Author: Benjamin S. Lambeth
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833032372
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 323
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Book Description
This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.
Author: Phil M. Haun
Publisher: www.Militarybookshop.CompanyUK
ISBN: 9781780392769
Category : Transportation
Languages : en
Pages : 368
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Book Description
First published in 2003. The NATO-led Operation Allied Force was fought in 1999 to stop Serb atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. This war, as noted by the distinguished military historian John Keegan, "marked a real turning point . . . and proved that a war can be won by airpower alone." Colonels Haave and Haun have organized firsthand accounts of some of the people who provided that airpower-the members of the 40th Expeditionary Operations Group. Their descriptions-a new wingman's first combat sortie, a support officer's view of a fighter squadron relocation during combat, and a Sandy's leadership in finding and rescuing a downed F-117 pilot-provide the reader with a legitimate insight into an air war at the tactical level and the airpower that helped convince the Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, to capitulate.
Author: Ivo H. Daalder
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN: 9780815798422
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
After eleven weeks of bombing in the spring of 1999, the United States and NATO ultimately won the war in Kosovo. Serbian troops were forced to withdraw, enabling an international military and political presence to take charge in the region. But was this war inevitable or was it the product of failed western diplomacy prior to the conflict? And once it became necessary to use force, did NATO adopt a sound strategy to achieve its aims of stabilizing Kosovo? In this first in-depth study of the Kosovo crisis, Ivo Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon answer these and other questions about the causes, conduct, and consequences of the war. Based on interviews with many of the key participants, they conclude that notwithstanding important diplomatic mistakes before the conflict, it would have been difficult to avoid the Kosovo war. That being the case, U.S. and NATO conduct of the war left much to be desired. For more than four weeks, the Serbs succeeded where NATO failed, forcefully changing Kosovo's ethnic balance by forcing 1.5 million Albanians from their home and more than 800,000 from the country. Had they chosen to massacre more of their victims, NATO would have been powerless to stop them. In the end, NATO won the war by increasing the scope and intensity of bombing, making serious plans for a ground invasion, and moving diplomacy into full gear in order to convince Belgrade that this was a war Serbia would never win. The Kosovo crisis is a cautionary tale for those who believe force can be used easily and in limited increments to stop genocide, mass killing, and the forceful expulsion of entire populations. Daalder and O'Hanlon conclude that the crisis holds important diplomatic and military lessons that must be learned so that others in the future might avoid the mistakes that were made in this case.
Author: Anthony M. Schinella
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815732422
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 393
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Book Description
Airpower can achieve military objectives—sometimes, in some circumstances It sounds simple: using airpower to intervene militarily in conflicts, thus minimizing the deaths of soldiers and civilians while achieving both tactical and strategic objectives. In reality, airpower alone sometimes does win battles, but the costs can be high and the long-term consequences may fall short of what decision-makers had in mind. This book by a long-time U.S. intelligence analyst assesses the military operations and post-conflict outcomes in five cases since the mid-1990s in which the United States and/or its allies used airpower to “solve” military problems: Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Lebanon in 2006, and Libya in 2011. In each of these cases, airpower helped achieve the immediate objective, but the long-term outcomes often diverged significantly from the original intent of policymakers. The author concludes that airpower sometimes can be effective when used to support indigenous ground forces, but decision-makers should carefully consider all the circumstances before sending planes, drones, or missiles aloft.
Author: John E. Peters
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 9780833030382
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 113
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Book Description
Operation Allied Force, the 1999 NATO air campaign that sought to prevent a wider humanitarian disaster in Kosovo, represents the triumph of air power to some observers and highlights air power_s limitations for others. While representing a successful cooperative allied military action for NATO, it also suggests limits to U.S.-European military cooperation. This report, a dispassionate assessment of Operation Allied Force, provides perspectives from both sides of the Atlantic as well as political and military implications. The campaign highlighted the growing gap between U.S. military capabilities and those of Europe, the potential consequences of joining a limited-objective operation that expands to undesirable proportions and duration, the absence of consensus both within the U.S. military and the Alliance on the best use of air power, the vulnerabilities of a multimember military coalition engaged in an essentially humanitarian operation facing an adversary fighting for its survival, and the limitations inherent in a fight-and-negotiate strategy that left an unrepentant adversary in power. The report concludes that the European allies can expect continued emphasis on the Defense Capabilities Initiative, a U.S. plan adopted by NATO that stresses the need for all NATO forces to be interoperable, deployable, and sustainable. Furthermore, the Europeans must reverse recent trends of defense reductions and invest more in order to realize major improvements in defense capabilities.
Author: Ken Coates
Publisher: Spokesman Books
ISBN: 9780851246413
Category : Jugoslavien
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Robert H. Gregory
Publisher: U of Nebraska Press
ISBN: 1612347312
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Book Description
"Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars: Air Power in Kosovo and Libya explores how the U.S. public, policymakers, and military services perceived and utilized air power and precision munitions before, during, and after Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999 with incorrect assumptions"--
Author: Mark Clodfelter
Publisher: U of Nebraska Press
ISBN: 9780803264540
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 338
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Book Description
Tracing the use of air power in World War II and the Korean War, Mark Clodfelter explains how U. S. Air Force doctrine evolved through the American experience in these conventional wars only to be thwarted in the context of a limited guerrilla struggle in Vietnam. Although a faith in bombing's sheer destructive power led air commanders to believe that extensive air assaults could win the war at any time, the Vietnam experience instead showed how even intense aerial attacks may not achieve military or political objectives in a limited war. Based on findings from previously classified documents in presidential libraries and air force archives as well as on interviews with civilian and military decision makers, The Limits of Air Power argues that reliance on air campaigns as a primary instrument of warfare could not have produced lasting victory in Vietnam. This Bison Books edition includes a new chapter that provides a framework for evaluating air power effectiveness in future conflicts.
Author: A. J. Bacevich
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 023112483X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
This is a concise history of the war for Kosovo. It offers a new lens through which to view U.S. national security in the age of globalization.
Author: Dag Henriksen
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
ISBN: 161251555X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
Selected for the 2008 Royal Air Force Reading List In this revealing work, Dag Henriksen discloses the origins and content of NATO's strategic and conceptual thinking on how the use of force was to succeed politically in altering the behavior of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The air campaign, known as Operation Allied Force, was the first war against any sovereign nation in the history of NATO and the first major combat operation conducted for humanitarian purposes against a state committing atrocities within its own borders. This book examines the key political, diplomatic, and military processes that shaped NATO and U.S. management of the Kosovo crisis and shows how air power became the main instrument in their strategy to coerce the FRY to accede to NATO's demands. The book further shows that the military leaders set to execute the campaign had no clear strategic guidance on what the operation was to achieve and that the level of uncertainty was so high that the officers selecting the bombing targets watched NATO's military spokesman on CNN for guidance in choosing their targets. Henriksen argues that structures preceding the Kosovo crisis shaped the management to a much greater degree than events taking place in Kosovo and that the air power community's largely institutionalized focus on high-intensity conflicts, like the 1991 Gulf War, hampered them from developing strategies to fit the political complexities of crises. Because fighting and wars in the lower end of the intensity spectrum are likely to surface again, study of the Kosovo crisis offers lessons for future international conflicts in which the combination of force and diplomacy will play a very significant role.
