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Author: Angus Deaton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
Author: Angus Deaton
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
Author: Joseph J. Cordes
Publisher: The Urban Insitute
ISBN: 9780877667520
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 522
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Book Description
"From adjusted gross income to zoning and property taxes, the second edition of The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy offers the best and most complete guide to taxes and tax-related issues. More than 150 tax practitioners and administrators, policymakers, and academics have contributed. The result is a unique and authoritative reference that examines virtually all tax instruments used by governments (individual income, corporate income, sales and value-added, property, estate and gift, franchise, poll, and many variants of these taxes), as well as characteristics of a good tax system, budgetary issues, and many current federal, state, local, and international tax policy issues. The new edition has been completely revised, with 40 new topics and 200 articles reflecting six years of legislative changes. Each essay provides the generalist with a quick and reliable introduction to many topics but also gives tax specialists the benefit of other experts' best thinking, in a manner that makes the complex understandable. Reference lists point the reader to additional sources of information for each topic. The first edition of The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy was selected as an Outstanding Academic Book of the Year (1999) by Choice magazine."--Publisher's website.
Author: Robin W. Boadway
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262017113
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 301
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Book Description
The author examines the role of optimal tax analysis in informing and influencing tax policy design.
Author: P. Galeotti
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401579652
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 229
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Book Description
G. Galeotti* and M. Marrelli** *Universita di Perugia **Universita di Napoli 1. The economic analysis of optimal taxation has permitted considerable steps to be taken towards the understanding of a number of problems: the appropriate degree of progression, the balance between different taxes, the equity-efficiency trade-off etc .. Though at times considered as abstract and of little use in policy design, the issues it addresses are real ones and very much on the agenda of many countries. As usual in scientific debate, criticisms have contributed to the correct understanding of the theoretical problems involved and made clear that, at the present state of the art, definitive conclusions may be premature. A first well-taken criticism addresses the assumption, underlying optimal taxation models, of a competitive economy with perfect information on the part of individual agents and full market clearing. Once we leave the Arrow-Debreu world, it is no longer necessarily the case that taxes and transfers introduce distortions on otherwise efficient allocations.
Author: Thomas Piketty
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Capital levy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper develops a realistic, tractable normative theory of socially-optimal capital taxation. We present a dynamic model of savings and bequests with heterogeneous random tastes for bequests to children and for wealth per se. We derive formulas for optimal tax rates on capitalized inheritance expressed in terms of estimable parameters and social preferences. The long-run optimal tax rate increases with the aggregate steady-state flow of inheritances to output, decreases with the elasticity of bequests to the net-of-tax rate, and decreases with the strength of preferences for leaving bequests. For realistic parameters, the optimal tax rate on capitalized inheritance should be as high as 50%-60% - or even higher for top wealth holders - if the government has meritocratic preferences (i.e., puts higher welfare weights on those receiving little inheritance) and if capital is highly concentrated (as it is in the real world). In contrast to the Atkinson-Stiglitz result, bequest taxation remains desirable in our model even with optimal labor taxation because inequality is two-dimensional: with inheritances, labor income is no longer the unique determinant of lifetime resources. In contrast to Chamley-Judd, positive capital taxation is desirable because our preferences allow for finite long run elasticities of inheritance to tax rates. Finally, we discuss how capital market imperfections and uninsurable shocks to rates of return can justify shifting one-off inheritance taxation toward lifetime capital taxation, and can account for the actual structure and mix of inheritance and capital taxation.
Author:
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
Author: Narayana R. Kocherlakota
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400835275
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for future research.
Author: Stuart Adam
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199553742
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Book Description
Based on the findings of a commission chaired by James Mirrlees, this volume presents a coherent picture of tax reform whose aim is to identify the characteristics of a good tax system for any open developed economy, assess the extent to which the UK tax system conforms to these ideals, and recommend how it might be reformed in that direction.
Author: Shlomo Maital
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Direct taxation
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Book Description
Author: Joseph E. Stiglitz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics).
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
This paper analyzes the set of Pareto efficient tax structures. The formulation of the problem as one of self-selection not only shows more clearly the similarity between this problem and a number of other problems (such as optimal pricing of a monopolist) which have recently been the subject of extensive research, but also allow the derivation of a number of new results. We establish (i) under fairly weak conditions, randomization of tax structures is desirable; (ii) if different individuals are not perfect substitutes for one another, then the general equilibrium effects -- until now largely ignored in the literatures -- of changes in the tax structure may be dominant in determining the optimal tax structure; in particular if relative wages of high ability and low ability individuals depends on the relative supplies of labor, the optimal tax structure entails a negative marginal tax rate on the high ability individuals, and a positive marginal tax rate on the low ability individuals (the magnitude of which depends on the elasticity of substitution); (iii) if individuals differ in their preferences, Pareto efficient taxation may entail negative marginal tax rates for high incomes; while (iv) if wage income is stochastic, the marginal tax rate at the upper end may be 100%.Our analysis thus makes clear that the main qualitative properties of the optimal tax structure to which earlier studies called attention are not robust to these attempts to make the theory more realistic
