Author: Thomas Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 470
Book Description
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
Author: Thomas Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 536
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 536
Book Description
The Philosophy of History
Author: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 586
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 586
Book Description
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
Author: Thomas Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind.Vol. 1
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
Author: Thomas Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 744
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 744
Book Description
A Treatise on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
Author: Thomas Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Medicine
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Medicine
Languages : en
Pages : 402
Book Description
Being No One
Author: Thomas Metzinger
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262263807
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 903
Book Description
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262263807
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 903
Book Description
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind (Vol. 1 of 3).
Author: Thomas A. Brown
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Book Description
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 582
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 582
Book Description
Minds, Brains and Science
Author: John R. Searle
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674267214
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 116
Book Description
Minds, Brains and Science takes up just the problems that perplex people, and it does what good philosophy always does: it dispels the illusion caused by the specious collision of truths. How do we reconcile common sense and science? John Searle argues vigorously that the truths of common sense and the truths of science are both right and that the only question is how to fit them together. Searle explains how we can reconcile an intuitive view of ourselves as conscious, free, rational agents with a universe that science tells us consists of mindless physical particles. He briskly and lucidly sets out his arguments against the familiar positions in the philosophy of mind, and details the consequences of his ideas for the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, questions of action and free will, and the philosophy of the social sciences.
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 0674267214
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 116
Book Description
Minds, Brains and Science takes up just the problems that perplex people, and it does what good philosophy always does: it dispels the illusion caused by the specious collision of truths. How do we reconcile common sense and science? John Searle argues vigorously that the truths of common sense and the truths of science are both right and that the only question is how to fit them together. Searle explains how we can reconcile an intuitive view of ourselves as conscious, free, rational agents with a universe that science tells us consists of mindless physical particles. He briskly and lucidly sets out his arguments against the familiar positions in the philosophy of mind, and details the consequences of his ideas for the mind-body problem, artificial intelligence, cognitive science, questions of action and free will, and the philosophy of the social sciences.