Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration, Department of Defense

Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration, Department of Defense PDF Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 76

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Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration, Department of Defense

Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration, Department of Defense PDF Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 76

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Book Description


Military Retention Incentives

Military Retention Incentives PDF Author: Justin Joffrion
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45

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Book Description
The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.

Military Cash Incentives: DOD Should Coordinate and Monitor Its Efforts to Achieve Cost-Effective Bonuses and Special Pays

Military Cash Incentives: DOD Should Coordinate and Monitor Its Efforts to Achieve Cost-Effective Bonuses and Special Pays PDF Author: Brenda S. Farrell
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437988016
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description
Assesses DoD¿s use of cash incentives to recruit and retain highly qualified individuals for service in the armed forces. It: (1) identifies recent trends in DoD's use of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses; (2) assesses the extent to which the services have processes to determine which occupational specialties require bonuses and whether bonus amounts are optimally set; and (3) determines how much flexibility DoD has in managing selected special and incentive pays for officer and enlisted personnel. The report analyzed service data on bonuses and special and incentive pays, and reviewed relevant guidance and other documentation from DoD and the services. Charts and tables. This is a print on demand report.

Retention, Incentives, and DoD Experience Under the 40-year Military Pay Table

Retention, Incentives, and DoD Experience Under the 40-year Military Pay Table PDF Author: Beth J. Asch
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780833091758
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
In a multimethod analysis, RAND researchers assess whether the military should continue using its 40-year pay table to retain experienced personnel or whether such retention could be equally achieved with a 30-year pay table.

Military Retention Incentives

Military Retention Incentives PDF Author: Justin L. Joffrion
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
The limited lateral entry and rigid pay structure for U.S. military personnel present challenges in retaining skilled individuals who have attractive options in the civilian labor market. One tool the services use to address this challenge is the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB), which offers eligible personnel with particular skills a substantial cash bonus upon reenlistment. However, the sequential nature of the bonus offer and reenlistment process limits the ability to adjust manpower quickly, raising interest in research that estimates the effect of the SRB on retention. While this literature has acknowledged challenges including potential endogeneity of bonus levels, attrition, and reenlistment eligibility, many studies do not address these concerns adequately. This paper uses a comprehensive panel data set on Air Force enlisted personnel to estimate the effect of the SRB on retention rates. We exploit variation in bonus levels within skill groups, control for civilian labor market conditions, and model reenlistment eligibility to avoid common assumptions that lead to biased impact estimates. We find substantial heterogeneity in the effect of the bonus, with the largest effects on first-term service members and those whose skills have not historically received a substantial bonus. We also find evidence that the bonus affects the timing of reenlistment decisions in addition to their frequency.

Military Retention Incentives

Military Retention Incentives PDF Author: United States Accounting Office (GAO)
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781721793143
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72

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Book Description
Military Retention Incentives: Effectiveness and Administration

Military Retention Incentives

Military Retention Incentives PDF Author: United States. General Accounting Office
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 62

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Book Description


Assessing Retention and Special and Incentive Pays for Army and Navy Commissioned Officers in the Special Operations Forces

Assessing Retention and Special and Incentive Pays for Army and Navy Commissioned Officers in the Special Operations Forces PDF Author: Beth J. Asch
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780833098801
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This report focuses on the effectiveness of monetary incentives, known as special and incentive pays, for U.S. Special Operations Forces commissioned officer retention.

Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program

Increasing Efficiency and Incentives for Performance in the Army's Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Program PDF Author: Beth J. Asch
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781977407535
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 124

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Book Description
This report documents research and analysis conducted as part of a project entitled Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Special and Incentive Pays in the Army, sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The purpose of the project was to help the Army determine how to best increase incentives for higher performance among enlisted members and to more efficiently achieve Army retention objectives.

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment

Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment PDF Author: Beth J. Asch
Publisher: RAND Corporation
ISBN: 9780833049667
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
"This monograph provides an empirical analysis of the enlistment, attrition, and reenlistment effects of bonuses, applying statistical models that control for such other factors as recruiting resources, in the case of enlistment and deployments in the case of reenlistment, and demographics. Enlistment and attrition models are estimated for the Army and our reenlistment model approach is twofold. The Army has greatly increased its use of reenlistment bonuses since FY 2004, and we begin by providing an in-depth history of the many changes in its reenlistment bonus program during this decade. We follow this with two independent analyses of the effect of bonuses on Army reenlistment. As we show, the results from the models are consistent, lending credence to the robustness of the estimates. One approach is extended to the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, to obtain estimates of the effect of bonuses on reenlistment for all services. We also estimate an enlistment model for the Navy. The estimated models are used to address questions about the cost-effectiveness of bonuses and their effects in offsetting other factors that might adversely affect recruiting and retention, such as changes in the civilian economy and frequent deployments"--P. iii.