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Author: Phuong Le
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder's valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no such mechanism exists.
Author: Phuong Le
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder's valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no such mechanism exists.
Author: Phuong Le
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Book Description
This paper studies the possibility of implementing Pareto optimal outcomes in the combinatorial auction setting where bidders may have budget constraints. I show that when bidders are single-minded, there is a unique mechanism, called truncation VCG, that is individually rational, incentive compatible and Pareto optimal. Truncation VCG works by first truncating valuations at budgets, and then implementing VCG on the truncated valuations. I also provide maximal domain results, characterizing when it is possible to implement Pareto optimal outcomes and, if so, providing an implementing mechanism. Whenever there are at least one multi-minded constrained bidder and another multi-minded bidder, implementation is impossible. For any other domain, however, implementation is possible.
Author: Torben Hagerup
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540223398
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 517
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 9th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, SWAT 2004, held in Humlebaek, Denmark in July 2004. The 40 revised full papers presented together with an invited paper and the abstract of an invited talk were carefully reviewed and selected from 121 submissions. The papers span the entire range of theoretical algorithmics and applications in various fields including graph algorithms, computational geometry, scheduling, approximation algorithms, network algorithms, data storage and manipulation, bioinformatics, combinatorics, sorting, searching, online algorithms, optimization, etc.
Author: Klaus Jansen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3540441867
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 280
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Book Description
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Optimization Problems, APPROX 2002, held in Rome, Italy in September 2002. The 20 revised full papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from 54 submissions. Among the topics addressed are design and analysis of approximation algorithms, inapproximability results, online problems, randomization techniques, average-case analysis, approximation classes, scheduling problems, routing and flow problems, coloring and partitioning, cuts and connectivity, packing and covering, geometric problems, network design, and applications to game theory and other fields.
Author: Phuong Chi Le
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This dissertation studies two problems in market design: the random assignment with fractional endowments, and combinatorial auction with budget-constrained bidders. In the random assignment problem, a number of objects has to be assigned to a number of agents. Though the objects are indivisible, an assignment can be probabilistic: it can give an agent some probability of getting an object. I first formulate an exchange economy that resembles the random assignment problem and prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in this economy. I then propose a pseudo-market mechanism for the random assignment problem that is based on the competitive equilibrium. This mechanism is individually rational, Pareto Optimal and justified envy-free. The mechanism is, however, not incentive compatible. Budget constraints of the bidders are a very relevant feature in combinatorial auctions. I show that they pose serious challenges to many prominent existing auction formats. Given the limitations of existing mechanisms, it is useful to know what mechanisms can accommodate budget constraints. I restrict my search to mechanisms that are reasonable: they must be incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which a bidder's marginal values, if non-zero, always exceeds his budget, I show that there exists an unique reasonable mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no reasonable mechanism exists. I propose a mechanism that is a partial solution, called budget VCG. It is based on the principle that a winning bidder must be able to pay the externality that he imposes on other bidders. The budget VCG mechanism partially attains Pareto optimality and has some good incentive properties.
Author: Peter C. Cramton
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Book Description
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Author: Shahar Dobzinski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Author: Alessandro Avenali
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788854803411
Category : Technology & Engineering
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages :
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"Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms - in particular, their truth revelation properties - assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method, which has empirically been shown to perform well. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players. We demonstrate the latter property by identifying sufficient conditions for a combinatorial auction to be truth-revealing, conditions which have applicability beyond the specific auction studied here."--Abstract.
Author: Edward William Naim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 174
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Book Description
