Legislating in the Dark PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Legislating in the Dark PDF full book. Access full book title Legislating in the Dark by James M. Curry. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: James M. Curry
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022628185X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Get Book Here
Book Description
Political science scholar James M. Curry explores the inner workings of Congress’s House of Representatives in this thought-provoking analysis. The 2009 financial stimulus bill ran to more than 1,100 pages, yet it wasn’t even given to Congress in its final form until thirteen hours before debate was set to begin, and it was passed twenty-eight hours later. How are representatives expected to digest so much information in such a short time? The answer? They aren’t. With Legislating in the Dark, James M. Curry reveals that the availability of information about legislation is a key tool through which Congressional leadership exercises power. Through a deft mix of legislative analysis, interviews, and participant observation, Curry shows how congresspersons—lacking the time and resources to study bills deeply themselves—are forced to rely on information and cues from their leadership. By controlling their rank-and-file’s access to information, Congressional leaders are able to emphasize or bury particular items, exploiting their information advantage to push the legislative agenda in directions that they and their party prefer. Offering an unexpected new way of thinking about party power and influence, Legislating in the Dark will spark substantial debate in political science. “Curry brings fresh insight and a breadth of evidence to bear on the role of information in lawmaking, including extensive interviews with legislators and staff and in-depth case studies of several pieces of legislation. Engagingly written, the book will enhance our understandings of congressional lawmaking and leadership and will be of interest to scholars of legislative studies and public policy.” —Tracy Sulkin, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Author: James M. Curry
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022628185X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 288
Get Book Here
Book Description
Political science scholar James M. Curry explores the inner workings of Congress’s House of Representatives in this thought-provoking analysis. The 2009 financial stimulus bill ran to more than 1,100 pages, yet it wasn’t even given to Congress in its final form until thirteen hours before debate was set to begin, and it was passed twenty-eight hours later. How are representatives expected to digest so much information in such a short time? The answer? They aren’t. With Legislating in the Dark, James M. Curry reveals that the availability of information about legislation is a key tool through which Congressional leadership exercises power. Through a deft mix of legislative analysis, interviews, and participant observation, Curry shows how congresspersons—lacking the time and resources to study bills deeply themselves—are forced to rely on information and cues from their leadership. By controlling their rank-and-file’s access to information, Congressional leaders are able to emphasize or bury particular items, exploiting their information advantage to push the legislative agenda in directions that they and their party prefer. Offering an unexpected new way of thinking about party power and influence, Legislating in the Dark will spark substantial debate in political science. “Curry brings fresh insight and a breadth of evidence to bear on the role of information in lawmaking, including extensive interviews with legislators and staff and in-depth case studies of several pieces of legislation. Engagingly written, the book will enhance our understandings of congressional lawmaking and leadership and will be of interest to scholars of legislative studies and public policy.” —Tracy Sulkin, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Author: Jonathan Lewallen
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472132067
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Get Book Here
Book Description
The public, journalists, and legislators themselves have often lamented a decline in congressional lawmaking in recent years, often blaming party politics for the lack of legislative output. In Committees and the Decline of Lawmaking in Congress, Jonathan Lewallen examines the decline in lawmaking from a new, committee-centered perspective. Lewallen tests his theory against other explanations such as partisanship and an increased demand for oversight with multiple empirical tests and traces shifts in policy activity by policy area using the Policy Agendas Project coding scheme. He finds that because party leaders have more control over the legislative agenda, committees have spent more of their time conducting oversight instead. Partisanship alone does not explain this trend; changes in institutional rules and practices that empowered party leaders have created more uncertainty for committees and contributed to a shift in their policy activities. The shift toward oversight at the committee level combined with party leader control over the voting agenda means that many members of Congress are effectively cut out of many of the institution’s policy decisions. At a time when many, including Congress itself, are considering changes to modernize the institution and keep up with a stronger executive branch, the findings here suggest that strengthening Congress will require more than running different candidates or providing additional resources.
Author: Eric Schickler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191628255
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 942
Get Book Here
Book Description
No legislature in the world has a greater influence over its nation's public affairs than the US Congress. The Congress's centrality in the US system of government has placed research on Congress at the heart of scholarship on American politics. Generations of American government scholars working in a wide range of methodological traditions have focused their analysis on understanding Congress, both as a lawmaking and a representative institution. The purpose of this volume is to take stock of this impressive and diverse literature, identifying areas of accomplishment and promising directions for future work. The editors have commissioned 37 chapters by leading scholars in the field, each chapter critically engages the scholarship focusing on a particular aspect of congressional politics, including the institution's responsiveness to the American public, its procedures and capacities for policymaking, its internal procedures and development, relationships between the branches of government, and the scholarly methodologies for approaching these topics. The Handbook also includes chapters addressing timely questions, including partisan polarization, congressional war powers, and the supermajoritarian procedures of the contemporary Senate. Beyond simply bringing readers up to speed on the current state of research, the volume offers critical assessments of how each literature has progressed - or failed to progress - in recent decades. The chapters identify the major questions posed by each line of research and assess the degree to which the answers developed in the literature are persuasive. The goal is not simply to tell us where we have been as a field, but to set an agenda for research on Congress for the next decade. The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics are a set of reference books offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of scholarship on American politics. Each volume focuses on a particular aspect of the field. The project is under the General Editorship of George C. Edwards III, and distinguished specialists in their respective fields edit each volume. The Handbooks aim not just to report on the discipline, but also to shape it as scholars critically assess the scholarship on a topic and propose directions in which it needs to move. The series is an indispensable reference for anyone working in American politics. General Editor for The Oxford Handbooks of American Politics: George C. Edwards III
Author: Michael D. Minta
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022676530X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 183
Get Book Here
Book Description
"How effective are civil rights organizations in lobbying Congress? They lack the resources of wealthier business-funded lobbying groups. And yet, these groups have been able to influence Congress in order to pass legislation and pressure agencies in the service of minority communities. In No Longer Outsiders: Black and Latino Interest Group Advocacy on Capitol Hill, Michael D. Minta explores the ways that civil rights groups representing a range of racial and ethnic minorities achieve success in Congress. Minta shows how increasing diversity in the House of Representatives plays an important role in the success of civil rights organizations. These organizations gain power and respect in part because they indeed represent the interests and views of their minority groups. The organizations from different ethnic and racial groups successfully cooperate on legislation and work closely with groups like the Congressional Black and Latino Caucuses to get a place at the legislative table"--
Author: Josh M. Ryan
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022658223X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 220
Get Book Here
Book Description
Congress is a bicameral legislature in which both the House and Senate must pass a bill before it can be enacted into law. The US bicameral system also differs from most democracies in that the two chambers have relatively equal power to legislate and must find ways to resolve their disputes. In the current landscape of party polarization, this contentious process has become far more chaotic, leading to the public perception that the House and Senate are unwilling or unable to compromise and calling into question the effectiveness of the bicameral system itself. With The Congressional Endgame, Josh M. Ryan offers a coherent explanation of how the bicameral legislative process works in Congress and shows that the types of policy outcomes it produces are in line with those intended by the framers of the Constitution. Although each bargaining outcome may seem idiosyncratic, the product of strong leadership and personality politics, interchamber bargaining outcomes in Congress are actually structured by observable institutional factors. Ryan finds that the characteristics of the winning coalition are critically important to which chamber “wins” after bargaining, with both conference committees and an alternative resolution venue, amendment trading, creating policy that approximates the preferences of the more moderate chamber. Although slow and incremental, interchamber negotiations serve their intended purpose well, The Congressional Endgame shows; they increase the odds of compromise while at the same time offering a powerful constraint on dramatic policy changes.
Author: David T. Canon
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 9780226092706
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 350
Get Book Here
Book Description
List of Tables and FiguresPrefaceIntroduction: Race, Redistricting, and Representation in the U.S. House of RepresentativesChapter One: Black Interests, Difference, Commonality, and RepresentationChapter Two: A Legal Primer on Race and RedistrictingChapter Three: The Supply-Side Theory of Racial Redistricting, with Matthew M. Schousen and Patrick J. SellersChapter Four: Race and Representation in the U.S. House of RepresentativesChapter Five: Links to the ConstituencyChapter Six: Black Majority Districts: Failed Experiment or Catalyst for a Politics of Commonality?Appendix A. Data SourcesAppendix B. Procedures for Coding the Newspaper StoriesNotesReferencesIndex Copyright © Libri GmbH. All rights reserved.
Author: Jeremy Gelman
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472127071
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 183
Get Book Here
Book Description
Most everyone, voters, political scientists, even lawmakers, think Congress is dysfunctional. Instead of solving problems, Democrats and Republicans spend their time playing politics. These days Capitol Hill seems more a place to bicker, not to pass laws. The reality is more complicated. Yes, sometimes Congress is broken. But sometimes it is productive. What explains this variation? Why do Democrats and Republicans choose to legislate or score political points? And why do some issues become so politicized they devolve into partisan warfare, while others remain safe for compromise? Losing to Win answers these questions through a novel theory of agenda-setting. Unlike other research that studies bills that become law, Jeremy Gelman begins from the opposite perspective. He studies why majority parties knowingly take up dead-on-arrival (DOA) bills, the ideas everyone knows are going to lose. In doing so, he argues that congressional parties’ decisions to play politics instead of compromising, and the topics on which they choose to bicker, are strategic and predictable. Gelman finds that legislative dysfunction arises from a mutually beneficial relationship between a majority party in Congress, which is trying to win unified government, and its allied interest groups, which are trying to enact their policies. He also challenges the conventional wisdom that DOA legislation is political theater. By tracking bills over time, Gelman shows that some former dead-on-arrival ideas eventually become law. In this way, ideas viewed as too extreme or partisan today can produce long-lasting future policy changes. Through his analysis, Gelman provides an original explanation for why both parties pursue the partisan bickering that voters find so frustrating. He moves beyond conventional arguments that our discordant politics are merely the result of political polarization. Instead, he closely examines the specific circumstances that give rise to legislative dysfunction. The result is a fresh, straightforward perspective on the question we have all asked at some point, “Why can’t Democrats and Republicans stop fighting and just get something done?”
Author: Alexander Bolton
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691224617
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Get Book Here
Book Description
Executive power in the shadow of legislative capacity -- Legislative capacity, executive action, and separation of powers -- 'Outmanned and outgunned' : the historical development of congressional capacity -- Pulling the purse strings : legislative capacity and discretion -- Continuous watchfulness? legislative capacity and oversight -- Presidential unilateral policy making -- Unilateral policy making in the U.S. states -- The future of legislative capacity.
Author: Oren Gross
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139457756
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book presents a systematic and comprehensive attempt by legal scholars to conceptualize the theory of emergency powers, combining post-September 11 developments with more general theoretical, historical and comparative perspectives. The authors examine the interface between law and violent crises through history and across jurisdictions.
Author: Lynda W. Powell
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472028278
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 271
Get Book Here
Book Description
Campaign contributions are widely viewed as a corrupting influence but most scholarly research concludes that they have marginal impact on legislative behavior. Lynda W. Powell shows that contributions have considerable influence in some state legislatures but very little in others. Using a national survey of legislators, she develops an innovative measure of influence and delineates the factors that explain this great variation across the 99 U.S. state legislative chambers. Powell identifies the personal, institutional, and political factors that determine how much time a legislator devotes to personal fundraising and fundraising for the caucus. She shows that the extent of donors' legislative influence varies in ways corresponding to the same variations in the factors that determine fundraising time. She also confirms a link between fundraising and lobbying with evidence supporting the theory that contributors gain access to legislators based on donations, Powell's findings have important implications for the debate over the role of money in the legislative process.
