Location and Objectives in Spatial Duopoly PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Location and Objectives in Spatial Duopoly PDF full book. Access full book title Location and Objectives in Spatial Duopoly by J. J. van Dijk. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: J. J. van Dijk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: J. J. van Dijk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 32
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: J. J. van Dijk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Kieron Meagher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
Get Book Here
Book Description
Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997) observe that although the Uniform consumer density is almost universally assumed in Hotelling style location games, it is more realistic to assume non-uniform distributions. Using Anderson et al.'s (1997) sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium, we extend the list of known distributions with characterised equilibria from two (Uniform and Triangular) to seven. Our extension includes the Normal and Logistic distributions which are commonly used in empirical research. We also analyse the effects of density choice on equilibrium outcomes. Holding the mean and dispersion of consumer tastes constant, we find that the Uniform distribution inflates differentiation effects.
Author: Tommaso M. Valletti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 52
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Luca Savorelli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Marketing
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
"We consider a spatial duopoly with non-monotonic network effects and extend the literature by endogenizing firms' location decisions. We show that the existence of equilibrium is ruled out due to displacement incentives at the location stage whenever network effects are sufficiently strong. Furthermore, unlike in exogenous location models, neither vertical product differentiation nor a monopoly outcome can arise endogenously in equilibrium. Relative to monotonic network effect models, our framework provides an additional rationale for a duopolistic market structure to be welfare-preferred to monopoly: for large population sizes, splitting demand between two firms can reduce the disutility from crowding."--Abstract from publisher's website.
Author: Jan Boone
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Abba Ptachya Lerner
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 62
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: J. J. van Dijk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Kieron Meagher
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
Get Book Here
Book Description
In spatial competition iuml;B01rms are likely to be uncertain about consumer locations when launching products either because of shifting demographics or of asymmetric information about preferences. Realistically distributions of consumer locations should be allowed to vary over states and need not be uniform. However, the existing literature models location uncertainty as an additive shock to a uniform consumer distribution. The additive shock restricts uncertainty to the mean of the consumers locations. We generalize this approach to a state space model in which a vector of parameters gives rise to different distributions of consumer tastes in different states, allowing other moments (besides the mean) of the consumer distribution to be uncertain. We illustrate our model with an asymmetric consumer distribution and obtain a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with an explicit, closed-form solution. An equilibrium existence result is then given for the general case. For symmetric distributions, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the general case can be described by a simple closed-form solution.
