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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
"A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
"A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme"--John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business web site.
Author: Emmanuel Saez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Earned income tax credit
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Book Description
This paper investigates the optimal income transfer problem at the low end of the income distribution. The government maximizes a social welfare function and faces the traditional equity-efficiency trade-off. The paper models labor supply behavioral responses along the intensive margin (hours or intensity of work on the job) and along the extensive margin (participation in the labor force). Optimal tax formulas are derived as a function of the behavioral elasticities, the shape of the income distribution and the redistribution tastes of the government. When behavioral responses are concentrated along the intensive margin, the optimal transfer program is a classical Negative Income Tax program with a substantial guaranteed income support that is taxed away at high rates. However, when behavioral responses are concentrated along the extensive margin, the optimal transfer program is an Earned Income Credit program with negative marginal tax rates at low income levels and a small guaranteed income. Numerical simulations calibrated with the actual empirical earnings distribution are presented for a range of behavioral elasticities and redistributive tastes of the government. For realistic elasticities, the optimal program provides a moderate guaranteed income, imposes low tax rates on very low annual earnings levels, and then starts phasing out benefits at substantial rates
Author: Louis Kaplow
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income distribution
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
"A substantial literature addresses the design of transfer programs and policies, including the negative income tax, other means-tested transfers, the earned income tax credit, categorical assistance, and work inducements. This work is largely independent of that on the optimal nonlinear income tax, yet formulations of such a tax necessarily address how low-income individuals should be treated. This paper draws on the optimal income taxation literature to illuminate the analysis of transfer programs, including the level and shape of marginal tax rates (including phase-outs), the structure of categorical assistance, and the role of work inducements in an optimal income transfer scheme"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site.
Author: Irwin Garfinkel
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483260496
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 577
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Book Description
Income Tested Transfer Programs: The Case for and Against covers the proceedings of the 1979 conference of leading scientists, sponsored by the Institute for Research on Poverty. The contributors consider the contribution of social science knowledge and analysis in settling the arguments in the debate about the merits of income testing in transfer programs. This text is divided into 13 chapters and begins with an overview of the history, stigmatization processes, and social cohesion of the program. The succeeding chapters define the terms “income-tested and “non-income-tested , as well as the historical importance of the income-testing issue. The discussion then shifts to the development of both income-tested and non-income tested programs in the United States. These topics are followed by surveys of the income support system and the issues in the income-testing debate. The remaining chapters provide evidence that most Americans have too much income testing in the overall income maintenance system. These chapters also present a reform agenda designed to reduce the role of income testing. This book will be of value to social scientists, social welfare workers, and researchers.
Author: Matti Tuomala
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191067741
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 631
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Book Description
Tax systems raise large amounts of revenue for funding public sector's activities, and tax/transfer policy, together with public provision of education, health care, and social services, play a crucial role in treating the symptoms and the causes of poverty. The normative analysis is crucial for tax/transfer design because it makes it possible to assess separately how changes in the redistributive criterion of the government, and changes in the size of the behavioural responses to taxes and transfers, affect the optimal tax/transfer system. Optimal tax theory provides a way of thinking rigorously about these trade-offs. Written primarily for graduate students and researchers, this volume is intended as a textbook and research monograph, connecting optimal tax theory to tax policy. It comments on some policy recommendations of the Mirrlees Review, and builds on the authors work on public economics, optimal tax theory, behavioural public economics, and income inequality. The book explains in depth the Mirrlees model and presents various extensions of it. The first set of extensions considers changing the preferences for consumption and work: behavioural-economic modifications (such as positional externalities, prospect theory, paternalism, myopic behaviour and habit formation) but also heterogeneous work preferences (besides differences in earnings ability). The second set of modifications concerns the objective of the government. The book explains the differences in optimal redistributive tax systems when governments - instead of maximising social welfare - minimise poverty or maximise social welfare based on rank order or charitable conservatism social welfare functions. The third set of extensions considers extending the Mirrlees income tax framework to allow for differential commodity taxes, capital income taxation, public goods provision, public provision of private goods, and taxation commodities that generate externalities. The fourth set of extensions considers incorporating a number of important real-word extensions such as tagging of tax schedules to certain groups of tax payers. In all extensions, the book illustrates the main mechanisms using advanced numerical simulations.
Author: Mr.Howell H. Zee
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 145184803X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
This paper explores the revenue-raising aspect of progressive taxation and derives, on the basis of a simple model, the optimal degree of tax progressivity where the tax revenue is used exclusively to finance (perfectly) targeted transfers to the poor. The paper shows that not only would it be optimal to finance the targeted transfers with progressive taxation, but that the optimal progressivity increases unambiguously with growing income inequality. This conclusion holds up under different assumptions about the efficiency cost of taxation and society’s aversion to inequality.
Author: Axelle Ferriere
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Axelle Ferriere
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Fiscal policy
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
We study the optimal joint design of targeted transfers and progressive income taxes. We develop a simple analytical model and demonstrate an optimally negative relation between transfers and income-tax progressivity, due to both efficiency and redistribution concerns. That is, higher transfers should be financed with lower income-tax progressivity. We next quantify the optimal fiscal plan in a rich dynamic model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Transfers should be generous and financed with moderate income-tax progressivity. To redistribute while preserving efficiency, average tax-and-transfer rates should be more progressive than marginal rates. Transfers, even if lump-sum, precisely allow to disentangle average from marginal rates. Targeted transfers further implement non-monotonic marginal rates, but generate only modest additional gains relative to a lump-sum transfer. Quantitatively, the left tail of the income distribution determines the optimal size of the transfer, while the right tail drives the optimal income-tax progressivity.
Author: Gordon H. Lewis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 368
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Author: Zhiyong An
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 28
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Book Description
The benchmark optimal income taxation model of Mirrlees (1971) finds that the optimal marginal income tax rate (MIT) is always non-negative. A key model assumption is the coincidence between social and individual work preferences. This paper extends the model to allow for differences in social and individual work preferences. The theoretical and simulation analyses show that under this model, when the government places a higher social weight on work than individuals, the optimal MIT schedule is shifted downwards, introducing the possibility for optimal wage subsidies at the bottom of the income distribution. This implies lower revenues, demogrants, and overall progressivity.
