Managing the Auditor-Client Relationship Through Partner Rotations

Managing the Auditor-Client Relationship Through Partner Rotations PDF Author: Mary Kate Dodgson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description
While current audit standards explicitly state engagement partner tenure requirements, firms have flexibility in managing the rotation process. We conduct semi-structured interviews with 20 U.S. audit firm partners who share their experiences on topics including how they identify appropriate candidate partners and what efforts they undertake to manage relationships with clients post-rotation. We investigate firms' motivation to manage the auditor-client relationship through the lens of Social Exchange Theory (SET), and we consider how likely outcomes of this rotation process map onto regulators' intent that a newly rotated partner provides a fresh perspective to the audit. Our study informs regulators and investors about the process by which engagement partners are selected for rotation, documenting that partner assignment is typically not random. Further, our finding that partner rotation is an extended process (rather than a single discrete event) has implications for audit researchers investigating the effects of partner rotation.

Managing the Auditor-Client Relationship Through Partner Rotations

Managing the Auditor-Client Relationship Through Partner Rotations PDF Author: Mary Kate Dodgson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 56

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Book Description
While current audit standards explicitly state engagement partner tenure requirements, firms have flexibility in managing the rotation process. We conduct semi-structured interviews with 20 U.S. audit firm partners who share their experiences on topics including how they identify appropriate candidate partners and what efforts they undertake to manage relationships with clients post-rotation. We investigate firms' motivation to manage the auditor-client relationship through the lens of Social Exchange Theory (SET), and we consider how likely outcomes of this rotation process map onto regulators' intent that a newly rotated partner provides a fresh perspective to the audit. Our study informs regulators and investors about the process by which engagement partners are selected for rotation, documenting that partner assignment is typically not random. Further, our finding that partner rotation is an extended process (rather than a single discrete event) has implications for audit researchers investigating the effects of partner rotation.

Navigating the Auditor-client Relationship During Sensitive Events

Navigating the Auditor-client Relationship During Sensitive Events PDF Author: Mary Dodgson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

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Book Description
Maintaining a positive auditor-client relationship is critical for audit firms, particularly during sensitive events. For instance, audit firms state in transparency reports that they take steps to minimize disruption during audit partner rotations, yet it is unclear what these actions entail or the potential effects of these actions on auditor independence and audit quality. I use multiple methods to provide insight into these practices and their related effects. First, I interview 20 audit partners to learn about the process by which audit firms manage the auditor-client relationship during sensitive partner rotation events. Interviewees describe how audit firms identify appropriate partner candidates and procedures followed to select and prepare the next lead partner. Respondents also elaborate on firms' ongoing relationship-managing activities, including the assignment of non-decision-making liaisons (often referred to as relationship partners or "RPs") to a subset of engagements to assist in navigating the auditor-client relationship during sensitive events (i.e., in preparation for upcoming partner rotations and when contentious auditor-client issues arise). Second, I conduct an experiment with financial executives to examine the influence that RPs may have on the resolution of contentious auditor-client issues. I also consider how RP influence may vary depending on the extent to which the audit partner and client manager have tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to resolve the issue (i.e., negotiation ripeness). I find that, in a traditional setting in which a RP is not involved, client managers concede less toward an audit partner's more appropriate position when the negotiation has reached a more ripe stage than when the negotiation stage is less ripe. However, I find it is at a more ripe stage that RP intervention is more effective in moving client managers toward a resolution, limiting the risk of seeking alternative methods of resolution that may impair the auditor-client relationship (e.g., issuing a qualified audit opinion). Collectively my findings inform regulators and researchers about the ongoing process by which audit firms manage the auditor-client relationship during sensitive events and how one common approach for managing the auditor-client relationship (i.e., assignment of RPs to a subset of engagements) influences the auditor-client relationship and audit quality.

Understanding Auditor-client Relationships

Understanding Auditor-client Relationships PDF Author: Gary Kleinman
Publisher: Gary Kleinman
ISBN: 1558761802
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 137

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Book Description
This work is intended to assist researchers, regulators, and practitioners who are interested in the topic of auditor independence. It presents a comprehensive model of the individual, work place, organization, inter-organizational, and organizational field level determinants of the topic.

The Auditor-Client Management Relationship in Financial Reporting Negotiation

The Auditor-Client Management Relationship in Financial Reporting Negotiation PDF Author: Michael Gibbins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper contributes to the growing literature on the auditor-client management negotiation process by focusing on the dyadic relationship. Our audit partner-CFO dyads describe the process of resolving issues related to financial reporting using a combination of open ended and semi-structured questions. Our qualitative and quantitative analysis of the interviews suggests that relationships can be characterized as either proactive or reactive and nested within these relationships some are described as good and some as poor. From our analysis, it appears that the CFO determines implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, the type of relationship they want with their auditor (i.e. proactive or reactive). However, it also appears that the audit partner is responsible for relationship quality (i.e. good or poor). But if the relationship is not in a good state or there is a mismatch between the CFO and audit partner personalities, the audit partner will most likely be switched either by the audit firm or the CFO. Further, our informants described a negotiation process that is not linear, but rather one that can iterate backwards, skip forward and return to redefine the basic issue. We label this aspect of negotiation as fluidity. Finally, two major types of issues were discussed (i.e. regulatory type issues or transaction-based issues) with the type of issue influencing many aspects of the resolution process. Overall, this qualitative research substantially increases our understanding of the nature of the CFO-audit partner dyadic relationship and improves our understanding of the components of prior models of auditor-client management negotiation.

Called to Account

Called to Account PDF Author: Paul M. Clikeman
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136224904
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 384

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Book Description
Selected as an Outstanding Academic Title by Choice Magazine in 2014! Called to Account takes a broad perspective on how financial frauds have shaped the public accounting profession by focusing on cases of fraud around the globe. Ever entertaining and educational, the book traces the development of the accounting standards and legislation put in place as a direct consequence of these epic scandals. The new edition offers updated chapters on ZZZZ Best and Arthur Andersen, plus new chapters devoted to Parmalat, Satyam, and The Great Recession. Through stories like Barry Minkow’s staged constructions sites and MiniScribe’s fake inventory number generating computer program, "Cook Book", students will learn that fraud is nothing new, and that financial reform is heavily influenced by politics. With discussion questions and a useful chart showing instructors and students how each chapter illustrates the topics covered in other textbooks, Called to Account is the ideal companion for any class in auditing, advanced accounting or forensic accounting.

Auditor Client Relationship and Audit Quality

Auditor Client Relationship and Audit Quality PDF Author: Suhaib Aamir
Publisher: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing
ISBN: 9783845415666
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 116

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Book Description
Different scandals around the globe during the past, in specific during the last decade, have intrigued the stakeholders to question the roles of both auditors and management. But most of the fingers since then have been raised on the role of auditors, because it is the auditors who are entrusted with the responsibility to detect any errors or frauds in the financial reports of the client-firm. Apart from this, the long-term auditor client relationship has been the center of attention in most of the discussions and debates as well. Numerous studies have been conducted by the academic researchers, financial and professional analysts, regulatory authorities and governing bodies, and in some cases by the auditors and the firms as well regarding the effects of long-term auditor-client relationship on audit quality, equity risk premium, financial reports quality, audit pricing etc. These studies provide us with different results, both with the positive and negative associations and effects of long-term auditor-client relationship on the basis of different factors and contexts. Therefore, we would be studying this relationship in between auditors and SME clients.

The Routledge Companion to Auditing

The Routledge Companion to Auditing PDF Author: David Hay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136210350
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 387

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Book Description
Auditing has been a subject of some controversy, and there have been repeated attempts at reforming its practice globally. This comprehensive companion surveys the state of the discipline, including emerging and cutting-edge trends. It covers the most important and controversial issues, including auditing ethics, auditor independence, social and environmental accounting as well as the future of the field. This handbook is vital reading for legislators, regulators, professionals, commentators, students and researchers involved with auditing and accounting. The collection will also prove an ideal starting place for researchers from other fields looking to break into this vital subject.

The Auditor-client Contractual Relationship

The Auditor-client Contractual Relationship PDF Author: Linda DeAngelo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 152

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Book Description


Research in Accounting Regulation

Research in Accounting Regulation PDF Author: Gary Previts
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080545440
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 309

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Book Description
Research in Accounting Regulation

Sustaining Mutual and Market Interests in the Auditor and Corporate Client Relationship

Sustaining Mutual and Market Interests in the Auditor and Corporate Client Relationship PDF Author: Khalid Rasheed Al-Adeem
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
This paper reviews the accounting literature on the audit function, the auditor-client manager relationship, and the possible influence of these relationships on auditor independence. The negotiation interactions between client managers and auditors and the distribution of power reveal the superior position of client management. The interactions also reveal that auditors participate in potential joint ventures. Auditor independence may be subject to compromise to sustain effective relationships with corporate client management even with the presence of a monitoring mechanism such as a board of directors. To ensure favorable opinions from their current auditors, managers may utilize any available possible means. A thorough audit that displeases client management comes at a cost for auditors who can be viewed as economic agents serving their own interests. To sustain confidence in attesting and assurance services, auditors must appear independent to external parties to provide assurance that auditors provide valuable services that support a 'functional' market. Trust placed in auditors and, thus, the capital market is possible as long as auditors appear independent.