On-the-Job Search and Moral Hazard

On-the-Job Search and Moral Hazard PDF Author: Espen R. Moen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42

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Book Description
We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on-the-job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on-the-job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker-firm pair of on-the-job search is high . Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on-the-job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets may lead to multiple equilibria: a low-turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high-turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on-the-job search are small.

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance

Moral Hazard in Health Insurance PDF Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161

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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice

Wage Structure with Moral Hazard in Job Search

Wage Structure with Moral Hazard in Job Search PDF Author: Kit-Chun Lam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62

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Book Description


The Economics of Search

The Economics of Search PDF Author: Brian McCall
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134422350
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 574

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Book Description
The economics of search is a prominent component of economic theory, and it has a richness and elegance that underpins a host of practical applications. In this book Brian and John McCall present a comprehensive overview of the economic theory of search, from the classical model of job search formulated 40 years ago to the recent developments in equilibrium models of search. The book gives decision-theoretic foundations to seemingly slippery issues in labour market theory, estimation theory and economic dynamics in general, and surveys the entire field of the economics of search, including its history, theory, and econometric applications. Theoretical models of the economics of search are covered as well as estimation methods used in search theory and topics covered include job search, turnover, unemployment, liquidity, house selling, real options and auctions. The mathematical methods used in search theory such as dynamic programming are reviewed as well as structural estimation methods and econometric methods for duration models. The authors also explore the classic sequential search model and its extensions in addition to recent advances in equilibrium search theory.

Moral Hazard

Moral Hazard PDF Author: Juan Flores Zendejas
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000515028
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 167

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Book Description
Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers.

Optimal Unemployment Insurance

Optimal Unemployment Insurance PDF Author: Andreas Pollak
Publisher: Mohr Siebeck
ISBN: 9783161493041
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 204

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Book Description
Designing a good unemployment insurance scheme is a delicate matter. In a system with no or little insurance, households may be subject to a high income risk, whereas excessively generous unemployment insurance systems are known to lead to high unemployment rates and are costly both from a fiscal perspective and for society as a whole. Andreas Pollak investigates what an optimal unemployment insurance system would look like, i.e. a system that constitutes the best possible compromise between income security and incentives to work. Using theoretical economic models and complex numerical simulations, he studies the effects of benefit levels and payment durations on unemployment and welfare. As the models allow for considerable heterogeneity of households, including a history-dependent labor productivity, it is possible to analyze how certain policies affect individuals in a specific age, wealth or skill group. The most important aspect of an unemployment insurance system turns out to be the benefits paid to the long-term unemployed. If this parameter is chosen too high, a large number of households may get caught in a long spell of unemployment with little chance of finding work again. Based on the predictions in these models, the so-called "Hartz IV" labor market reform recently adopted in Germany should have highly favorable effects on the unemployment rates and welfare in the long run.

Making EI Work

Making EI Work PDF Author: Keith Banting
Publisher: McGill-Queen's Press - MQUP
ISBN: 1553393295
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 490

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Book Description
Since the inception and design of Canada's Employment Insurance (EI) program, the Canadian economy and labour market have undergone dramatic changes. It is clear that EI has not kept pace with those changes, and experts and advocates agree that the program is no longer effective or equitable. Making EI Work is the result of a panel of distinguished scholars gathered by the Mowat Centre Employment Insurance Task Force to analyze the strengths, weaknesses, and future directions of EI. The authors identify the strengths and weaknesses of the system, and consider how it could be improved to better and more fairly support those in need. They make suggestions for facilitating a more efficient Canadian labour market, and meeting the human capital requirements of a dynamic economy for the present and the foreseeable future. The chapters that comprise Making EI Work informed the task force's final recommendations, and form an engaging dialogue that makes the case for, and defines the parameters of, a reformed support system for Canada's unemployed. Contributors include Ken Battle (Caledon Institute of Social Policy), Robin Boadway (Queen's University), Allison Bramwell (University of Toronto), Sujit Choudhry (New York University School of Law), Kathleen M. Day (University of Ottawa), Ross Finnie (University of Ottawa), Jean-Denis Garon (Queen's University), David Gray (University of Ottawa), Morley Gunderson (University of Toronto), Ian Irvine (Concordia University), Stephen Jones (McMaster University), Thomas R. Klassen (York University), Michael Mendelson (Caledon Institute of Social Policy), Alain Noël (Université de Montréal), Michael Pal (University of Toronto Faculty of Law), W. Craig Riddell (University of British Columbia), William Scarth (McMaster University), Luc Turgeon (University of Ottawa), Leah F. Vosko (York University), Stanley L. Winer (Carleton University), Donna E. Wood (University of Victoria), and Yan Zhang (Statistics Canada).

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Third Edition

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets, Third Edition PDF Author: Tito Boeri
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691206368
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 732

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Book Description
The leading textbook on imperfect labor markets and the institutions that affect them—now completely updated and expanded Today's labor markets are witnessing seismic changes brought on by such factors as rising self-employment, temporary employment, zero-hour contracts, and the growth of the sharing economy. This fully updated and revised third edition of The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets reflects these and other critical changes in imperfect labor markets, and it has been significantly expanded to discuss topics such as workplace safety, regulations on self-employment, and disability and absence from work. This new edition also features engaging case studies that illustrate key aspects of imperfect labor markets. Authoritative and accessible, this textbook examines the many institutions that affect the behavior of workers and employers in imperfect labor markets. These include minimum wages, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, family policies, equal opportunity legislation, collective bargaining, early retirement programs, and education and migration policies. Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are being transformed today. Fully updated to reflect today's changing labor markets Significantly expanded to discuss a wealth of new topics, including the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic Features quantitative examples, new case studies, data sets that enable users to replicate results in the literature, technical appendixes, and end-of-chapter exercises Unique focus on institutions in imperfect labor markets Self-contained chapters cover each of the most important labor-market institutions Instructor's manual available to professors—now with new exercises and solutions

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets

The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets PDF Author: Tito Boeri
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691158932
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 464

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Book Description
Most labor economics textbooks pay little attention to actual labor markets, taking as reference a perfectly competitive market in which losing a job is not a big deal. The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets is the only textbook to focus on imperfect labor markets and to provide a systematic framework for analyzing how labor market institutions operate. This expanded, updated, and thoroughly revised second edition includes a new chapter on labor-market discrimination; quantitative examples; data and programming files enabling users to replicate key results of the literature; exercises at the end of each chapter; and expanded technical appendixes. The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets examines the many institutions that affect the behavior of workers and employers in imperfect labor markets. These include minimum wages, employment protection legislation, unemployment benefits, active labor market policies, working-time regulations, family policies, equal opportunity legislation, collective bargaining, early retirement programs, education and migration policies, payroll taxes, and employment-conditional incentives. Written for advanced undergraduates and beginning graduate students, the book carefully defines and measures these institutions to accurately characterize their effects, and discusses how these institutions are today being changed by political and economic forces. Expanded, thoroughly revised second edition New chapter on labor-market discrimination New quantitative examples New data sets enabling users to replicate key results of the literature New end-of-chapter exercises Expanded technical appendixes Unique focus on institutions in imperfect labor markets Integrated framework and systematic coverage Self-contained chapters on each of the most important labor-market institutions

Asymmetric Information on Job Search, Insurance, Moral Hazard and Efficiency of Wage Contracts

Asymmetric Information on Job Search, Insurance, Moral Hazard and Efficiency of Wage Contracts PDF Author: Kit-chun Lam
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Human capital
Languages : en
Pages : 104

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Book Description