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Author: Heidi Li Feldman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
Author: Heidi Li Feldman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 370
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Book Description
Author: Simon Kirchin
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191652504
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 248
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Book Description
What is the difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind? Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts (such as good, bad, right and wrong) are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones (including brave, rude, gracious, wicked, sympathetic, and mean) are termed thick concepts. In this volume, an international team of experts addresses the questions that this distinction opens up. How do the descriptive and evaluative functions or elements of thick concepts combine with each other? Are these functions or elements separable in the first place? Is there a sharp division between thin and thick concepts? Can we mark interesting further distinctions between how thick ethical concepts work and how other thick concepts work, such as those found in aesthetics and epistemology? How, if at all, are thick concepts related to reasons and action? These questions, and others, touch on some of the deepest philosophical issues about the evaluative and normative. They force us to think hard about the place of the evaluative in a (seemingly) nonevaluative world, and raise fascinating issues about how language works.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Dissertations, Academic
Languages : en
Pages : 596
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Book Description
Abstracts of dissertations available on microfilm or as xerographic reproductions.
Author: Aharon Barak
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400841267
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 444
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Book Description
This book presents a comprehensive theory of legal interpretation, by a leading judge and legal theorist. Currently, legal philosophers and jurists apply different theories of interpretation to constitutions, statutes, rules, wills, and contracts. Aharon Barak argues that an alternative approach--purposive interpretation--allows jurists and scholars to approach all legal texts in a similar manner while remaining sensitive to the important differences. Moreover, regardless of whether purposive interpretation amounts to a unifying theory, it would still be superior to other methods of interpretation in tackling each kind of text separately. Barak explains purposive interpretation as follows: All legal interpretation must start by establishing a range of semantic meanings for a given text, from which the legal meaning is then drawn. In purposive interpretation, the text's "purpose" is the criterion for establishing which of the semantic meanings yields the legal meaning. Establishing the ultimate purpose--and thus the legal meaning--depends on the relationship between the subjective and objective purposes; that is, between the original intent of the text's author and the intent of a reasonable author and of the legal system at the time of interpretation. This is easy to establish when the subjective and objective purposes coincide. But when they don't, the relative weight given to each purpose depends on the nature of the text. For example, subjective purpose is given substantial weight in interpreting a will; objective purpose, in interpreting a constitution. Barak develops this theory with masterful scholarship and close attention to its practical application. Throughout, he contrasts his approach with that of textualists and neotextualists such as Antonin Scalia, pragmatists such as Richard Posner, and legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin. This book represents a profoundly important contribution to legal scholarship and a major alternative to interpretive approaches advanced by other leading figures in the judicial world.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 722
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Book Description
Author: Graham Hubbs
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1135086036
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 327
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Book Description
This volume puts leading pragmatists in the philosophy of language, including Robert Brandom, in contact with scholars concerned with what pragmatism has come to mean for the law. Each contribution uses the resources of pragmatism to tackle fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of law, and social and political philosophy. In many chapters, the version of pragmatism deployed proves a fruitful approach to its subject matter; in others, shortcomings of the specific brand of pragmatism are revealed. The result is a clearer understanding of what pragmatism has meant and can mean across these tightly related philosophical areas. The book, then, is itself pragmatism in action: it seeks to clarify its unifying concept by examining the practices that centrally involve it.
Author: Lon Luvois Fuller
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788175341630
Category : Law and ethics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Author: Sean Coyle
Publisher: Hart Publishing
ISBN: 1841135046
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 185
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Book Description
In a series of new essays the authors attempt to answer important questions about the nature of jurisprudential thinking.
Author: Nils Jansen
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198705050
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 577
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Book Description
This English translation makes available to anglophone readers a modern classic of German tort theory. It argues that modern German tort law is faced with doctrinal tensions based on problematic theoretical assumptions which stem from historical conceptions of tortious liability, inappropriate to modern times. From a theoretical perspective, it argues against the prevalent doctrinal view in Germany that conceives of tortious liability as split between two tracks - a fault-based track and a strict liability track - each with different normative foundations. Instead, Jansen asserts that there is no rigid distinction between the normative foundations of each form of liability. Rather, both fault liability and strict liability in German law, and indeed other European systems, are best considered as resting upon the unifying theoretical structure of outcome responsibility. The book thus places responsibility rather than wrongdoing at the centre of the normative foundations of tort law. Historically, the book traces in detail how conceptions of tort liability have changed from Roman law to contemporary legal doctrine. It shows how particular historical understandings of the normative basis of tort law have led to continuing normative tensions in contemporary doctrine. Finally, the book examines how a reconstruction of modern German - and, indeed, European - law as based upon outcome responsibility should affect its doctrinal structure. This book makes contributions to the study of the theory, history, and doctrinal structure of tort law. While drawing on and explaining German tort law, its comparative, theoretical, and historical analysis will be of interest to scholars in all legal systems.
Author: H. L. Ho
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199228302
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 362
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Book Description
This book examines the legal and moral theory behind the law of evidence and proof, arguing that only by exploring the nature of responsibility in fact-finding can the role and purpose of much of the law be fully understood. Ho argues that the court must not only find the truth to do justice, it must do justice in finding the truth.
