises. Another section discusses communities, with applications including social trust, favor exchange, and social collateral; the importance of communities for migration patterns; and the role that networks and communities play in the labor market. A prominent role of networks, from an economic perspective, is that they mediate trade. Several chapters cover bilateral trade in networks, strategic intermediation, and the role of networks in international trade. Contributions discuss as well the role of networks for organizations. On the one hand, one chapter discusses the role of networks for the performance of organizations, while two other chapters discuss managing networks of consumers and pricing in the presence of network-based spillovers. Finally, the authors discuss the internet as a network with attention to the issue of net neutrality.
Risk Sharing with Endogenous Enforcement
Author: Thorsten Volker Köppl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Book Description
Extreme Environmental Events
Author: Robert A. Meyers
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1441976949
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 1273
Book Description
Extreme Environmental Events is an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the basic tenets of complexity and systems theory, as well as the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems, to the prediction, monitoring, and evaluation of major natural phenomena affecting life on earth. These phenomena are often highly destructive, and include earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, climate change,, and weather. Early warning, damage, and the immediate response of human populations to these phenomena are also covered from the point of view of complexity and nonlinear systems. In 61 authoritative, state-of-the art articles, world experts in each field apply such tools and concepts as fractals, cellular automata, solitons game theory, network theory, and statistical physics to an understanding of these complex geophysical phenomena.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1441976949
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 1273
Book Description
Extreme Environmental Events is an authoritative single source for understanding and applying the basic tenets of complexity and systems theory, as well as the tools and measures for analyzing complex systems, to the prediction, monitoring, and evaluation of major natural phenomena affecting life on earth. These phenomena are often highly destructive, and include earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, climate change,, and weather. Early warning, damage, and the immediate response of human populations to these phenomena are also covered from the point of view of complexity and nonlinear systems. In 61 authoritative, state-of-the art articles, world experts in each field apply such tools and concepts as fractals, cellular automata, solitons game theory, network theory, and statistical physics to an understanding of these complex geophysical phenomena.