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Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long-term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long-term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.
Author: Joan Farré Mensa
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 54
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Book Description
A major cause of supply chain deficiencies is the bullwhip effect which can be substantial even over a single echelon. This effect refers to the tendency of the variance of the replenishment orders to increase as it moves up a supply chain. Supply chain managers experience this variance amplification in both inventory levels and replenishment orders. As a result, companies face shortages or bloated inventories, run-away transportation and warehousing costs and major production adjustment costs. In this article we analyze a major cause of the bullwhip effect and suggest a remedy. We focus on a smoothing replenishment rule that is able to reduce the bullwhip effect across a single echelon. In general, dampening variability in orders may have a negative impact on customer service due to inventory variance increases. We therefore quantify the variance of the net stock and compute the required safety stock as a function of the smoothing required. Our analysis shows that bullwhip can be satisfactorily managed without unduly increasing stock levels to maintain target fill rates. Keywords: Bullwhip effect, Supply chain management, Inventory management, Variance reduction.
Author: Douglass C. North
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521397346
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 164
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Book Description
An analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies is developed in this analysis of economic structures.
Author: Douglass C. North
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139642960
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 231
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Book Description
Continuing his groundbreaking analysis of economic structures, Douglass North develops an analytical framework for explaining the ways in which institutions and institutional change affect the performance of economies, both at a given time and over time. Institutions exist, he argues, due to the uncertainties involved in human interaction; they are the constraints devised to structure that interaction. Yet, institutions vary widely in their consequences for economic performance; some economies develop institutions that produce growth and development, while others develop institutions that produce stagnation. North first explores the nature of institutions and explains the role of transaction and production costs in their development. The second part of the book deals with institutional change. Institutions create the incentive structure in an economy, and organisations will be created to take advantage of the opportunities provided within a given institutional framework. North argues that the kinds of skills and knowledge fostered by the structure of an economy will shape the direction of change and gradually alter the institutional framework. He then explains how institutional development may lead to a path-dependent pattern of development. In the final part of the book, North explains the implications of this analysis for economic theory and economic history. He indicates how institutional analysis must be incorporated into neo-classical theory and explores the potential for the construction of a dynamic theory of long-term economic change. Douglass C. North is Director of the Center of Political Economy and Professor of Economics and History at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a past president of the Economic History Association and Western Economics Association and a Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written over sixty articles for a variety of journals and is the author of The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History (CUP, 1973, with R.P. Thomas) and Structure and Change in Economic History (Norton, 1981). Professor North is included in Great Economists Since Keynes edited by M. Blaug (CUP, 1988 paperback ed.)
Author: L. A. Busch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Avinash K. Dixit
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691130345
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In much of the world and through much of history, private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have grown up in place of formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue under the shadow of the law. Numerous case studies and empirical investigations have demonstrated the variety, importance, and merits, and drawbacks of such institutions. This book builds on these studies and constructs a toolkit of theoretical models to analyze them. The models shed new conceptual light on the different modes of governance, and deepen our understanding of the interaction of the alternative institutions with each other and with the government's law. For example, one model explains the limit on the size of social networks and illuminates problems in the transition to more formal legal systems as economies grow beyond this limit. Other models explain why for-profit enforcement is inefficient. The models also help us understand why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems.
Author: Mark Gradstein
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026207284X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 251
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Book Description
Experts address "the development puzzle"--unprecedented growth coupled with unequal distribution of that growth across different countries--and focus on the importance of institutional arrangements and norms and culture.
Author: Elhanan Helpman
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674038578
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 672
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Book Description
Institutions and Economic Performance explores the question of why income per capita varies so greatly across countries. Even taking into account disparities in resources, including physical and human capital, large economic discrepancies remain across countries. Why are some societies but not others able to encourage investments in places, people, and productivity? The answer, the book argues, lies to a large extent in institutional differences across societies. Such institutions are wide-ranging and include formal constitutional arrangements, the role of economic and political elites, informal institutions that promote investment and knowledge transfer, and others. Two core themes run through the contributors’ essays. First, what constraints do institutions place on the power of the executive to prevent it from extorting the investments and effort of other people and institutions? Second, when are productive institutions self-enforcing? Institutions and Economic Performance is unique in its melding of economics, political science, history, and sociology to address its central question.
